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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to discover the association between geographical mobility and labour
markets outcomes of Italian early graduates.
Even if is an argument widely trated in literature, I’ll try to investigate the evolution of the
“Brain Drain” process in light of recents event: the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the cut back
in higher education.
Migration decisions are closely related to degree of social mobilty in a country, especially where
there are strong interregionals differences as in Italy where, analyse migration path evolution of
human capital might be very useful to policy makers intent to reduce regional gaps and improve
the “equality of opportunity” level.
Take into account migration endogeneity, the results suggest a positive effect of spatial mo-
bility on economic performance with differences according to movement trajectories. However
some limits, due also to the lack of adequate data, indicate that further researchs are necessary
in order to identify a causal relation.
The thesis is strutured as follows: the first chapter explains push and pull factros related to
migration and the connection with social mobility, wage inequality and regional development.
The chapter two presents an estimation of the return to geographical mobility of early graduates
wages while the third chapter present the estimation of return from geographical mobility in
terms of employment condition using a dataset summarizing information coming from three
different sources: Almalaurea, Infostud and Ministry of Labor.
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1The reasons behind geographical
mobility
1.1 The migration model and its application
As in human capital theory, migration is to be considered a form of private investment with
effects on lifetime earnings and on labour market outcomes (Sjaastad, 1962; van Ham et al.,
2001)
A large volume of existing studies on migration focused on the utility maximization frame-
work and micro-econometric analysis attempts to provide information on factors affecting the
costs and benefits characterizing spatial mobility. In migration studies, individual utility is a
function of origin, destination characteristics and expected earnings (Dahl, 2002; Dotti et al.,
2013) and varies in importance in accordance with individual preferences.
A very simple formalization with an earnings additive function and individual preferences
assumes that a movement between origin i and destination j can be explained by the follow
equation:
Vijk = yik + tijk k=1,......,N
where:
tijk = f(origin characteristics, destination characteristics, individual controls)
Vijk is a utility index, yik are earnings and tijk is a vector containing both individual char-
acteristics shaping the utility function (age, gender, education etc.) and external factors such as
differences in income taxation, the local labour market, public serivices, climate and crime which
impacts on the costs and benefits of mobility, correlated with migration decision as push or pull
factors.
Since rational individuals try to maximize overall lifetime migration returns, the preferred
perspective in this kind of analysis is long term. However, there are no particular reasons
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preventing this model from being used in order to evaluate the short term effects of spatial
mobility, especially when the target population is made up on a selected group, with higher
human capital (they are graduate), a higher propensity to move (they are young) and when
there are strong differences between local labour markets (as in Italy).
In a shock-free labour markets, classic human capital theory implies that education in-
creases worker productivity and that employers will pay higher wages for this higher produc-
tivity (Becker, 1962). In the same way migration is an investment which is justified on both
supply and demand sides. On the supply side it is a searching process in which individuals stop
moving when their individual preferences are satisfied1. From the demand side, migration can
be understood using job market signaling theory (Spence, 1973) where employers may consider
migration positively or negatively in terms of productivity, motivation and abilities.
In the follow discussion, and in the empirical part of this dissertation, much greater attention
will be paid to individual utility, leaving aside debates on how geographical mobility might be
evaluated by employers.
In this framework, the primary factors evaluated are mainly pecuniary. Thus it is assumed
that migration depends on expected wages, employment probabilities and net migration costs
(Gabriel and Schmitz, 1995).
Thus the net present value of migration’s economic returns is defined as:
NPVi =
T∑
t=0
(PDWD − POWO)t
(1 + r)t
− C
where:
PD = probability of employment at destination
PO = probability of employment at origin
WD = expected wage at destination
WO = expected wage at origin
r = discount factor 2
t = time index3
C = direct and indirect costs of migration.
Migration costs are expressed as:
C = δWO +DC + IC
where δ is a positive constant and DC are the direct costs4.
If we assume constant employment probabilities and constant wages, we can resolve the internal
rate of return from migration obtaining:
1Considering migration’s economic returns alone, this happens when a wage offer exceeds or equals the
reservation wage.
4In reference to Da Vanzo (1976) and Kratx (2011) we can synthesize the costs of migration as follows: di-
rect costs (pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs like transport, rent, information costs and costs in leaving part-
ners, relatives and friends) and indirect costs (opportunity costs).
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r =
(PDWD − POWO)t
δWO +DC + IC
The internal rate of return indicates that the decision to relocate is beneficial if r exceeds the
direct and indirect costs of migration. This value is positively correlated with PD and WD and
negatively correlated with δ PO, WO DC and IC
5.
The existing relationship between the variables cited above varies in accordance with different
migration scales (local, regional or international migration), and it is mainly regional migration
which is considered here, since transnational or short distance movement requires alternative
hypotheses6.
As far as regional migration is concerned, this model has been used to show that relocation
decisions are frequently driven by income differences between regions (Sjaastad, 1962; Venhorst
and Co¨rvers, 2015) and that migration to work is recognizable as a tool with which to escape
the unemployment trap (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989).
However the reasons behind migration are not solely economic since typically individuals are
trying to satisfy one’s own preferences which are also strongly influenced by facilities, services,
and more generally, by the quality of life. The presence of these “hidden preferences” and the
possibility that may interact differently with external and cultural factors has led to discussions
around the need to reconsider human capital, migration and the rational expectation theory
together (Gambetta, 1987).
Furthermore, in order to take this specificity into account, temporal autocorrelation in migration
decisions should be considered. In fact, relocation decision are strongly influenced by previous
migration experience. To take a specific example, a decision to move at beginning of university
is strongly correlated with mobility to work and many of the factors underlying both decisions
are common. Since migration decisions are taken before starting university or directly after hu-
man capital investments (Cutillo and Ceccarelli, 2012), exploit this particularity and analyzing
migration and remigration processes helps us to clarify how different utility functions respond to
external factors.
In fact, it is plausible to assume that “hidden preferences” and the non-economics factors play
a greater role than calssic economic components for the young and those with greater human
capital since they can be attracted by learning opportunities, innovative contexts and dynamic lo-
cations, meaning that they can decide to move also for “consumption reasons”(Marinelli, 2011a).
Furthermore, they react more to differences between regions and are more incline to take on
migration costs.
This has been shown in studies of workplace mobility (Mocetti et al., 2010), and may also be
true of student migration flows, especially with increases in college access for those coming from
lower social classes (Argentin and Triventi, 2011) and with new higher education resources and
differentiation between regions (Viesti, 2016).
Considering a restricted sample (the young and those with greater human capital) adds com-
plexity to the model but generates some advantages:
5Relocation costs can be reduced in various ways: financial and psychological support (by families for ex-
ample), migration experience, social capital. These factors are strictly correlated with contextual and personal
characteristics and this makes it difficult to isolate their effects (Kratz et al., 2011).
6Here, in the geographical mobility for study purposes context, I am specifically referring to the decision
to move to a region other than one’s home region, whether for work reasons or after high school graduation, to
attend university.
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• analyzing student mobility helps us to understand regional disparity in greater depth (Dotti
et al., 2013);
• analyzing student mobility helps us to understand differences in labour market functioning
since in Italy, the choice of university impacts on wage and employment conditions (Cutillo
and Ceccarelli, 2012; Makovec, 2006).
Studying migration process through the association between work and study mobility entails
consideration of issues such as diverse educational supply quality and relative clusterization,
differences in resource assignment between universities and variances in access to education, all
factors which are directly controllable by policy makers.
I would argue that this kind of analysis can give indications on how to deal with migration’s
effects on economic development but it is advisable from a theoretical point of view to discuss
some of the mechanisms influencing individual choices (such as family background, social capital
and wage inequality) which can be linked to migration first.
1.2 Wage inequality, social mobility and migration
In general wage inequality studies have attempted to understand earnings polarization between
individuals with different levels of skills and human capital (“between inequality”) and between
individuals with the same level (“within inequality”)7.
From the first contributions (Atkinson, 1970) to recent work (Piketty, 2015), there have been
various debates about the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In Italy some analysis
moved the debate to the role played by “within wage inequality” (Franzini and Raitano, 2011)
with some indications of theoretical arguments potentially useful in policy term. Summarizing,
it might be argued that inequality (in terms of economic outputs and opportunities) can be gen-
erated by the functioning of the labour market (“demand side”) and by differences in educational
supply (“supply side”). However only a few studies have taken into account the role played by
migration choices on the geographical distribution of ovearall wage inequality (Lilla, 2005) and,
in turn, on the rising “within wage inequality”.
If it is true that labour markets evolution (especially from a legislative point of view) may
be ranked such a key factor, it should be also be considered that workers (especially better edu-
cated workers) can choose where to work, and at least for Italy, the economic differences between
regions drives spatial mobility (Mocetti et al., 2010). “Within wage inequality” and “between
spatial inequality” are, then, strictly interconnected since differences in wage premiums (for the
same level of human capital) is a push factor in migration models and the spatial sorting of skills
affects inequalities between places (Nakajima et al., 2014).
The existing literature, with its attempt to explain the different labour market outcomes
between early graduates, has focused its attention to both demand side and supply side related
factors. Regarding supply side factors, for example, diverse economic conditions may be at-
tributed to differences in university quality (Chevalier, 2011; Pietro and Cutillo, 2006), subject
7See Baldini and Toso (2004).
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(Ballarino and Bratti, 2009; Buonanno and Pozzoli, 2009)8, individual ability and family back-
ground. On the last point, Ordine and Rose (2015), looking at the Italian data, have investigated
the causes of “within wage inequality” among early graduates taking into account the effects of
family background, education quality and educational mismatches on earnings, using a quantile
regression. Their results are interesting: across different quantiles the highest exploit “rent”
derived from the interaction of socioeconomic background and subject chosen. They conclude
that university quality and family background are important factors in top wage earnings and
that there is a pool of workers confined to the bottom of the earnings distribution scale due to
family constraints.
At same time, from a macro prospective, growth in enrollment rates has led to graduates in
the same subject obtaining very different jobs, increasing the wage disparity among them. For
example Lindley and McIntosh (2015) have shown that the rise in earnings variance may be due
to an increase in enrollment rates of individuals from lower ability categories, by subject choice
or due to a combination of the two.
For Italy, too, it has been shown that there has been an increase in enrollment rates in higher
education over the last decade (Triventi and Trivellato, 2009) but the effects on labour market
performances has not been analyzed in depth.
On the other hand, some theories argue that there are demand side factors affecting differ-
ences in economic conditions between early graduates. For example differences in employability
and earnings can be due to demand shifts which have led to remuneration disparities, affecting
wage inequality. One of the main drivers in this case is technological progress and there has been
much debate on the effects of “Skill bias thecnological change” (Acemoglu et al., 2001) on rising
inequality (Card and DiNardo, 2002), also considering early graduates as the target population9.
Differences amongst early graduates can be also due to changes in labour market regulation.
For example, using a sample of U.S. 500 labour markets in 1990, Mccall (2000) has linked
rising “within group inequality” to more flexible and insecure jobs (e.g., flexibilization and short-
term contracts). In Italy Ballarino and Bratti (2006) have discussed the implications of two
reforms, “Pacchetto Treu” (Law no. 196, 24th June 1997) and “Riforma Biagi” (Law no. 30,
14th February 2003), on labour market outcomes, suggesting a possible correlation between this
reform and the worsening of graduates employment conditions.
Once again, with reference to Italy, some recent works (Fana et al., 2015; Sestito and Viviano,
2016) has begun analyzing the first effects of a further measure adopted in Italy, i.e. law 183 of
2014 named the “Jobs Act”, that introduced new types of contracts (mainly temporary) and new
incentives for firms. Here it has been suggested that this measure could have negative economic
effect on the working conditions of younger, although a longer timeframe and more up-to-date
data will be needed to verify this thesis.
However, whether we consider the causes of wage inequality from the supply or the demand
side, it is plausible to assume a differentiated effect by region or by local labour market, especially
in strongly heterogeneous contexts such as Italy.
8Buonanno (2008), investigating the causal link between field of study and subsequent outcomes in the
labour market for Italian early graduates, shows that the quantitative fields increase not only the speed of tran-
sition into the first job and employability but also earnings at the outset of careers.
9For Italy higher variability in earnings is evident among different fields of study, even between and
within regions (Brunello and Cappellari, 2008), while for other countries such the U.S. the differences be-
tween “S.T.E.M.” (Science Technology Engineering Mathematics) and non STEM graduates is much clearer
(Carnevale et al., 2011).
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The interaction between the factors referred to above act as push and pull factors shaping
individual relocation choices, which, in turn, could make differences in earnings most heavily
dependent on geographical factors.
Following this hypothesis it has been shown that there is a wage premium resulting from the
agglomeration economy (Chang, 2015; Matano and Naticchioni, 2016), and this effect is strongly
related to migration. For example Kanbur (2005) has argued that highly skilled worker mobility
results in increasing wage level in the destination countries while Marinelli (2011 A) has argued
that this effect is greater where differences between places are very strong and where there are
unidirectional movements between regions, such as in Italy.
There is a reverse causality relationship between human capital agglomeration and wage in-
equality and there has been much debate over the possibility that policies which aim to reduce
wage inequality are strictly related to human capital distribution (Acciari and Mocetti, 2013;
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Tselios, 2009)10.
In fact, encouraging student and worker mobility is a goal of the EU itself ((EC), 2010) and has
positive effects on regional development and labour market efficiency11. Students’ geographical
mobility has positive externalities, too, since it can be a way of avoiding “market failures”, or
sub-optimal investment in education choices allowing individuals to find a good match between
educational supply and their preferences.
It is precisely in the latter example that efficiency means that migration, especially for younger
people and for those coming from disadvantaged family contexts or from poor areas, is a social
condition improvement tool (Impicciatore and Tuorto, 2011; Scarlato, 2007).
Considering the role played in relocation decisions by economic disparities between places, it
should be stressed that costs and benefits of migration depend on an inidividual’s own economic
condition and family background, which are in turn affected by cultural and social capital in their
places of origin. This shapes preferences, risk aversion, motivation and perception regarding job
satisfaction and job quality. In the utility maximization framework described in the previous
paragraph this implies a tijk factor value which differs more by geographical area than by “start-
ing condition”. I would argue that differences in starting conditions acquires importance as the
reason behind spatial differences and it is relevant to trace a connection between migration mod-
els and concepts such as “equality of opportunity” and “intergenerational mobility”.
Studies on intergenerational mobility have attempted to understand to what extent actual
economic condition correlate with individual family background features (Nietzsche, 2011).
Generally, the family background effect operates via three large scale channels: income, edu-
cation and social network (Argentin and Triventi, 2011); analyzing relocation decisions may be
useful in ruling out two of these channels: income effect, because we can assume that strong
financial support helps to mitigate the direct and indirect costs of migration and social network
effects, because we can assume that migration paths are influenced by family ties and by “neigh-
borhood effects”.
Whilist many studies regarding intergenerational mobility (Mocetti, 2007) show a strong cor-
relation between parents and children’s labour outcomes, none of these studies take into account
(at least for Italy) that different patterns of social mobility can be found in different areas12.
10Investigating the role of spatial educational distribution on income inequalities Karahasan (2009) has ar-
gued that a more equal distribution of human capital could guarantee more equal income distribution without
capital distribution.
11Exchanging new ideas and collaboration between individuals contributes to increasing innovation and re-
search through “spillover effects” (Strathman, 1994).
12Taking the British census for 1966 to 1981 into account, for example, Savage (1988) has enquired into
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Incorporating “individual migration history” into this framework may help us to grasp the rea-
sons behind different employment conditions.
At same time it is possible, at least theoretically, to connect the concept of equality of oppor-
tunity to migration literature if we assume that equality between individuals should imply the
potential for the same chances and opportunities (Fromm, 2013).
Some of migration’s direct and indirect costs are psychological and moneraty and both have
impact on academic performance and working careers. While for monetary costs the connection
with family income should be clear the connection with family income (more financial support
implies lower monetary costs), for psychological costs we have to consider that these can be
strictly dependent on personal socioeconomic status (Eddy, 2011)13.
Thus, implying that migration depends on starting conditions, is true for those who decide where
(and whether) to attend university (Karlson, 2013):
“migration is a choice that implies consideration of the consequences. These are constrained
by family background and academic performance. In this way choice is naturally bound by con-
straints that are at least partially determined by factors beyond indiviudal students’ control”.
In the equality of opportunity concept discussed in the literature (Peragine and Serlenga,
2008; Roemer, 2004), according to which no one should have an unfair advantage, migration is
way of overcoming “differences in circumstances”, in family background and place of origin.
In Italy, where study mobility is not especially marked, at least in the early 2000s (Brunello
and Cappellari, 2008), students’ university choices are not free, with preference given to closer
universities to avoid moving costs. In such cases, inequality of opportunity leads to market fail-
ure (due to sub-optimal choices by individuals).
Undoubtedly, many factors influence spatial mobility. For example, study mobility can also be
limited by the legal value of qualifications. Silvestri (2001) has carefully discussed the importance
of avoiding formal value in education and differentiation between universities (specialization,
course availability) in order to incentivize student mobility especially if qualification inflation
(Ichino and Terlizzese, 2013) and regional economic gaps (Viesti, 2016) are making moving an
“exit strategy” for those from poor areas.
However all the reasons behind migration find a common denominator if we consider that edu-
cation is a private good (“rivalrous” and “excludable”) with positive externalities for society as
whole and on economic growth Barra and Zotti (2017).
As Acemogulu has expalined (2001):
“Often, education decisions are not taken by individuals alone, but by their families. For
example, families often contribute towards schooling expenses. However, parents may be only
imperfectly altruistic, that is, they may not care sufficiently about their children. In this case,
they will tend to underinvest in their children’s education”14.
whether upward social mobility is correlated with an individual’s geographical mobility without finding a
marked link.
13For Italy it has been shown that moving decisions are heavily influenced by observability of wages in coun-
tries of origin and destination (Capuano, 2009) and is possible to hypothesize that this informations flow may
be distorted by friendship and family ties.
14In the same work, studying the change in income distribution from 1970 to 1990, he finds family income to
have a significant effect on university attendance figures.
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Under investment can be exacerbate if students and workers are not perfectly mobile because
they are strongly hindered by moving costs (Ordine and Rose, 2007) and furthermore, differences
in wage levels between graduates cannot be balanced since returns on education investment are
not evenly distributed between places.
The arguments discussed may lead to critiques of human capital theory (Argentin, 2010) ad-
vancing hypotheses that returns on education depend more on type of university attended and,
by the match between education and labour supply than on social origin through migration:
“studies on local labour markets came to the conclusion that a considerable amount of re-
gions are characterized by an unfavorable labour market structure. These regional disparities
persisted over a long historical time period. This spatial inequality implies social inequality, be-
cause household are locally committed and migration costs are involved in leaving disadvantaged
regions” (Wagner, 1989).
1.3 Social capital, migration and the labour market
As explained in the previous paragraph family background can influence investment in education
and migration, with a differentiated impact from places to place. In fact, in Italy, there are also
regional differences in “family structures”15 and more generally in social capital.
Several studies (Coleman, 1988; Franzini, 2015; Granovetter, 2005) have argued that one of
the channels through which the effects of family background influences labour market outcomes
is the “social capital” effect, a very broad concept but which can be defined as “a tendency
to develop trust relationships and extend cooperation to the whole community” with expected
returns (Lin, 2000; Putnam et al., 1994).
However social capital can also generate inequality in socioeconomic achievement and quality
of life (Lin, 2000). In fact, the way in which social capital endowment can depends on family
ties, which in turn influence educational choices (Checchi, 2006), labour outcomes (Brunello and
Checchi, 2005) and the normal functioning of the labour market (Giuliano et al., 2008) has been
debated. Furthermore, the strength of this bonds varies between geographical areas, and effects
on human capital distribution cannot be excluded (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Reher, 2004).
Social capital can influence geographical mobility because we can expect a correlation in peo-
ple’s behavior when they live close together. Proximity between individuals implies that they
share the same sources of information and often similar individual characteristics as a result of
self-selection (“exogenous social effects”) and/or because they learn from one another’s behavior
(“endogenous social effects”) (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004).
The presence of marked diffrences in quality and quantity of social capital may have an adverse
impact in terms of equality of opportunity in the labour market16 but also in university choice
and college enrollment.
15For the Southern Italian regions, Banfield (1958) has discussed the concept of “familismo amorale” or a
situation in which family ties assume such great importance as to inhibit the ability of individuals to associate
collectively, arguing that this is one of the causes of slow development of some regions.
16Argentin and Triventi (2011) have explained how informal ties, or social networks, represent a source of
inequality in the school to work transition in Italy.
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Showing a causal link between the role exerted by family ties and labour market outcomes is
extremely difficult given its “unobservable” nature. However, study mobility flows can help in
this aim. Migrants are ideally suited to testing presence of network effects since they are more
susceptible to asymmetric information in the labour market and also because usually they tend
to be more socially cohesive. An interesting empirical analysis has been proposed in Munshi
(2001) in which the author seeks to isolate the “network effect” using data on migration patterns
and labour market outcomes, based on a sample of individuals belonging to multiple origin-
communities in Mexico. Through the instrumental variable approach, he found that the network
effect has powerful effect on employment conditions but this effect depends on the economic
condition (job and income) of the person helping in labour market success (the same concept
was stressed by Holmlund (2009)).
On this point, clarifying the distinction between social capital and social network may be
useful. The social capital definition proposed by Putnam (Putnam et al., 1994) identified social
capital as “public good” and saw it as made up of composed by three components (Siisiainen,
2003): moral obligations, social values and social network.
The component determining “negative externalities” is the last of these since it indicates a
situation in which family are levered to obtain jobs, i.e. the “informal channel” to get a job
prevails over the “formal channel” (Pellizzari, 2010).
The two concepts are often used interchangeably (or in a confused way), and Im referring here
to that part of social capital which is connected with migration decisions. The absence of social
networks can enhance mobility in order to improve one’s social condition (especially where there
is a shortage of social capital and lower institutional and university quality (Scarlato, 2007)),
while opportunities to benefit from social networks can disincentivize mobility.
The role of family ties and social capital in the migration model has already been examined
in some studies. David et al. (2010) have explained that geographical mobility is negatively
correlated with local social capital since investing in local ties is rational when workers do not
expect to move to another region17.
Some discussion on this correlation has been done for Italy and extended with student mo-
bility path analysis. Controlling for a large set of individual and geographical covariates, for
example, Labini (2008) has found that the potential for making use of family ties in the labour
market decreases where the level of social capital is greater. Furthermore, he has demonstrated
the extent to which social capital of the origin location influences the likelihood of using family
ties to find a job and shows that this plays a greater role in the provinces where institution and
university quality is low.
These results suggest the influences of geographical factors in labour market functioning and the
next paragraph discusses the Italian context.
17They argue that different levels of social capital are causes for lower geographical mobility in Northern Eu-
ropean countries, in constrast to South country where the social capital is low and where contacts with friends,
relatives and neighbors (“informal ties”) are more frequent.
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1.4 Equality of opportunity, the “Bologna process” and
the Italian “dualism”
The equality of opportunity concept discussed in the previous paragraph is especially significant
in Italy, affected as it is by marked economic differences between regions.
This gap has persisted for some considerable time and different functioning of local labour mar-
kets due to cultural and structural factors. If ideal geographical mobility (both students and
workers) was guaranteed then the negative effects resulting from these differences can be re-
duced. However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, migration has direct and indirect costs,
dependent on family background, financial constraints and social capital. This means that re-
gional gaps are able to influence social inquality level in a country and people, which are randomly
allocated across the territory, can be subject to losses in terms of equality of opportunity.
At same time, even assuming ideal mobility, it should be considered that people are attracted
to better living, working and educational conditions and a human capital clustering process
(“polarization effect”) but, whilst in some area this generates socio-economic development loss,
other regions are not able to take advantage of the “spillover effects” discussed above.
Specifically for the Italian context other adverse effects may be created (in terms of socio-
economic inequality) if migration is one way. It is well know that Italy’s Southern regions,
have been experiencing large scale outflow of highly educated and qualified human capital since
1990, with considerable losses in economic growth (Piras, 2005). The reasons behind this mi-
gration are various and have concerned different generations and age groups (Malanima and
Daniele, 2007). Marinelli and Iammarino (2017), considering a young graduate target groups,
have suggested that the Northern, more innovative and dynamics regions, are able to exploit
graduate skills differently Southern regions where, the “routine public” employment has much
more weight and has created a productivity and job clustering effect.
Unfortunately, this gap is present in educational opportunities too, since it seems that there
is unequal distribution of resources in higher education in Italy (Viesti, 2016). A connection
between educational policies and labour market outcomes cannot be excluded (Checchi and Van
De Werfhorst, 2014) as well as connection between educational policies and resource clustering
which impacts on inequality of opportunity and geographical mobility. For example, Peragine
and Serlenga (2008) have proposed a theoretical definition of equality of opportunity in higher
education and applied it to Italy, finding a strong family background effect both in academic
performance and early graduate income to different extents in different place of origin18.
Whilst this may not be the sole factor affecting Italy’s regional gap, a lack of appropriate ed-
ucational reform may have led to the formation of crucial factors for socioeconomic development
being absent in some areas, stimulating migration (both to study and work) as alternative (and
irrational) options19.
Restricting attention to migration for study purposes and the Italian scenario, we have seen
that returns on education may depend on how educational supply reacts to change in skill de-
mand (Magni and Renda, 2010) and education quality. Contrary to what is assumed in classic
human capital theory, the amount of skills acquired is of lesser significance for labour market
18They find a lower equality of opportunity in Southern regions, especially considering family background
effect on degree marks and drop-out rates.
19With the “New Economic Geography” paradigm, Krugman (1991) has identified crucial socio-economic
development factors that are the basis for the agglomeration economy and the same factors have been identified
as push and pull factors in migration to study (Marinelli, 2011a).
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outcomes, while the choice (driven by differences in quality and resource availability) of univer-
sity is significant.
Many studies have focused on the effects of university quality differentiation on labour market
outcomes20.
In a microeconometric framework, students prefer to attend higher quality universities be-
cause they expect to benefit economically and are willing to move where human capital is better
created and, better paid. However, if migration becomes an “exit strategy”, affordable only by
those capable to deal with migration costs, such differentiation between place and institution
creates social inequality “resulting from the relationships between the different capabilities of
different groups” (Sellar and Gale, 2011).
On the quality issue, at least for Italy, it should be stressed that the index used as proxy for
quality21 in education is summarized in national rankings (Pietro and Cutillo, 2006) which cite
university choice without taking into account that good labour market outcomes may be due to
differences in available resources. In light of the above arguments, it is advisable to review this
index22, discriminating between the quality deriving from by circumstances and by better skill
in management resources.
Subject of study choices, additional grounds for differences in economic returns from education
(Becher, 1994), are highly correlated with educational supply structure. In fact for Italy, study
mobility can be justified by the absence of complete educational supply in some areas.
Several initiatives have been taken in response to this issue. The concepts of quality, subject
choice and human capital distribution have certainly been influenced by one the most important
European educational reforms, the “Bologna process”. Set up with the aim of increasing enroll-
ment rates in universities and reducing inequality in education (Argentin and Triventi, 2011),
this can be considered a watershed in educational supply structure evolution.
The first (positive) effect shown in the literature is a rise in the enrollment rates, especially
for most highly skilled students with low family backgrounds (Cappellari and Lucifora, 2009)23.
Another positive effect is the introduction of a break in the academic path (3 years for a B.A.
and 2 years for M.A.). This may have mitigated the asymmetric information inherent in human
capital investment, making the decision to relocate to study less risky and thus increasing its net
benefit (Cappellari and Lucifora, 2009).
However, there are also some negative effects to consider since this reform was unable to
mitigate the family background effect on education or to stimulate changes in the distribution
of resources in tertiary education.
On the first point, the enrollement growth rates in favor of individuals coming from lower skills
or/and income distribution groups has not smoothed the differences in high school lever starting
20For example Di Pietro and Cutillo (2006) show a negative correlation between overeducating and insti-
tution quality while Ciriaci and Muscio (2014) show a positive university quality effect on employability. Fur-
thermore best performance in the labour market also derives from having studied in institutions with higher
scientific research rates (Cutillo and Ceccarelli, 2012; Monks, 2000).
21For example the pupil-teacher ratio (Brunello and Cappellari, 2008) or SAT score (Black and Smith, 2006).
22For a discussion on the efficiency of the quality index at international level, see Billaut et al. (2010.)
23According to the authors, this implies the existence of constraints (financial or cultural) affecting educa-
tional choice.
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conditions. Universities made no provision to equalize pre enrollment conditions for students
from disadvantaged background (Checchi, 2014), who still experience difficulties in obtaining
qualifications24.
The labour outcome effects of this lack of concern for “starting conditions” has increased
with the deterioration of worker stability, (due to labour market reforms and financial crisis)
and it is plausibile to assume that for the most disadvantaged investment in human capital
has become more uncertain as well as family background, both through the social capital and
financial resources25 has become more relevant (Berloffa et al., 2014).
The Bologna process has thus failed to mitigate the family background effect that has always
been significant in Italy26.
Another negative effect of the Bologna process connected with educational supply structure, is
the increase in university entrance fees and the proliferation of additional univeristy sites, which
are extremely varied in course and available resources terms (Argentin and Triventi, 2011).
If resources are not distributed equally across countries, new universities with fewer resources
(and lower quality) can lead to an efficiency loss in higher education (Viesti, 2016).
Our discussion thus far has led to the conclusion that theories explaining the labour market
supply demand/balance must be reviewed and should take into account geographical differences
and relative effects on spatial mobility. As explained by Argentin (2010) for Italy, the labour
market-educational system relationship is neither productive nor efficient but rahter one that
fosters reproduction of social stratification where “top job position” are achieved indipendently
by skills and capability. If there is a risk that the returns on education depend on social origin
and by place of origin, this has profound implications for the existence of a meritocracy.
Furthermore, if differences in starting condition (geographical and social) are not incorpo-
rated into the human capital theory, education does not represent an additional “tool” useful
in increasing intergenerational mobility but is rather an expression of demand by families who
trying to transfer labour market advantages to their children via migration strategies too.
1.5 Policy implication
The above arguments reflect on educational policy’s relevance in ensuring better human capital
and resource distribution through spatial mobility. However it is difficult to find common ground
between individual preferences and social utility since they can be incompatible.
In fact, as educational costs and benefits are supported and enjoyed by society as whole
(Bowman and Myers, 1967), the decision to move to study or work has positive and negative
externalities for local development and, in addition to individual utility government (local or
national) preferences should also be considered.
From an individual point of view, it may be desirable to incentivize mobility and create a
24Cappellari and Lucifora (2009) argue that the reform has had limited effects on dropout rates.
25Argentin and Triventi (2011) analyzed whether the labour market flexibilization process has changed fam-
ily background’s role in the school to work transition without finding marked changes. However it should be
stressed that their observational period, the 1992 to 2007 period, is one of significant labour market evolution
but leaves out crucial post 2007 events (the financial crisis). It might be interesting to extend the analysis to
subsequent years and evaluate possible changes on the family background effect.
26Checchi (2003) explains how household monetary income seems to affect the private or public university
choice while Bratti (2001) explains how financial constraints interact with public fundings such as scholarships.
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balance between individual preferences and both educational and labour markets27, but, at same
time, the government needs to avoid already human capital poor places suffering further impov-
erishment (Schultz, 1982).
The two views mentioned here are not necessarily conflicting since knowledge on how mi-
gration probability varies according to individual features helps us to understands how regional
development gaps can be reduced and which factors to take action on (Carnevale and Strohl,
2013)28. However study mobility flows of highly skilled individuals should be a priority in the
formulation and evaluation of industrial policy, too.
The most troubling implication of uncontrolled mobility flows, capable of neutralizing human
capital’s positive effect on local development (Lucas, 1998), is the clusterization process which,
as we have seen, is a feature of the Italian context. In terms of economic growth, a North-South
catching up process for Italy, has been discussed by Dalamzzo and De Blasio (2003), showing
that local dispersion and low levels of human capital have negative effects on the productivity of
Southern areas which lag behind and proposing a solution based on direct resource allocations
to this area.
The clustering process is exacerbated by “competition mechanisms” between institution,
driven mainly by the mobility of high school leavears (before and after the beginning of tertiary
education). In general, competition is used in order to improves educational supply quality29
but its beneficial effects are lost if there is resource and supply “stratifiaction” between Southern
and Northern universities. In fact, public funding for education seems to have triggered an ad-
verse effect with (student) geographical mobililty becoming an alternative mechanism to direct
allocation of resources universities located in disadvantaged contexts (Rizzi and Silvestri, 2001)
with a social costs transposed onto household budgets.
As regards competition effects, I consider two observations to be relevant:
• competition between universities based on mobility can generate entrance selection with
possible effects on student performance for those forced into a second best choice 30;
• competition between universities and the presence of low mobility costs may lead to the
creation of elite universities (with the brightest students from the whole country) on one
side and less prestigious universities on the other (De Fraja and Iossa, 2002).
The last point suggests that lower mobility, determined by student grants or affordable university
accommodation, helps students to make their best choices but may have negative effect in terms
of polarization of human capital since the less able and motivated will attend their local college
and the benefits of this initiative will be enjoyed only by a select few31.
For these reasons, measures capable of stimulating efficiency in higher education and simulta-
neously reducing the quality gap between universities without exploiting geographical mobility,
27For example, Dalmazzo and De Blasio (2003) found local human capital averages in Italy to have a posi-
tive effect on individual wages which is greater for labour markets located in the South.
28Carnevale and Strohl (2013) describe an interesting difference between EU countries and the US, arguing
that European countries prefer to use welfare policies to adjust the labour market-citizen relationship while the
US prefers to leave this goal to the private education market with questionable effects in terms of equality of
opportunity.
29Raising university quality can be useful especially for regions with negative migration rates (Southern re-
gions) and those with major human capital dispersion (Ciriaci, 2014).
30In reference to primary schools Gibbons (2006) has shown the negative effects of competition on pupil
performance and that higher degrees of competition can generate polarization within and between schools.
31This is what is called the “locking-in effect”, widely discussed in relation to employability boosting mea-
sures (Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 2002).
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have been proposed. This kind of policy normally includes initiatives designed to connect up
labour markets and university systems. Developing scientific research centers and creating the
conditions for more innovative and dynamic entrepreneurship can help to reduce the clusterisa-
tion effect between regions. Policy makers can incentivize public research connected with local
labour markets’ entrepreneurship, training and education, in order to influence capital allocation
(Ciriaci and Muscio, 2014)32 and use policies aimed at equalizing differences between regions
in transport, housing costs or, in general, on quality of life (Brezis et al., 2011; Ciriaci, 2014).
Furthermore, for Italy, action on “economic external factors” sheds light on the necessity to
review the current resource allocation system which rewards universities less efficiency and ef-
fectiveness than for “circumstances conditions”, attracting better students and better professors
on the strength of different local conditions (Ciriaci, 2014; Rizzi and Silvestri, 2001)33.
Therefore, from a social point of view, the best policy is not necessarily incentivizing mobility
and the trade-off between the two actors should always be considered. However, the existence
of this effect notwithstanding, there is a common preference for policies incentivizing mobility.
One of the goals of the Bologna process was harmonizing the different European university sys-
tems and, thereby, achieving a higher degree of comparability” in order to incentivize mobility,
stimulate competition and increase quality (Mechtenberg and Strausz, 2008).
In Italy, were universities have been subject to enrollment competition over the past decade
(Agasisti and Dal Bianco, 2007; Cattaneo et al., 2017), many initiatives have aimed to increase
mobility and thus reduce institutional quality gap and, furthermore, there is a general preferences
for giving resources directly to students rather than univerisities. An example is “Decreto Legge
69/2013”, known as “Decreto del Fare” according to which, the Italian Government funds 1000
grants of 5000eper year to students moving from their home town to other regions34. However
this kind of initiative is not frequent and the Italian scholarship scheme is highly fragmented
as a result of a significant resource cuts in recent years (Cattaneo et al., 2017; Viesti, 2016).
Firstly, in Italy there is a gap between those entitled to scholarships (“idonei”) and those who
actually get them. This distinction is based (at least for the first year) on financial economic
situation indicators (ISEE), which can be subject to bias since they are self-declared. This leads
to a loss of efficiency in resource allocation between high school leavers and, in general, higher
social inequality. Furthermore, these resources designed to sustain student mobility vary between
regions, typically being higher in Northern regions (Ciriaci and Nuzzi, 2012). This can generate
talent allocation distortions and in resources which are likely to incentivize migration benefiting
advantaged areas. A solution to this mismatch might be linking the current scholarship scheme
to a different family income measurement from ISEE and creating a less expensive and more
efficient “selection policy”.
Other kinds of measures have been implemented to provide resources for educational facilities
such as rooms, teachers and laboratories but it would seem that such “supply side policies” are
not effective in improving quality and efficiency (Rizzi and Silvestri, 2001)35.
Once again in order to promote mobility, action might target housing and rental prices. For
example Mocetti and Porello (2010, B) have shown that rising housing prices (at least until the
32“The investment in higher education is not sufficient to improve regional development and a mix between
industrial and innovation policies is needed” (Marinelli, 2011b).
33Pigini and Staffolani (2015) have studied the effects of policies aimed at changing educational costs, sug-
gesting paying greater attention to regional disparities than manipulating costs and fees in education.
34Access to grants is based on a ranking system which uses students’ secondary school grades and geographi-
cal distances between students’ home towns and the chosen university.
35Ordine et. al (2007) have reffered to regional differences in higher education supply and discuss the effects
of geographical mobility on wages. Finding positive effects on labour outcomes, they conclude that it might be
more efficient to subsidize geographical mobility than to reallocate resources directly to universities.
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financial crisis of 2007) have generated a slow down in geographical mobility implying than better
monitoring and subsidies for students from different provinces or regions might be useful36.
To overcome a lack of solid support for mobility and satisfying student preferences, proposals
have been put forward designed to turn the current schoolarship system into a mixed system
based on student loans and scholarships like those used in others European countries (Ichino
and Terlizzese, 2013; Rizzi and Silvestri, 2001). However, on this point, the excessive financial
responsability placed on high school leavers, should be considered, with these incurring long
term debts also connected to economic fluctuations. This can generate possible negative effects
on academic and labour outcomes, especially if the social network channel has some weight in
the labour market (Ciriaci and Nuzzi, 2012; Franzini, 2015).
Others studies analyzing the effects of high school levers and early graduates migration (Ca-
puano, 2009), propose paying attention to the “come-back phenomenon”, i.e. those who move
to study in a different region and come back to their home towns after graduation. Incentivizing
early graduates coming back home after graduation (especially those coming from poor human
capital areas) can in fact contribute to the socio-economic development of regions lagging behind
(Mocetti et al., 2010) 37.
Additional policies may be discussed if two consideration are take into account:
• moving implies costs deriving from asymmetric labour market information (Schwartz, 1973;
Sjaastad, 1962) but also from a lack of information on degree structure (internal informa-
tion) that leads students to prefer to remain in their home towns before starting university
and after completing their studies (Netz, 2015).
• a lower degree of social mobility in our country is related to mistaken choices and un-
filled expectations from educational investments which usually promote phenomena such
as “over-education” or in a worst case, unemployment (Giuliano et al., 2008).
On the first point, reliable information on what it means to study far from home (funding
opportunities, housing arrangements in destination region and recognition procedures) may help
to overcome this information gap and enable families and individuals to avoid geographical fail-
ing to bring the expected rewards.
A second point relates referred to the presence of a strong family background influence on
educational choices (Bowles et al., 2009) especially for poor families (Giuliano et al., 2008). An
information policy explaining the structure of the courses offered by universities and the dif-
ference between them is needed especially if there is intention to get it far from home. This
would helps to avoid academic interruptions (“drop out”) or delayed graduation (“fuori corso”),
particularly marked in Italy (ANVUR, 2016).
As we can see from this discussion, measures connected with geographical mobility are highly
controversial and the relative effects can be positive or negative, depending on the point of view
considered. However, rather than focusing on the different actors considered, policies can be
grouped according to the timeframes required for relative and possible effects. This would make
36The policy indications suggested by Sa et al. (2004) have the same implications since they propose, for the
Netherlands, improving transport or lowering the rental cost burden in order to improve geographical mobility.
37This is one of the few examples in which both individual and social utility can be maximized (Vidal,
1998).
23
two different kinds of measure possible: short and long term policies. Reducing economic dispar-
ities between regions can be considered a long term policy, in general linked to a more equitable
geographical distribution of resources, while modifying educational costs and supply structures
or incentivizing geographical mobility can be considered a short term policy. The latter, which
policymakers would seem to have preferred, is not the optimal solution where differences between
places are so marked. Reference to studies stressing that some non-cognitive abilities and values
can be strongly influenced by environment (Bowles et al., 2009; Platone, 1990) and consideration
of the fact that the gap between regions also concerns the value attributed to education, work
on regional gaps may be more efficient.
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2Student spatial mobility: an
estimation for Italy
2.1 Introduction
Even it is well know that people move in order to rise income, make the best possible use of
the human capital investment and obtain better working conditions (Machin et al., 2012), the
relationship between geographical mobility and labour market outcomes cannot be defined in
advance.
From a theorical point of view, since the true productivity level is not directly observable by
employers, spatial mobility could act as a screening device: it can be considered a negative fea-
ture if we assume that less able decide to move (Holmlund et al., 2009), or a positive one if we
assume that mobility can be considered a strong motivation proxy (Cutillo and Ceccarelli, 2012).
We expect (at least in the short run) that “movers” can be subject to wage penalties due to
a lack of knowledge on the local labour market functioning and to the adpative process required
to find new job opportunities but the direction of this relationship it is not definable a priori
since others mechanisms can influence the job searching process and in turn, working conditions.
The first mechanism, already discussed in the previous chapter, is the possible existence of social
networks in school-work transtion, that might have even much more weight respect to regional
and local labour market characteristics acting as push and/or pull migration factors (Marinelli,
2011b).
The second and more rilevant factor to consider is that a specific educational system could
influences student mobility, labour mobility and in turn economic performances (Machin et al.,
2012). Current literature discuss different educational system classifications, one of them is pro-
posed by Allmendinger (1989), based on the distinction between “standardization” and “strat-
ification” structure. In a standardize system, education maintains a degree of comparability,
where quality and resources are equally distributed within country. Indeed, with a statification
systems, a selection on the student having access to higher educational quality and, in the worst
cases, a selection to higher education access at all, becomes possible.
Regional disparities in higher education resources may develop a human capital stratification
powered by geographical mobility with relevant effect even on the local labour market function-
ing and specialization.
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This phenomenon suggests that relevant conclusions pointed out by human capital theory (Becker,
1962) and by “signalling theory” (Spence, 1978), trying to explain differences in returns to edu-
cation, looses value and furhter explanations should be found.
For Italy, where the educational system is stratified in terms of resoruces and supply and
where the social network channel in school-work transition is strong and different within country
(Ghignoni et al., 2017), there are empirical evidences showing that choices on where to start
tertiary education has some implication on academic and working career (Ciriaci and Nuzzi,
2012) especially given that changes in the labour market functioning and in social condition have
led to an higher demand for skilled workforce whose adaptability depends on spatial mobility
(Faggian and McCann, 2009).
However, migration cannot be considered as an isolate event but as a dymanic phenomenon,
influenced by past miration history, where the effect of differences between places on relocation
decision can remains costant or can be influenced by micro and macroeconomic shocks (Kennan
and Walker, 2011).
This therotical framework and some empirical evidences (Di Cintio and Grassi, 2012; Makovec,
2006), suggests that that there are different labour market outcomes according to different migra-
tion paths and consider the full migration history as an individual features with an explanatory
power, can be useful to point out differences in earnings, all characteristics being equal.
Estimate by how much geographical mobility increases (or decreases) earnings is quite complex
since it requires to compare economic outcomes of people who moved with people who are sim-
ilar in terms of skills and human capital but did not move. Since not all similarities between
groups can be take into account, investigate repeated migration is useful to clarify the role of the
“unobsevarbles factors” affecting both migration and economic performances. Da Vanzo (1976)
discussed widely on the utility of studying repeated migration especially since the reasons be-
hind spatial mobility are not necessary related to economic differences between places, but also
to non-economic drivers that indirectly influence working careers.
For example, individuals, after a first migration experience might return at home for disappoint-
ment in the expectations, or, the retun migrants may be influenced by non-pecuniary motivations
as friendship, family ties which, however, influence even employability and income1.
As stressed in previous works (Machin et al., 2012; Weiss, 2015), two are the main reasons
why early graduates and high school levears are suitable samples on which carry out analysis
aiming to measure economic effects of migration and remigration:
• more educated and younger are more prone to move since are able to reduce migration
adaptive costs2;
• moving choices are taken mainly at the end of the high school graduation or after university
completion (Cutillo and Ceccarelli, 2012).
Exploit information on relocation decision before to start university gives suggestion on some
channels powering social inequality often analysed only which reference to labour market func-
tioning. For example, those who move after graduation could have been forced to remain at
home after high school due to liquidiy constraints hampering the possibility to get “first best”
choice in education and, in turn, with possible negative effects on working conditions. If we face
1According to the economic theory, non-pecuniary goods are considered as “normal goods”, consumed pro-
portionally to income, giving higher utility if consumed in origins region (Capuano, 2009; DaVanzo, 1976).
2Scarlato (2007), analyzing years between 1991 to 2005, points out that the “movers” are a positive selected
sample of the whole population: they are more prone to move (and look for a job position suitable to own pref-
erences), are more quailified (in terms of education) and are younger.
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a situation where those with a low family background are forced to choice field of study offered
by closer universities, than it might be also possible that they accept the first job avavilable with
consequences on overeducation and on job satistfaction (Ciriaci, 2014).
Conversely, a good family background might incentivizes repeated migrations (even ante grad-
uation) in places different by the origin thanks to financial support if they belive that there
are higher economic returns on education in specific labour markets (Capuano, 2009; Dustmann
et al., 2011), or might incentivizes to come back at home to exploit social network channel and
better knowledges of local labour market (DaVanzo and Morrison, 1981).
Even if is difficult to find empirical evidence for this mechanism, do not consider it at all can
be misleading. Consider past migration event add new possible hypothesis on this, helping to
explain existing relationship between workplace mobility and economic output.
In addition, is interesting analyse migrations evolution in the second half of the 2000s since
greater attention to repetaed migration increases when labour market conditions are unfavoreable
(DaVanzo, 1976). On this point, despite is a process experienced throughout all Europe, higher
flexibility has influenced Italy early than other countries. In fact, during the 2000s there were
two major labour market reforms, namely “Riforma Biagi” and the “Pacchetto Treu” which have
led to a wider spread of fixed-term contracts which have weakened stability workers conditions3.
Starting by such theoretical background, this analysis aims to estimate the effect of geograph-
ical mobility on earnings after graduation, grouping the early graduates according to different
migragion paths, from high school to the labour market. Two are the main hypothesis considered:
• move before to start university increase the probability to relocate after graduation4 since
some migration costs (also non-pecuniary) could be lowered if individuals already move in
the past (Maier and Sprietsma, 2016; Sjaastad, 1962);
• the interaction between individual and environmental factors affects migration decision
(Allmendinger, 1989).
I decide to disentangle this analysis in three different sequential steps to which correspond
three different research questions and different econometric strategies, however, strictly corre-
lated. With the first analysis I try to figure out push and pull factors influencing relocation
individual decision, before and after graduation. Other than influnced by individual features, as
family background, age, academic career, relocation decision can be influenced also by envoir-
mental factors as public trasport, quality of life and further on.
In this step I verify if the factors influencing migration have somme common grounds in the two
sequential mobility decisons.
I exploit empirical evidences found in this step to estimate the final effect of workplace mobility
on wage through the instrumental variable approach. Some of the enviromental and individual
variables are added as control in the estimation of post graduation mobility effect on wages,
affected by endogeneity as I’ll explain in the next paragraphs.
In the third step, I group individuals according to different migration decisions from the end
of the secondary high school to the labour market, specifying five differents migration paths and
examining if there are some earnings differences between them.
3Furthermore there was an increase in public employment with relevant effects on workplace mobility (Mo-
cetti et al., 2010).
4For Italy it has been shown that the two relocation decisions are strictly correlated (Ciriaci, 2014;
Makovec, 2006).
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As stressed in the previous chapter, this analysis has relevance for the policy makers since if
policies incentivating the return migration are absent, human capital may be accumulated only
in wealthier regions, leaving the others lagged behind (Ciriaci, 2014), especially in Italy, where
those who come back after graduation are too few or the weak educational system in some regions
is not able to keep on the human capital created (Ciriaci, 2009).
At same time, evidences on the convenience to move can be relevant for household paying cost
of the education, and, if the case, of mobility. Even if higher average levels of human capital has
positive effect on indivdual wage, the net benefit might be offsets if to higher wage are associated
to higher living costs (Moretti, 2013; Rauch, 1993).
In fact, for Italy, there are empirical evidences showing how universities located in Northern re-
gions (more attractive) could guarantee best opportunities but with major costs, with the result
that choice to study in North might not be compensated in terms of economic output, at least
in the short run (Brunello and Cappellari, 2008).
Here further evidences on the effect of spatial mobility on earnings are presented.
2.2 “Dualism” and resources allocation in Italy
Interregional migration in Italy acquired a new relevance in 90s and 2000s since both student and
workplace mobility experienced new increasing trends (Cattaneo et al., 2017; Panichella, 2013)
and explanations suggested are various.
Firstly, the public employment diffusion in the second half of the ’50s in Southern regions (Franco,
2010) gave to families more economic stability and than new possibility to move in richest regions
even to study and this can justify the rising graduates mobility at ’90s ending. For the ’2000s
a relevant event to consider is the 2007 financial crisis5. Since working conditions are subject
to worsening is plausibile assume the high school levers become more selective in human capital
investment decisions and are more prone to move with expection of higher returns on education
according to university attended. This assumption finds some empirical evidences since in Italy
the economic crisis had its sharp effects on employment from 2009 (ISTAT, 2010), that, looking
to the figure 2.1, coincides with student interregional mobility rising. Furthermore, as its turn out
by figure A.1 in the appendix, the academic year 2009/2010 marks a new increase in migration
from Southern to Northern regions. However, between the Southern regions, severals differences
on the propensity to move are present. The figure A.2 shows the net migration rate (average)
by regions from 2004/2005 to 2013/2014. It is calculated as follow:
N.M.Rit =
Student enrolled in each region − Student residents enrolled in each regions
Student enrolled in each region
i=1,......,20.
t=t¯=2005,......,2014
This index show if a region gains or loses human capital through student migration flows
and, with exception of Val D’Aosta and Abbruzzo6, Southern regions are those with negative
5Cattaneo et a. (2017) considers as further explanation the diversification in trasport modes with the entry
into the transport market of new low-cost companies (Rayanair) and high speed trains (Frecciarossa, Italo).
6The reason for this outlier can be the very small size for the Val D’Aosta and the proximity to Lazio, and
to University of Rome “La Sapienza” (one of Europe’s bigger universities and one of the moste attractive in
Italy) for Abbruzzo.
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migration rate.
The same trend is confirmed looking to the figure A.3 in the appendix where difference between
the net migration rate in the academic year 2004/2005 and the academic year 2013/2014 is
calculated for each region7.
Figure 2.1: Trend in interregional students mobility (%) in the period 2005–14.
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data, section “Anagrafe nazionale degli studenti”.
A further explanation for rising migration was already discussed previously. Other than
regional differences in terms of labour markets, amenities and quality of life, specific educational
supply features can influence both student and workplace mobility.
In Italy, tertiary education has been subject to many changes in the twenty century. After the
“Second World War” there has been a strong increase in enrollment to universities, especially
from those coming from low family background. The absence of finacial barriers (tuition fees)
rises enrollments but, at same time, has not given relevance to implement policies aimed to
redirect resources to univerities that have to face with a changed audience, composed not just
by students coming from “licei” but also from vocational and technical schools. Probably this
is why, until the early 2000s, we observe an increase in enrollment rates to which corresponds
increase in drop out probability and delayed graduation (“fuori corso”), but not in the graduation
rates (Triventi and Trivellato, 2009).
This trend reamins stable until the implementation of the “Bolonga Declaration” in the 2001-
2002. Afterthat we see a decrease in the enrollment probability, stronger for student coming
from Southern regions, seemingly as a consequences of adequate educational policies lack and of
a simultanueous reduction in household income (De Angelis et al., 2016)8.
An important finding regards the number of scholarships effectively assigned that drops by 82%
of 2008 to 69% of 2011 (ANVUR, 2016). The last two factors have brought human capital
accumulation much more dipendent by household contribution and, despite tuition fees and
7A very similar graph is presented in Viesti (2016). Cattaneo at al. (2017) show for the period 2002-2012 a
very similar trend for in student interprovincial mobility.
8Even if the mean contribution for southern students is lower respect to Northern region, the average fees
payed have incresed in the years 2001-2009 especially for students enrolled in this macro-area.
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schoolarships vary according to individual economic condition, the percentage of those who
receive public economic support sufficient to afford education costs, as the percentage of student
using guaranteed public loan, is in Italy very low (OECD, 2017).
In addition, the criteria used to assign scholarships are very different between regions since
interact with regional taxtions, directly modifiable at a decentralised level (Res and Viesti, 2016).
This creates huge heterogeneity in financial support available for students of different regions
other than a diversification in the administrative procedures to obtain it.
In fact, the schoolarhip structure assigment is based on a fund called “Fondo integrativo per il
diritto allo studio”, financed through regional contribution, which seems to have had a “regres-
sive effects” in terms of resources redistributiuon: university costs become higher in region as
Molise, Campania, Calabria and lower in Northern regions that, in the period 2001-2008 were
able to exploit (even due to a major courses diversification) greater financial resources.
The probability to get scholarship becomes greater in universities located in the North than in
South and incentives to move where resources are higher. Furthermore we cannot exclude at all
a correlation between resources available and drop-out probability (or delayed graduation), that
are greater in disadvantage regions (De Angelis et al., 2016).
Differences in resources distribution among regions seem to be worsened even more after another
reform implemented in 2008 (“Riforma Gelmini”) that has had a general effect of decreases re-
sources from the government and increases those coming from the private system (OECD, 2017).
Figure A.4 (appendix) shows how the amount of expenditures (public funds) in scholarships is
subject to a reduction from the academic year 2009/2010, even if there is an increase starting
from 2011. A very similar trend is confirmed if we consider the figure A.5 showing (in %) the
amount of scholarships effectively paid on the student eligible to obtain it (“idonei”).
The figure A.6 indeed, shows how much resources spent for scholarships differ between regions
and is clear as Southern regions are all below the national mean.
On the migration paths just discussed, several considerations can be made. The first one is
on the type of courses supplied in the Southern regions. According to a recent research (Viesti,
2016) seems that universities located in this macro-area are more specialized in a general educa-
tion provided through bachelor degree (B.A.), and the lackness of advanced degrees (M.A.) may
led to incentivate migration and complete studies in other regions.
The second points, is on the diversification of the educational supply provided in southern univer-
sities (even in the advanced degree), that, being low, have had the effects on lowering univeristies
attractivines (Rizzica, 2013). On the issue De Angelis et al. (2016) describe accurately how, after
a rapid expansion of courses available at local level in the first 2000s, by 2009 there has been
a significant reduction of them partly due to a resources contraction, a trend that, by the way,
seems common to all regions.
Conluding, the policies measures adopted in the last decades seems have grown the possi-
bility that gap between regions in terms of labour market conditions is extended also in the
educational system, powered by competition to get more resources in order to increase national
quality ranking 9. This effects doesn’t change direction even with the increased autonomy for
Italian universities, with a decentralization process which seems to have had the unique effect
of a proliferation (at least in the early 2000s.) of small size university centres, less attractive
respect to the bigger ones (Rizzi and Silvestri, 2001).
9Ciani at al. (2010), propose a quality assessment methodology for universities, discussing the relevant
weight of the labour markets heterogeneity on the differences between working careers, which often are used
for the quality evaluation.
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Even if factors influencing student mobility are many and heterogeneous, resources distribu-
tion can have exerted some effect on this phenomenon.
2.3 Data Source
The data used in this exercise are provided by ISTAT10 survey “Indagine sull’inserimento pro-
fessionale dei laureati”, a very informative data source with a great number of data about job
condition and academic career. Depending on the year considered, the survey is carried out three
and four years after graduation11.
The sample is representative of the entire graduate population, from both public and private
universities. Before choosing this data I considered the possibility to use alternative survies, as
the one provided by “Almalaurea”. As explained in the next chapter, Almalaurea is a public
inter-university consortium composed (as of today) by 75 universities covering partially graduate
population.
The structure of the Almalaurea survey is very similar to the one used in this analysis with
the adavantage of interviewing graduates one year, three years and five years after graduation,
giving than the possibilty to have repeated cross section. The strenght of Alamalura data for
the specific researchs question proposed in this analysis is that allow to identify more precisely
the time at which workplace mobility takes place by enriching the set of control variables ex-
cluded here since affected by reverse causality, that, as explained in the following paragraphs, is
a specific form of endogeneity. Unfortunately this data are not freely available and are hardly
obtainable.
ISTAT data, used in this exercise, by the way, allow the define quite precisely migration paths
of early graduates, from high school12 to the labour market.
However, being a survey, and being “movers” a specific target population, the number of
observation available is quite low. Furthermore, ISTAT data are subject to the presence of
missing values on relavant variables.13. Therefore, in order to have a larger sample, I decide
to merge two survies: 2011 and 2015 referred to 2007 and 2011 graduates14. This allow me to
increase the numbers of observations despite the survey structure change year by year15.
After the merge the sample is composed by 90,779 observations from which I ruled out those
working at time and before graduation and those engaged in postgraduate qualification, charac-
terized by different migration behaviours16 (Di Cintio and Grassi, 2012).
For same reasons I exclude those enrolled in medicine e defense since enrollment to such field of
10“Istituto Nazionale Di Statistica” is the Italian national statistical office.
11Before the survey carried out in 2011, tha graduates were interviewed after three years. In the last two
surveys (2011 and 2015), the graduated were interviewed after four years.
12In order to define the origin region i decide to not consider the place of birth (additional information
present in the dataset) since can be different from the high school region.
13Ordine and Rose (2015) using sama data but different survey (2004 and 2007), have analysed the covari-
ates missing values distribution in order to verify if they are randomly distributed or related to some observed
characteristics (they didn’t find any empirical evidence supporting this thesis).
14Di Cintio e Grassi (2012) make the same procedure merging survies carried out in 2004 and in 2007
15I had to harmonize the surveis since same questions was structured differently. Furthermore happens that
informations present in one of the wave are dropped in the other one.
16For example we can expect that those already working don’t move at least until the end of the actual con-
tract.
31
study is subjcet to entrance exam at national level. This implies that who is admitted is subject
to a different contraints, influencing differently the choice on university location.
Finally I exclude all observations moving abroad to study or to work.
At the end of the selection, the sample size is composed by 46,892 observations17. However
missing values on some variables allow estimation only on 5281 observations.
The table A.1 (appendix) show some descriptive statistics. Looking to the first part of the
table, we see that the largest percentage of students come from southern regions (31%) and from
North West (25,49%) while macro-areas losing more human capital are South and Islands since
the percentage o student enrolled and working in this areas drastically goes down (respectively
14,9% and 3,84% for univrersity macro-area and 9% and 2% for working area).
The same table shows that more attractive macro-areas is the North West while center and
norther east regions exhibit stability between university and working area.
The table A.1 reports also descriptive statistics for migration paths, defined as follow:
Post graduation mobilty region of univeristy 6=region of work
Ante graduation mobility region before start university 6= region of univeristy (transferred)
Different migration paths are identified as follow:
Stayers • high school region = working region = university region
Come Back • high school region = working region
• university region 6= high school region
• Transferred to university region to attend
Double movers • high school region 6= working region
• university region 6= high school region
• Transferred to university region to attend
Movers Remained • high school region = working region
• university region 6= high school region
• Transferred to university region to attend
Post graduation movers • high school region 6= working region
• university region = high school region
From the table A.1, we can see that the highest percentage of “Stayers” is composed by those
coming from Northern regions which, conversely, show the lower percentage of “Double movers”.
Southern regions and island show similar patterns and with higher percentage of “Moversre-
mained” and “Post graduation movers”.
Higher percentage of “Comeback” are present for Islands and North East regions.
The last part of the table show how much two migration choices are correlated: the 54% of those
who move to study move also after graduation.
17Most of the deleted observations were composed by students who were already working at the time of
graduation or who were engaged in education or training activities.
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Before to continue to discuss on other descriptive statistics, some clarification on how i’ve
specify the variable log earnings should be made. In fact, due differences among waves used, some
adjustment were necesessary. Firstly, wages for self-employed workers and dependent workers
are reported differently: annual salary for the first and monthly wage for employees18. Thus,
to obtain monthly wage for self-employed workers, I divide the aggregate annual salary by 12
(months worked in one year).
This procedure has been applied just the 2011 wave since for the other one monthly income
of the principal job for both self employed and dependent worker is already available.
On the functional form of the dependent variable, Di Cintio and Grassi (2012) use the logarithm
of hourly salary because in this way is possible to better capture worker productivity. I decide
to not use the hourly salary since Im expecting a weak short run migration impact19.
The table A.2, A.3 and A.4 describe all the variables used, data sources and relative statistics
for the full sample and for the different migration groups.
The table A.3 compare descriptive statistics for movers and stayers, distinguishing if they
move after high school (“Ante graduation mobility”) or after graduation completion (“Post grad-
uation mobility”). The statistics suggests, as expected, that strong differences between stayers
and movers after high school graduation are absent (the only exception is the “Autonomous”
variable, showing a value clearly broder for the movers). Instead, more marked differences be-
tween stayers and movers after graduation are present. In addition to the monthly earnings,
higher for movers, the descriptive statistcs suggest that those moving after graduation has better
labour market outcomes since the percentage of part time worker is lower (7% against the 9%
for the stayers), job specialization is higher and the percentage of those using the social network
channels to find a job is lower (16% for the movers and 22% for the stayers). The table A.4 re-
ports descriptive statistics among different migration groups and is clear that “Double Movers”
and “Post graduation movers” show better performances: higher earnings, less part time job and
an higher job specialization. Furthermore the variables referred to academic career (“Gradua-
tion Mark” and “On time”) are higher for this two groups (especially for the “Post graduation
movers”).
The other two groups, “Come Back” and “Stayers”, are those with less work experience20 and
the former group show even the greater percentage of autonomous worker (19%). Finally, on the
family social class, the polarization between “Come Back” and “Stayers” and the others three
groups is quite clear since they show lower value (especially “Stayers”). Indeed, among the last
three catogories, those moving after graduation, even if have better labour markets outcomes,
are even those with lower social calsses suggesting a possible empirical evidence for the “liquidity
contraints” hypothesis.
18For dependent worker i take into account additional payments (“tredicesima and quattordicesima”).
19Maier and Sprietsma (2016), estimating the long run effect of regional migration on labour market out-
comes, use hourly salary as dependent variable (the selected individuals were 40 years old).
20Work experience is calculated in months after deducting by time used to find the first job. Unfortunately
the data do not allow to figure out possible working interruption.
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2.4 Econometric specification: what are push and pull fac-
tors influencing ante and post graduation mobility?
As anticipated, with the first step of this analysis I try to analyse factors which have some
influences on the two relocation decisions, before and after graduation. As discussed in the first
chapter, we can consider mobilty choice as a funcion of different factors related to the origins
(X) and destination regions (Y) (Dotti et al., 2013):
Uxy = f(origin characteristics, destination characteristics, indivual controls)
x=1,......,20
y=1,......,20
To point out relationship between this factors I exploit a Recursive Bivariate Probit model
(Green, 2007; Marra and Radice, 2011; Nichols, 2011) that allows to take into account correlation
between ante and post graduation mobility using the first dipendent vairable (“ante graduation
mobility) as a dummy variable in the second equation21 as specified below:
y1
∗
i = x
′
1iα1 + ε1i,
y2
∗
i = βy1i + x
′
2iα2 + ε2i,
}
i=1,......,n, (2.1)
where n is the sample size and y1
∗
i , y2
∗
i are continuos latent variable which determine the
observed binary outcomes y1i and y2i according to the following rule:
yvi =
{
1 if yv
∗
i > 0
0 if yv
∗
i < 0
i=1,2
y1
∗
i represent the decision to relocate to study after high school graduation and y1
∗
i represent
the decison to relocate to work while x′1i and x
′
2i are control variables row vectors, respectively
for first and second equation22.
The error terms (ε1i, ε2i) are assumed to be identically distributed as a bivariate normal
with zero means, variance equal to one and correlation ρ, that in this framework represent the
“tetrachoric” correlation between y1 and y2:
[
ε1
ε2
|x1 x2
]
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
0 ρ
ρ 0
)]
If the correlation between the two error terms is zero than two probit models may be esti-
mated. In fact we can consider the RBP model as natural extension of the probit model that
21Ciriaci (2014, A), looking to Amemya (1978) analyses ante-lauream and post-lauream migration choice
with two separate probit.
22The control variables contained in x1 and x2 may be the same or different Green (2007).
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allows to take into account the correlation between two dummies variables 23 (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010; Green, 2007) .
So the condition justifying the RBP model is the following:
corr(ε1iε2i)=ρ6=0.
The error term in the two equations reflects the unobserved factors influencing individual
utility function for each migration decision. The use of the RBP model allows for the possibility
that both type of migration are influenced by the same unobserved factors. In other words, if
the error terms of the two equations are correlated, unobserved factors affecting the decision to
move after high school are correlated to the factor affecting decision to relocate post graduation.
As discussed in the following paragraphs, this assumption allow to face with endogeneity issue
affecting migration with additional econometric method. Furthermore, if correlation between
two equation has been shown, the RBP model guarantees more efficient24 respect two simple
probit equations (Green, 2007; Maier and Sprietsma, 2016).
2.5 Econometric specification: is it convenient to move af-
ter graduation?
After the RPB model estimation, I try to point out if, in terms of wage, there are positive or
negative returns from geographical mobility after graduation. Starting from the classical “Min-
cer equation” (Mincer, 1958), where post graduation mobility is an endogenus dummy variable,
I exploit the model described in the previous paragraph in order to verify if it is convinient to
move after graduation.
The wage equation is specified as follow:
ln wi = α+ βy2i +
N∑
i=1
Xi + γ1i, i=1,......,n (2.2)
The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly wage, y2i, as in the RBP model, is a
dummy equal to 1 for those moving after graduation, Xi are controls added and α is the costant
term.
In this framework, neglect endogeneity led to a bias in the estimation of spatial mobilty on
wage. In presence of endogeneity, the β parameter will be bias and states not just the effect
of workplace mobility on wage but also the effect of unobservables factors included in the error
term γ1i (Heckman, 1977b).
The magnitude and the direction of the bias may changes according to the existing relationship
23While Makovec (2006) finds a strong correlation between the two equations, Capuano (2011) finds a posi-
tive correaltion between the two equations only if regional factors are excluded from the analysis. She justifies
this result arguing that relocation decision is driven only by regional factors and not from individual factors.
24I should obtain corrected standard errors.
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between unobserved factors and the endogenous variable. Mobile graduates could be more moti-
vated and abile and higher earnings can be justified by a plausibile positive correlation between
higher skills and earnings. Conversely, as explained by Maier and Sprietsma (2016) (2016), the
“Stayers”, being more motivated and able, find a job close to home or university and achieving
higher labour market performances.
To avoid this bias I follow the two step procedure with a non parametric identification (Dust-
mann et al., 1997; Heckman, 1976), expoliting the predicted value obtained by the RBP described
above. Even if the endogenus dummy in the wage equation is y2, following Maier Maier and
Sprietsma (2016), Nichols (2011) and Wooldridge (2010), considering correlation between y2
and y1, I correct for endogeneity one step before, when I estimate the predicted probability
of move after the high school graduation (y1). In the RBP presented in fact, even the variable
y1 is endogenous and when I add this terms in the second equation I have to take into account it.
Therefore, in the RBP model, considering ante graduation mobility as a treatment variable
and post graduation mobility as outocome variable, I estimate the marginal predicted probabilty
of begin mobile after graduation Pˆ , used as instrumental variable for y2 in the wage equation
through a Two Stage Least Square (Heckman, 1977a; Maier and Sprietsma, 2016):
Pˆ = P (y2i = 1| ˆIntrumentj , X ′1i, X ′2i)
Pˆ should be considered a prediction which does not include part of mobility related to unob-
servable factors.
The two step procedure use the inverse Mills ratio which, being a nonlinear function of the
variables included in the first stage, allows to perfectly identify equation in the second stage even
without exclusion restriction. However, the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio is based on the
indipendent variable normality assumption in the first stage (a probit model), difficult to justify.
This is why is common practice use a variable in the first stage not included in the second one.
In literature, this procedure is called “exclusion restriction” (Amemiya, 1985; Maddala, 1986).
If we ruled out ante graduation mobilty from this analysis, a simple two step procedure re-
quires, in the first stage, a probit model for post graduation mobility. In this case, the exclusion
restriction implies that if variables used to specify y2i and the wage equation are the same, the β
will be bias since Xi (which includes the selection term λ) and y2i are collinear (Chiburis et al.,
2007).
However, in this exercise, the exclusion restriction is implemented differently since I try to resolve
the endogeneity problem in three steps where the instrumental variable is included in the first
equation y1 and excluded from y2.
However, from examples shown in literature is not clear if covariates specification for 2.1 and
2.2 must be the same.
Using the same model, Maier and Sprietsma (2016) show a procedure where the instrumental
variable is added in y1 and the covariates between the equations 2.1 and 2.2 are different.
Differently to this approach, as in a standard two step procedure (Stock and Watson, 2005),
is possible to use the same set of covariates for the equation in 2.1 except the instrument, added
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only in y1. Even if I follow the latter option, as robusteness proof, I verify even if, depending
on the alternative covariates specification in the equation 2.1 and 2.2, the estimates undergo
substantial changes.
Firstly, as suggested by Nichols (2011) I present the estimations for RBP model (table 2.1)
and for the Two Stage Least Square (“2sls”) (table A.5, appendix)25 The tables suggest results
robusteness since the “Ante graduation mobility” effect, as the effect of the control variables
added (with expectation for the variable “Family social class”), keep significance and direction
in both models.
As further proof I present in the table A.6 the effect of post graduation mobility on wage
calculated using a different set of covaraites for y1 on y2, following than the approach proposed
by Maier and Sprietsma (2016)26.
The results suggest that the effect of Pˆ on earnings remains stable regardless the coavariates
specification27.
Another iussue concerns the need to use two instrumental variable for two endogeneus dummy.
As clearly stated by Wooldridge (2010) the number of instrument should be equal to the number
of endogenous dummy which in this case are two: mobility ante-graduation and mobility post-
graduation.
However, it is no clear if in case of error terms correlation among y1i and y2i, one exclusion
restriction is sufficient and, even comparing the procedure used by Maier and Sprietsma (2016)
and Makovec (2006), this doubt is not overcome. Even if I use just one instrumental variable,
as further robusteness proof, I add an additional instrumental variable for the equation y2i, the
“Internal Relocation Rate” (presented in the following paragraphs) in order to very possible
changes in the estimation. The Internal Relocation Rate” (I.R.R.), already used by Cutillo and
Ceccarelli in the estimation of workplace mobility on wages (2012), is deinfed as the ratio be-
tween the net yearly number of migrants cancelled in the region on the total regional population
as on 1 January of the year.
Even in this case, use two instrumental variable doesn’t change the results28.
Instrumental variable approach has been subject to several critics since variable exogeneity is
often difficult to prove. This is why several alternative methodologies has been proposed. One of
them, already applied in very similar analysis is the Propensity Score Matching (Buonanno and
Pozzoli, 2009; Di Cintio and Grassi, 2012; Makovec, 2006) which is based on a very strong as-
sumption: it is possible to resolve the endogeneity controlling for a large number of “observable”
covariates contained in the dataset (Martini and Sisti, 2009)). Consistent estimation with these
tecniquie requieres a considerable number of observations other than a large number of covari-
ates (Black and Smith, 2004) and even if the second condition is satisfied, the sample size at my
disposal is not quite large (especially for the sub-population analysis) for a suitable “propensity
score” specification.
25I would like to thank Austin Nichols from Urban Institute of Washington, DC for suggestions at this stage.
26Different set of covaiates for the RBP model imply a different value for the marginal predicted probability
to move after graduation (Pˆ ).
27The coefficient of Pˆ is very similar respect the one obtained in the table 2.3 (5% versus 4%) even if the
significance level is higher with the first approach.
28The results are not subject to substantial changes even using two instrumental variables and changing the
set of covariates in the RBP model.
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In light of this issue and of the arguments set out in previous paragraphs (“dualism”, human
capital clustering and differences in resources allocation), leading to the assumption that the
relocation decision can be influenced by external factors29, the instrumental variable approach
is used.
I suppose that some factors as human capital clustering, labour market characteristics or
educational supply, having different value in the individual utility function (Dahl, 2002; Moretti,
2013), exert some influence on relocation decision.
Among such factors, I use as instrument the “Scholarships” hypothesizing that differences in
resoruces assigned at the time of leaving secondary education affect the probability of being
mobile after graduation only through the migration at the beginning of university. In the next
paragraph I’ll explain how this variable is specified.
29Generally it is preferable use as instrument individual variable as parents condition, presence of sibling or
family income (Black and Smith, 2004). Unfortunately, I couldn’t find in the dataset a suitable variable useful
to this aim.
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2.6 Instrumental variable, self-selection and endogeneity
As introduced previously, analyze spatial mobility effects on labour market outcomes implies to
face with endogeneity, occurring when one or more than one of the covariates are related to the
error term in the model. One of the common caused of endogeneity is the omitted variables
problems and specifically the “self-selection”.
Even if the methodological procedure to overcome endogeneity are very similar, the causes of
endogenity indicate different concepts30. In this excercise I use different concepts of endogenity
according to different research questions. Endogeneity occurs in situation where the relation-
ship between two variable is uncorrectly identified due to the presence of unobservables factors
correlated to the endogenus variable. When I estimate the returns (in terms of earnings) of the
geographical mobility I assume that bias comes from this unobserved relationship.
There is self-selection when the indipendent variable is observed just for a restricted sample of
the population that occurs when I compare earnings among sub-population groups with different
migration paths.
All causes of endogeneity are often resolved through two step procedure where, according to this
research question, in the first stage, the probability to move is calculated using one (or more)
variable correlated with endogenus dummy (or with treatment) but uncorrelated with the out-
come variable.
The impossibility to identify exactly a causal relationship between two variable is a recurring
problem in the estimation of schooling return, labourforce participation, unionization and even
in migration since there are factors influencing geographical mobility and labour market outcome
which are not directly observable by researchers but must be consdier to explain difference in
returns to migration (Dahl, 2002; Malamud and Wozniak, 2008; Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980).
In this fremework we can have an upwards bias (or positive self selection) if there is a positive
correlation between higher educational level and migration: is possible that major earnings are
justified not by migration itself but from the presence of spillover effects coming by the presence
of human capital (Bartel, 1989; Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980) or, because more able individual
are prone to move in places where the returns to human capital are higher (Borjas et al., 1992;
Venhorst and Co¨rvers, 2015).
Otherwise, even if internal migrants possess greater ability or motivation than nonmigrant
(Gabriel and Schmitz, 1995), as explained previously, at least in the short run, they might have
to deal with “adjustments process” due to a unclear knowledge of the local labour market, with
penalty in terms of wage, employability or job position (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Tselios, 2009). It
is still questionable the direction of the bias and the type of selection in migration since the
results on the effects of geographical mobility on wage present in literature differ according to
methodology used and by the observation period lenght. Furthermore, with the instrumental
variable approach, the results can differ even according to the exogenous variable used.
As explained, in the last econometric framework, I start from the hypothesis that liquidity
constraints and resources available influence university choice: the amount of scholarships as-
signed at regional level represents an opportunity to offset the lack of resources provided by family.
Analyzing push and pull factors affecting student mobility Vergolini and Zanini (2015) exaplain
that the scholarships provided by region can influence mobility.
Specifically Vergolini and Zanini (2015), analyzing the role of financial aids and schoolarships
30For an accurate discussion see Antonakis et al. (2010).
39
in shaping enrollment high school levers decisions, find that resource allocation doesn’t increase
the number of enrollment but increases student mobility and improves the match between uni-
versity supply and student preferences31.
Following this result, I use the number of scholarships awarded (on the number of eligible
candidates, i.e. “idonei”) at regional level32 and the variable is specified as follow:
Scholarshipit =
Scholarships awarded
number of eligible candidates
i=1,......,20
t=t¯=2000...2006
Since one limit of this analysis is the lack of informations on the year of enrollment at the
university and since the dataset is composed by two waves, I averaged the number of schoolar-
ships assigned (in the origin region) on different academic years, from 200033 to 200634.
This variable is presented in percentage and should represents an index of resources available
per student, provided by regions. The main intuition is that greater are resources transferred,
lower is the likelihood to move in other regions; viceversa, smaller is the amount of resources
assigned in the origin region, major would be the propensity to relocate to study.
Being an instrument, the variable “Scholarship” should have the following characteristics
(Nichols, 2011):
1. correlated with the migration at start of tertiary education;
2. the instrument must be exogenus.
Exogeneity implies that scholarships assigned influence decision to relocate to work only
through ante graduation mobility.
While the first condition find empirical evidence (see table 2.1), the second one may be argued
sayng that even if regions with lower resources (typically southern) can be even those who face
higher human capital losses, a direct correlation between resources in higher education and work-
place mobility is hardly explainable.
Before to use this variable, I consider the possibility to use other variables as instrument:
• sleeping accommodation assigned on the number of applications submitted;
• “net migration rate” (%) at regional level (student mobility, years between 2004 to 2007).
31This study was implemented on sample of students from one Italian province (Trento).
32Regional institutions (“Ente regionale per il diritto allo studio”) collect data (available on University and
Research Ministry site (“MIUR”)) on all services provided by regions to support educational costs.
33First year in which MIUR data are available.
34I would like to thank Federica Laudisa from IRES Piemonte (“Osservatorio regionale per l’Universita` e per
il diritto allo studio universitario”) for suggestions at this stage.
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The first variable is very similar to the instrument used, and even though the effect of this
variable is significant I prefer to use the variable presented above since it is a most comprehensive
measure of the resources available at regional level.
The “net migration rate” shows if each region gains or loses human capital through student
migration flows. Since is plausibile to assume that the decision to move to study in a different
regions could be influenced by informations obtained through networks (friendships or family),
I expect correlation between past migration rate (from origin region) and actual relocation deci-
sion. Therefor, the first condition for a strong instrument is satisfied35.
Unfortunately the first year available in MIUR data is the academic year 2003/2004 and I
can’t use it as instrument for two reasons:
• past migration helps to resolve endogeneity only if goes sufficiently backwards in time. For
example when I take the net migration rate in 2006 as past migration and net migration
rate in 2007 as present migration, if the actual net migration rate is endogenous there’s
no justification for assume that the migration rate in 2006 is exogenus since it could be
correlated with some trends in the labour market present in 2007 (unobservable factors
affecting relocate decision in 2006 are the same of those present in 2007);
• the exact year of enrollment is not available and it could happens that there are some
individuals enrolled at university before 2004 and the instrument presented loses values for
this group.
Two points just mentioned raise doubts about instrument exogeneity.
Before to continue with the discussion it should be pointed out that in this step, as in the
estimation of migration premium according to migration paths, im not considering observations
not enrolled at university and not active in the labour market. These groups are not randomly
selected across population and self selection issue led to possible additional bias in the estima-
tion. Since no solutions are found to overcome these limits, the results interpreation requires
additional caution.
35Furthermore use past migration in order to endogenize present migration is the mostwidely solution (Al-
tonji and Card, 1991; Bartel, 1989).
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2.7 Econometric specification: are there migration paths
more convenient than others?
After having estimates the returns from geographical mobility on wage, I investigate if it is pos-
sible to find differences on earnings among migration paths.
Looking to the RBP model described with the equation 2.1, is possible to obtain the predicted
probability for four outcomes:
Pr(y1i=1, y2i=0 | x1, x2)
Pr(y1i=0, y2i=1 | x1, x2)
Pr(y1i=0, y2i=0 | x1, x2)
Pr(y1i=1, y2i=1 | x1, x2)
Each equation identifies a subset of the study population differentiated by migration choices
before and post graduation 36 and respectively:
• Movers remained (those who move to study and reamins in the same region after gradua-
tion);
• Post graduate movers;
• Stayers (those who don’t move at all).
The fourth combinations of the equations in 2.3 identifies two subgroups simultaneously,
namely “Double Movers” (who move twice, to study and to work ) and “Comeback” (who move
to study and than come back in the origin region after graduation).
In this step I follow two approach used by Makovec (2006) and Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2012)37
with some differences. Working on same data (but on different waves), Makovec estimates the
effect on earnings of attending college in Nothern versus Southern regions, than considering only
a one way movement, from South to North, without distinguishing between “Comeback” and
“Double movers” (due to the small numbers of observations available). Cutillo and Ceccarelli
(2012) use an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to compare earnings among movers and non movers
after graduation, without take into account previous migration paths.
Here I use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) to calculate earn-
ing’s differences between groups identified with equation 2.3, taking always like a reference group
the Stayers38.
36Faggian (2009) identifies same groups.
37I thank Andrea Cutillo from ISTAT for valuable advices provided at this stage.
38Use the Stayers as reference group is standard practice. Furthermore the Stayers is the largest subgroup in
the sample as shown in table A.1.
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The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is specified as follow:
Y¯M − Y¯N︸ ︷︷ ︸
Earnings difference
between Movers
and Stayers
= (X¯ ′M − X¯ ′N )βˆN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowment effect
+ X¯ ′M (βˆN − βˆM )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Migration premium
+ (γˆM λ¯M − γˆN λ¯N )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selectivity term
(2.3)
The decomposition is implemented as a sum of two terms: endowement effect and coefficient
effect. The endowment effect quantifies differences on outcome varaiable explained by observed
characteristics while the coefficient effect explains how observed characteristic are valued and
compensated by the market.
The presence of self-selection implies that, to get an unbiased estimation of spatial mobility
on wage, for every groups I calculate the inverse Mills ratio used as a covariate in the Oaxaca
Blinder decomposition (Jann et al., 2008), implemented as many are the comparisons 39.
However this step is a little bit complex since, for two of the groups identified in 2.3, I have
to consider simultaneously more than one selection related to mobility. For the “Post graduate
movers” I can simply consider selectivity bias deriving by post graduation mobility, while for the
“Moversremained” I consider only self-selection deriving by ante graduation mobility.
For two differents migration choices, two inverse Mills ratios (calculated with two differents
probit), are estimated and used in the “corrected” Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.
Contrary, for “Double movers” and “Come Back”, since they move twice, I calculate two
inverse Mills ratios, one for the first migration decision (ante graduation mobility) and one for
the remigration decision (post graduation mobility), added simultaneously in the decomposition
(Iammarino et al., 2017).
Even if identified by same equation, the last two groups are different and costs and benefits of
migration and remigration can be considered differently (Tunali, 1986).
The two selection equations for “Double movers” and “Come Back” are specified with differ-
ent instrumental variables: endogeneity of ante graduation mobility is resolved using the variable
“Scholarship”, used in the previous step, while for post graduation mobility I use the “Internal
relocation rate” introduced in the previous paragraph. Using data on Italian interreggional res-
idence transfer, I pick up the hypothesis discussed previously: the propensity to migrate from
one region to another is a function of the number of people who have previously migrated from
the same region (Cutillo and Ceccarelli, 2012).
The “Internal Relocation Rate” (I.R.R.) is deinfed as follows:
I.R.R.it =
Cancelled in Regionit
Regional population at 1 January
i=1,......,20.
t=t¯=1995,......,2006.
39Di Cintio and Grassi (2012) estimate the effect of the regional mobility on the wage for five trajectories of
mobility (study movers, work movers, early movers, late movers, back movers) using a Propensity Score match-
ing.
43
I.R.R. is assigned to the region where individual attend to university and we expect that bigger
is this value, bigger is the probability to relocate after graduation40.
I calculated the average regional rate from 199541 to 2006, express in o/oo.
The variable just described suffer of some limitations. The first one is about the “composi-
tion”. Propensity to move varies by educational level (Shryock Jr and Nam, 1965) which is not
specified in ISTAT data as well as the reason behind mobility42.
The second limitation is the impossibility to identify origin and destination region.
Alternatively to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the migration premium for “Double
movers” and “Come Back” can be estimated following the approach proposed by Tunali (1986),
which estimates the effect of geographical mobility on earnigns take into account migration and
remigration decision in a Bivariate Probit model (not recursive).
In presence of remigration process, as in this exercise, Tunali proposes to use a three steps
procedure that adapted to this framework are specified as follow:
y1
∗
i = x
′
1iα1 + Schoalrship+ ε1i,
y2
∗
i = x
′
2iα2 + I.R.R.+ ε2i,
ln wi = α+ x
′
1iβ + x
′
2iγ + λ1 + λ2 + υ1i
where λ1 and λ2 are the invers Mills ratios calculated with two Probit models for two selection
equations y1i and y2i. Migration and remigration are specified with the following rules:
Stay if y1i = 0 and y2i = 0
move once if y1i = 1 and y2i = 0 or y1i = 0 and y2i = 1
move more than once if,y1i = 1 and y2i = 1.
and “Double movers” and “Come back” are identified with the following equation:
M =
{
1 if y1
∗
i > 0 and y2
∗
i > 0 (“Double movers” and “Come Back”)
0 Otherwise (“Stayers”)
40Even if not shown in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results, the direction of the effect of I.R.R on y2 is
positive and highly singnificant.
41The first year available on the ISTAT website for the regional residence cancellation. The data are avail-
able in the ISTAT website for demographic information, http://demo.istat.it.
42The same issue will be treated in the next chapter.
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This structure is similar to a Bivariate Probit model where Mi is given by the product of y1i
and y2i. Than I can write the probability of a positive outcome as follow:
Pr(Mi=1) = Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = 1) = F (x1iα1, x2iα2, ρ)
where F is cumulative distribution function.
The difference with the Bivariate Probit model is that all the observations where (y1i = 1 and
y2i = 0) or (y1i = 0 and y2i = 1) are identified through Mi.
This model is estimable through a “Bivariate Probit model with partial observability” (Poirier,
1980), where joint outcomes take the form of a dichotomous observable variable (Tunali, 1986).
STATA allows to estimate Poirier’s model and the inverse Mills ratio used to correct the double
selection for “Double movers” and “Come back”.
However I didn’t used this model for several reasons.
The model propesed by Porier is not recursive, this means that the first dummy indicating ante
graduation mobility is not added as control in the post graduation mobility equation. Since I
have not found in literature any empirical example adaptable to this analysis that use a RBP
model with partial observability I avoided to use it, even for the small sample size discussed. In
fact, as my knowledge, in order to estimate a RBP model and obtain the maximum likelihood
estimation an adequate number of observations is required especially for a Poirier specification.
This limits are confirmed since i’ve tried to estimate Poirier model model without reaching
model convergence, even using few controls for the two selection equations.
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2.8 Empirical results for the Recursive Bivariate Probit
model
The table 2.1 reports the results for RBP model43. First observation is on “goodness of fit”:
the model fits the data well (χ2=2344.87; p < 0.000) and most parameters are statistically sig-
nificant. Furthermore the LR test (χ2=42.10) suggests that the disturbances error for the two
equations are significantly correlated and the main hypothesis justifying the use of the RBP
model is respected 44. In fact the estimated correlation 0.407, is far away from zero and is sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.000).
In the ante graduation mobility equation I find a significant value of the “Net Migration rate”
with a sign in line with the expectation: bigger is the net migration rate in the origin region,
less is the probability to move after high school.
The “Scholarship” is significant and the coefficient direction suggests that the number of schol-
arships awarded in the region before enrollment are negative correlated with probability to move
after high school, even if the coefficient is quite low (-4%). The last result is in line with Pigini
and Staffolani (2015) which show that the resources available at regional level act as attractivenes
measure for the high school leavers. Cattaneo (2017) finds very similar result but, differently
from here, he assigns the value of the variable “Scholarship” to the origin province (before to
start tertiary education)45.
On the university size of the region before enrollment, it is possible to note that value are positive
but only “mega” university size seems have influence on relocation decision (reference categorie:
small). If we assume that students prefer to enroll in univerisity with larger number of courses
(Pigini and Staffolani, 2015), we can expect that bigger are universities in the region of origin,
less is the probability to move. However it is also possible, as this result confirms, that the
student might prefer small size universities since these may offer higher teachear standard or a
more efficient placement service (Bacci et al., 2008).
The variable “University size” in the right side of the table 2.1 referes to the size of the univer-
sity attended and show an opposite effect (even if non significant) on relocation probability after
graduation: greater is the size, lower the probability to move after graduation.
The occupational rate, that allows to control for the heterogeneity between local labour
markets (Sa´ et al., 2006)46, is based on ISTAT historical time series47 is assigned to the region
before enrollment for the equation y1 and to the university region for the equation y2.
The coefficient is significant and higher but the sign show a counterintuitive result, especially if
read considering the variable “High school area”: an higher occupational rate is associated with
a greater probability to move before graduation.
This can be explained saying that the economic factors have less relevance in the relocation
decision before graduation where, indeed, the “consumption reason” for migration (amenities,
quality of life etc.) might have higher weight.
43For a variable structure description see table A.2 in the appendix.
44Otherwise two different probit model would be used.
45In order to verify the consistency of the variable, I’ve tried to assign this value to the region where people
attend to university getting anyway similar results in terms of significance and direction.
46I have to stress that as explained by Etzo (2011) the unemployment rate is itself endogenous and may be
simultaneously determined with migration.
47The ISTAT web site provides time series for the occupational rate at regional level from 2004 to 2017.
Here I take an average of different years depending on the equation considered (2004 to 2008 for the first equa-
tion and 2009 to 2014 for the second equation). Data are available at the following link: http://dati.istat.it/
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The variable “Transport quality”48 is a satisfcation index on transport means provided an-
nually by the ISTAT. To cover observational period, I consider an average of data collected in
different years, selected according to the equation considered: years from 2003 to 2007 for y1 and
years from 2008 to 2012 for y2. The index is based on the most importants means of transport:
bus, train and pullman (turistic, regional)49.
Trasport is one of index used to rank provinces quality of life, annualy update by the main
national newspapers (“IlSole24ore” and “LaRepubblica”) and among different contextual vari-
ables available may exerts a particular relevance in relocation decision. In fact, previous results
(Demarinis, Iaquinta, Leogrande, and Viola, Demarinis et al.; Etzo, 2011) show that interregional
migration flows are favored by the presence of good trasports both at origin and destination50
and the same result is confirmed here: the coefficient is significant (even if the magnitude is
low) for the first equation suggesting that more satisfaction on transport quality discourage ante
graduation mobility.
In contrast to previous results which showed a propensity to move greater for female (Faggian
and McCann, 2009), the results highlight that female are less mobile, especially after graduation
(5% less than male).
Even if non significant, to higher high school marks are associated negative moving likeli-
hood. Conversely,for post graduation mobility, those with better academic performance (espe-
cially those with a degree mark higher than 106) are those with an higher probability to relocate.
In line with previous empirical findings for Italy (Bacci et al., 2008; Impicciatore and Tuorto,
2011), this result support the hypothesis of a positive self-selection (those who are more moti-
vated or skilled are more prone to move)51.
On the family background, (variable “Family social class”) I find interest results. Others em-
pirical analysis show how family income and liquidity constraints are relevant factors affecting
decision to relocate after high school graduation (Kratz et al., 2011; Lupi and Ordine, 2009).
Even if the coefficient is significant only for the last class, I find very similar results since to
an higher social class is associated greater probability to relocate ante graduation, in line with
descriptive statistics presented in the table A.3.
For y2 I find opposite results even in comparison to previous litearture findings. In fact, while
Ciriaci and Nuzzi (2012), using same data, but differents waves, support the thesis that proba-
bility to relocate after graduation is higher not for most skilled students but for those wiht more
economic support, the table 2.1 shows an opposite result. However, the latter should be read
with caution since the social class index, here made up as the most prestigious professional posi-
tion between father and mother, in addition to being an approximation for the family economic
condition, is arbitrary .
However, if we suppose that individuals move in order to improve own social condition and
obtain better match in the labour market or if we suppose that family support (economic and
psychological) exerts its greater influence more in university choice than in post graduation mo-
bility, we might also expect greater propensity to move after graduation for those with low family
48I thank Roberto Fantozzi from ISTAT for the help provided in the data selection.
49Croce and Ghignoni (2015), use as transport quality proxy (congestion) the accidents per 1000 cars in the
local labour market.
50As stressed by Cattaneo et al.(2017), the recent increase in competition, lowering prices, has facilitated
regional as provincial journeys.
51Furthermore, even without achieving significant results, for equation y1 and as proxy for individual ability,
I add a dummy variable indicating if the student have obtained the title on schedule (“On time”).
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background.
Since as stated by Faggian et al. (2007) not necessarily prestigious profession are associated
with higher education, I decide to keep separate the parental education effect.
The results suggest that the higher educational level is strongly correlated with ante gradua-
tion mobility. For example having at least one parent with a B.A or M.A. increase the probability
to move by 20% points. This results may also be explained considering that most of psychological
costs are due to cultural gap between origin and destination (Brezis et al., 2011), and these can
be reduced if we assume positive correlation between family support and family educational level.
In the first equation, I add as a control, the macro-area where the people obtained high school
graduation (“High school area”) while, for the second equation, I use as a control the university
macro-area. In line with expectation and previous findings (Ciriaci, 2009; Di Cintio and Grassi,
2012), Southern regions and Islands are those showing higher propensity to move before gradu-
ation.
Less clear are the results for the post graduation mobility since differences between macro-areas
are not so marked and only northern region show significant correlation52. Literature suggests
several hypotheses on reasons behind such differentiating paths by macro-area. For example, for
Italy, Etzo (2011) shows that northern migrants (coming from richer regions) place greater weight
on site-specific amenities as climate or quality of life and is plausibile assume that according to
the macro-area of origin, individuals respond differently to differences between places.
On the type of high school graduation, I find that those coming from vocational school are less
prone to move before graduation (baseline categories is lyceum)53 while, for the field of study I
find a significant coefficient only for economics, which is negative correlated with post graduation
mobility. However, differently from what is suggested by empirical evidences, is plausibile expect
that quantitatve fileds show less mobility since, as argued by Kratz (2011), should guarantee
greater probability to find a jobs in university region.
As living cost measure I use data provided by national newspaper “Il sole 24Ore” which
carries out (annualy) reviews of housing costs54 and monthly rental costs (by provinces).
As for the occupational rate and the trasport quality, this is an average on three different year
(2003, 2007 and 2011) and the value is assigned in to province before enrollment for the first
equation, “Housing cost (origin)” and to the province where people attend to university, “Hous-
ing cost (university province)”. The reason why different years are selected is that using two
waves (graduates in 2007 and graduates in 2011), individuals can decide to move in a very wide
temporal range55.
However, the living cost measure used is rather rough and the results should be read carefully56.
Furthermore the variable structure is different among y1 and y2. For 2003 only rental prices
are available while for the 2007 “IlSole24” survey provides global housing costs. The average on
52I’ve tried to substitute the university macro-area with high school macro-area in y2, obtaining that those
coming from South and Island are more prone to move even after graduation.
53Makovec (2006) shows that have attended to lyceum increases ante graduation probability to move, with a
greater extent for northern students.
54Cost per square meter in euro.
55Since even for graduates in 2007 relocation after high school is considered, the time frame goes (presum-
ably) from 2003 to 2011.
56A more comprehensive measure, other than considers the exact amount paied for a rent, should take into
account even the location (near o far to unviersity) since differences in terms of accessibility give more informa-
tion on individual socioeconomic condition.
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two years is necessary and to overcome limits poses by different data structure, the index must
be defined as a difference form the national mean (rental price for 2003 and housing cost for
2007)57. Than, the variables used have a different value even if is plausibile to suppose that at
higher rental costs can be associate to higher housing costs58.
Table 2.1 show a negative correlation between housing costs and the two relocation decisions,
even if the coefficients magnitude are very low. It is possible to suppose that to higher living
costs correspond higher occupational opportunities which disincentive mobility. However, as em-
pirical evidences suggest (Etzo, 2011), if we suppose that higher disposable income, allowing to
deal with transaction cost, is associated to higher living costs, even a positive correlation with
mobility can be justified, especially for first move decisions. Unfortunately, the working of this
“inderect channel” is difficult to disentangle without more accurate data.
Again on the estimation of the “contextual variables” effects, clearer relationships can emerge
if defined as difference between origin and destination region (Rabe and Taylor, 2012), as indeed
it was done in other works which try to estimate the effect of differences in housing prices on
labourmobility (Cannari et al., 2000; Mocetti et al., 2010).
However, in this analysis expressing all contextual variables as difference between origin and
destination, implies that is not possible to assign the relative value to those who don’t move.
To overcome this problem a try a different specification calculating the difference between the
variable assigned to the orgin region and the national mean for mobility to study, and the dif-
ferences between the variable value assigned to the university region and the national mean for
the post graduation mobility. However, probably because regions showing mean values under
the national mean are always southern regions, collinearity led to exclude such variable from the
analysis.
The right side of the table 2.1 shows that mobility ante graduation is a good predictor for post
graduation mobility: having moved to study increases relocation probability after graduation by
18%59.
Respect to the equation y1 I introduce as additional control the age at time of graduation.
Even if the original dataset provides only age in classes, I find (wiht all coefficients strongly
significant), in line with previous results (Ciriaci, 2014; Kratz et al., 2011) that is negatively
correlated to migration probability.
This results, concurrently with results obtained on the graduation mark and on the dummy “On
time”, suggest a movers positive selection, i.e. are those completing to study early and with
higher graduation mark that move after graduation.
This hypothesis is also supported by the dummy “Network” if we assume that the social network
is a signal of lower skills and/or motivation.
The set of dummy variables indicating post-lauream specialitation (completed) show very
different results. At first, i’ve added a unique dummy, comprising all the type of specializations,
but, to disentagle different effects, I decide to keep them separate. Those who completed a
57This is why negative values are possible (see table A.2 in the appendix).
58Pigini and Staffolani (2015) use secondary school graduates survey (2004) provided by ISTAT and to mea-
sure the housing costs effect on enrollment decision they exploit the 2003 “IlSole24” survey dividing rental costs
by 5, under the assumption that 20 square meters correspond to an average acceptable size for a room.
59Ciriaci and Nuzzi (2012) find that the effect of mobility ante graduation increase the probability to move
after graduation by 77%.
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Phd are less likely to move post graduation60 while who continue with Master or stage (“in
firms”) show higher propensity to move. Finally those who have concluded a training for liberal
profession (variable “Training”) show a lower moving probability.
For the dummy “Married” (at time of inteview), the direction of the effects is in line with the
expectation (Kratz et al., 2011) and is negative correlated with mobility after graduation even
if the coefficient is not significant and the magnitude is low61.
The second last dummy on the right side of the table 2.1 show that those who have gradauted
in a private university show less probability to move by 10%. Finally, since Im considering two
waves, two year dummy are added. The coefficients are highly significant and even the magnitude
is quite large. This support the hypothesis of a rising migration propensity after 2009 (see figure
2.1)
2.9 Empirical results for the wage equation
Comparable results for the estimation of the equation 2.2 can be found in three empirical works
by Makovec (2006), Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2012) and Maier and Sprietsma (2016).
Considering only mobility from southern to northern Italian regions, Makovec estimates the
eranings returns of attending to a North University versus a South one.
Using a two steps procedure (“endogenous switching regression model”) finds that those who
move early earn more than both those who do not move at all and those who move later (after
graduation). Furthermore, with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, shows that those who move
are those with better “endowment” (positive selection).
As instrumental variable for y2 uses the presence of children while, for y1 he uses 4 instrumental
variables, mainly referred to differences in educational supply: a dummy indicating whether the
student was living in a main city (“capoluogo”), a dummy capturing whether a university was
recently founded in the origin province, the total number of undergraduate courses supplied by
universities located in each province before enrollment, and, finally, a dummy capturing whether
it was present a polytechnic in the high school province.
Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2012), looking to differences in wage only after graduation62 with a
switching regression model find a relavant gap between migrants and non migrants: move after
graduation increase wage by 10%. They find also a positive self-selection arguing that also if
migrants start from a lower wage (due to a bad knowledge of the local labour market), may still
get higher wage thanks to greater ability and motivation.
Even Maier and Sprietsma (2016), using the same model presented in this exercise, find a
positive wage returns to regional mobility for the first job 63.
The results presented in this paragraph confirm the literature findings. Firstly, from the
F-value of excluded instrument we can conclude that the predicted mobility after graduation
derived from the RBP model (equation 2.1) is strongly correlated with actual regional mobility
and that the instrument is strong.
60However I don’t know if the Phd is completed in the region where individuals get the M.A. or if it started
in a different region.
61This can be due to the low number married individuals. See table A.2 for descriptive statistics.
62They didn’t consider ante migration mobility and differents migration paths.
63Differently from here they use longitudinal data and the log hourly wage as dependent variable.
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The first regression for the wage equation (table 2.2) is estimated without take into account
endogeneity while the table 2.3 show results for the wage equation estimated with endogeneity
correction.
The effect of the post graduation mobility is strongly significant in the first table and remains
very similar in the second one: interregional migration after graduation is associated to greater
earnings (even if the value is low and varies between 4% and 5%). The table 2.3 reports even
all control variables used. As stressed by Mocetti (2013), higher housing costs in the working
province are associated to higher earnings (even if the coefficient magnitude is not particularly
high) and, furthermore, in line with expectations, to higher job specializations are associated
higher wages. The parent education doesn’t have effect on wage while higher family social classe
is strongly correlated with higher earnings.
As expected those engaged in part-time job earn much less than full time worker (around
50%) while, considering different working area, those located in western regions mantain a wage
gain respect to the others macro-area, especially South and Islands.
As stressed previously, attend to a private universities, generally smaller than public ones and
then able to provide better placement services, disincentivizes mobility post graduation (even if
the coeffiecient is not significant).
In line with previous empirical findings (Makovec, 2006; Oaxaca, 1973), quantitative field
(engineering and economics) give higher wage returns than math and physic (scientific is the
reference category) while women earn less by 8.6% point .
The last consideration is on the experience, a continuos variables (see table A.2) giving the
months intercurrent between the first job and the time of interview. Even if months used to find
the first job are considered (and ruled out), this is a very rough measure for the accumulated
experience since doesn’t take into account possible job breaks or job change64. However, I find a
positive correlation with earnings, but low, being observations at the beginning of their profes-
sional career.
64Unfortnualy is not available any additional information helping to measure accurately working experience.
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Table 2.1: Recursive Bivariate Probit: marginal effects
Ante graduation mobility Marginal Effect Post graduation mobility Marginal Effect
Net Migration Rate -0.412*** Ante graduation mobility 0.186***
Scholarships -0.040** Housing cost (university
province)
-0.00004***
University size (high school
area): medium
0.308 Female -0.0532***
University size (high school
area): big
0.378 Family social class:
medium
-0.00853
University size (high school
area): mega
0.387* Family social class: high -0.020
Occupational rate 2004
2008 (%)
0.775*** University macroarea:
North East
0.088***
Trasport quality 2002-2007 0.019*** University macroarea: Cen-
ter
0.0956***
Female -0.0005 University macroarea:
South
0.094
High school mark: medium 0.005 University
macroarea:Islands
0.078
High school mark: high -0.008 Engineering 0.00240
Family social class:
medium
0.013 Economics -0.0474**
Family social class: high 0.055** Social -0.0352
Poli. high school area -0.028 Humanities -0.0161
High school macroarea:
North East
0.064 Physical educ. -0.0206
High school macroarea:
Center
0.241*** Family study title: middle
School
0.00437
High school macroarea:
South
0.437*** Family study title: high
school
0.0610
High school macroarea:
Islands
0.540*** Family study title: gradu-
ated
0.0437
High school track: psico.
Art.
-0.020 Family study title: post
gradut.
0.0868*
High school track: voca-
tional
-0.085*** Transport quality 2008 -
2012
-0.00343***
Family study title: middle
School
0.043 Occupational rate 2009
2014 (%)
-1.331***
Family study title: high
school
0.086* Age: more than 23-24 -0.046*
Family study title: gradu-
ated
0.200*** Age: more than 25-29 -0.062**
Family study title: post
gradut.
0.152*** Age: more than -0.094***
Housing cost (origin) -0.0002*** University size: medium 0.024
Year (2015) 0.203*** University size: big -0.029
University size: mega -0.043
Network -0.0787***
On time 0.002
Grad.Mark: 91-100 0.047**
Grad.Mark: 101-105 0.050**
Grad.Mark 106-110 0.087***
Grad.Mark 110 lode 0.059**
Ereasmus 0.067***
Phd -0.127**
Specialization 0.027
Scholarship (work) 0.049*
Master 0.137***
Stage 0.073***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Ante graduation mobility Marginal Effect Post graduation mobility Marginal Effect
Others spec. -0.014
Training -0.059***
Training (educ) 0.054*
Polytechnic -0.007
Married -0.007
Private -0.101**
Year (2015) 0.209***
N 5281
Coeff Stand.errors P>z
/athrho 0.432 0.066 0.000
ρ 0.407 0.055
Wald test of rho=0 chi2(1) = 42.10 Prob > chi2 = 0.000
χ2 = 2344.87 p < 0.000
(dy/dx) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Cluster standard errors
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Table 2.3: Regression with instrument
Dependent variable: Monthly earnings (log)
Coeff. Stand.errors
Post graduation mobility 0.053** (0.023)
Housing cost (working area) 0.001** (0.000)
Job specialization: middle 0.079 (0.076)
Job specialization: low-middle 0.072 (0.075)
Job specialization: high 0.079 (0.075)
Family study title: middle school 0.030 (0.028)
Family study title: high school 0.026 (0.028)
Family study title: graduated 0.031 (0.036)
Family study title: post gradut. 0.034 (0.031)
Part-time -0.509*** (0.026)
Private university 0.032 (0.028)
High school mark 0.007 (0.008)
Family social Class: medium 0.044*** (0.013)
Family social Class: high 0.041** (0.016)
Field of study: engineering 0.055*** (0.015)
Field of study: economics 0.027 (0.016)
Field of study: social -0.069*** (0.020)
Field of study: humanities -0.140*** (0.020)
Field of study: physical education -0.088* (0.052)
Female -0.086*** (0.012)
Age: 23-24 0.010 (0.019)
Age: 25-29 0.036 (0.024)
Age: more than 30 0.021 (0.036)
Graduation mark: 91-100 0.004 (0.019)
Graduation mark: 101-105 0.023 (0.019)
Graduation mark: 106-110 0.013 (0.022)
Graduation mark: 110 Lode 0.056*** (0.021)
Working area: North East -0.032** (0.013)
Working area: Center -0.073*** (0.016)
Working area: South -0.087*** (0.022)
Working area: Islands -0.175*** (0.058)
Network -0.011 (0.015)
On time 0.030** (0.012)
Phd -0.036 (0.049)
Specialization 0.001 (0.028)
Master -0.002 (0.021)
Scholarship (Work) 0.015 (0.033)
Stage 0.033*** (0.011)
Other spec. -0.025 (0.019)
Training -0.082*** (0.017)
Training (educ) -0.003 (0.027)
Experience 0.004*** (0.000)
B.A. -0.022 (0.017)
Self-employed -0.587*** (0.037)
Married 0.016 (0.014)
Year 2015 -0.071*** (0.014)
cons 7.015*** (0.091)
N 5281
F test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 5280) = 1378.52
Prob > F = 0.0000
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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2.10 Empirical results for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposi-
tion
Mains empirical findings comparable on the results achieved with the Oaxaca Blinder decompo-
sition are proposed by Makovec (2006) and Di Cinitio and Grassi (2012).
The latter, using same data (waves 2004 and 2007 for graduated in 2001 and 2004), applies a
Propensity Score Matching to compare labour market outcomes for the migration paths identified
in 2.365 and the results found are the follows:
• the “Comeback” show little benefits (in terms of wage) respect to others group;
• those showing greater benefits are those who move after graduation.
Furthermore, thanks to a considerable amount of observations, they divide the sample according
to the macro-area of origin and applying the same methodology, finds that graduates coming
from southern regions have good performances if the find a job in norhtern regions.
As explained, the propensity score matching starts from the strong assumption that is possi-
ble to resolve endogeneity only through information provided by the dataset (Martini and Sisti,
2009). However, even if useful to balance observed covariates between groups, the Propensity
Score method doesn’t allow to overcome the omitted variable bias discussed above, i.e. doesn’t
allow balance between unobservable characteristichs. Furthermore, to have a good specification
of the propensity score (which is the probability of being treated), only pre treatment variable
should be included (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Garrido et al., 2014; Jones, 2007; Winkelmayer
and Kurth, 2004) and, since with data available is not possible to ruled out exactly when the
individual moves (treatment), a good covariates specification is hardly achievable66.
With a similar research question, Makovec (2006) use both Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
and Propensity score in order to verify if it is convenient to move from south to north regions to
study and work.
In the decomposition exercise, he finds that differences in exptected earnings are always sig-
nificants for the three population subgroups (which corresponds here to “Movers remained”,
“Post graduation movers” and “Stayers”): attending college in Northern (and find a job there)
versus Southern regions give more earnings respect to who move after graduation and respect to
“Stayers”67. The propensity score method confirms the results of the first decomposition.
Since are not present in literature empirical findings focused on “Double Movers” labour
market outcomes I try to close this gap comparing them with “Come back” and “Stayers”.
The tables 2.5 and 2.6 reports wage differences (respect to “Stayers”) for the last groups
mentioned.
The unadjusted procedure (fourth line of the tables) show a positive gap (8%) for “Double
Movers” and a negative one (10%) for “Come back”. However, applying the adjusted procedure
(eighth line of the tables), the estimation are subject to greater changes since for the “Double
65They implement 7 comparisons considering different treament and control groups.
66An esaustive desription of the causal model and of the use of the propensity score is suggested by Nichols
(2007).
67As in this excercise, this is the groups with higher number of observations.
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Movers” the gains on the Stayers become of 16% (“downard bias”) while for the “Come back”
the results completely turn over in terms of coefficient magnitudine and direction.
In both comparison, the endowmente effect (“explained part”) is significant. This parameter
can be interpreted as the mean increase in the stayer’s wage if they had the same characteristchs
of the compared group, i.e. the explained part represents the difference in earnings due to
different characteristichs for individuals belonging to different groups.
Indeed, the coefficient terms (unexplained part or “migration premium”) quantify the change
in the relative groups when I apply the “Stayers” coefficient for the entire sample (Jann et al.,
2008) and can be interpreted as the “labour market discrimination”, i.e. how the labour market
evaluates mobility.
In others words, the unexplained part is the migration disparity in wage that would remain even
if “Double Movers” or “Come back” had the mean levels of the “Stayers” measured characteris-
tics (Sen, 2014).
However, in the both comparisons, the coefficient for the unexplained part is not significant, sug-
gesting that the differences in earnings among the two group are due to differences in observables
characteristics.
As further proof for the presence of selection bias, I add as a covariate in the wage equation
the inverse Mills ratios, assessing their significance. If the inverse mills ratio coefficient (which
represents the covariance between the errors in the wage and the migration equation), is signifi-
cant the adjusted procedure finds empirical justification (Tucker, 2009).
For the “Come back”, the selection term is positive for post graduation mobility and negative
for ante graduation mobility while, for “Double Movers”, I find opposite results. However, in
both equations, they are never significant.
Following the selection term interpretation suggested by Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2012), a neg-
ative coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio indicates that there are unobserved factors increasing
the probability of selection and decrease (“downward bias”) the score on the dependent variable.
When the coefficient is positive, than there are unobserved factors increasing both the probabil-
ity of selection and the score on the dependent variable (“upward bias”). The direction of the
bias is confirmed by selectivity term sign (downward bias for the Double Movers and an upward
bias for the Come Back), but, as explained, lack of significance for the unexplained part and for
the inverse mills ratio suggests that are the observable variables explaining earnings differences
between groups.
The others two tables (2.7 and 2.8) compare “Stayers” with those who move after graduation
(“Post graduation movers”) and with the “Movers Remained”. Those moving after graduation
exploit a wage premium on the “Stayers” by 11% points while those moving before graduation
and working in the same region where they attend to university show lower eranings by 5%.
The adjusted procedure confirms the results even if in the table 2.8 earnigs differences between
“Stayers” and “Movers Remained” becomes not significant. A slightly differences regards the un-
explained part for those who move after graduation that is the unique one significant (even if, in a
preliminary regression I find that the inverse Millls ratio is not significant and positive). Indeed,
for the second comparison (table 2.8) I find that the inverse Mills ratio is significant and pos-
itive, suggesting than an upward bias, confirmed comparing adjusted and unadjusted coefficients.
From this results appears that some differences between the migration paths considered exist.
In general there are eranings gains from mobility but they differ according to mobility pattern
after graduation. Those who come back at home after graduation or decide to remain in the region
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where they attend to university show lower earings while those who move two times (before and
after graduation) or only after graduation show higher earnings. Between the last two groups,
looking to unadjusted procedure, are those who move after graduation that have greater benefits
from mobility. Higher earnings for “Post graduation movers” is confirmed implementing the
Oaxaca Blinder decompostion (without correction since in this case it not possible to calculate
the inverse mills ratio) between this group and the “Double movers”: “Post graduation movers”
show a wage premium on the “Dobule movers” of 3%.
From the table 2.4 is clear how the results are subject to marked changes when the adjusted
procedure is applied, especially for “Come Back” and “Dobule movers”. As additional tests
i’ve implemented the Oaxaca decomposition changing the set of covariates used in the selection
equations (y1 and y2 ) findings that a slightly change in the covariates used in the first step
to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, produce very differnts results68. Reasons for a low results
robusteness can be found or in the small sample size or in the incorrect specification of the two
steps procedure used to overcome self-selection. However disentagle the two effects is hardly
achievable with data available and further researchs are necessary. My suggestion is to interpret
the results with caution and, by the way, is arguably to give more reliability to the andjusted
procedure, which appear to be more stable and consistent even with descriptive statistcs (table
A.4).
68Even in this case some differences between comparison appear and the results presented in tables 2.7 and
2.8 seem more stable.
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Table 2.4: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
Table 2.5: Stayers Vs. Double-movers
n1=2384
n2=596
Coeff. Stand.errors
Overall
Stayers 7.172*** (0.008)
Double-movers 7.252*** (0.017)
Difference -0.0807*** (0.019)
Adjusted
Stayers 7.172*** (0.008)
Double movers 7.265*** (0.083)
Difference -0.166** (0.083)
Explained -0.0354*** (0.015)
Unexplained -0.1309 (0.082)
N 2980
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table 2.6: Stayers Vs. Comeback
n1=2384
n2=563
Coeff. Stand.errors
Overall
Stayers 7.170*** (0.008)
Come Back 7.069*** (0.022)
Difference 0.103*** (0.024)
Adjusted
Stayers 7.170*** (0.006)
Come Back 7.201*** (0.050)
Difference -0.0315 (0.049)
Explained 0.112*** (0.016)
Unexplained -0.144 (0.128)
N 2947
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table 2.7: Stayers Vs. Post graduation
movers
n1=2384
n2=757
Coeff. Stand.errors
Overall
Stayers 7.172*** (0.008)
Post grad. mover. 7.286*** (0.015)
Difference -0.114*** (0.017)
Adjusted
Stayers 7.172*** (0.008)
Post grad. mover. 7.296*** (0.032)
Difference -0.125*** (0.033)
Explained -0.0699*** (0.013)
Unexplained -0.0558* (0.031)
N 3141
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table 2.8: Stayers Vs. Movers-
remained
n1=2384
n2=981
Coeff. Stand.errors
Overall
Stayers 7.171*** (0.008)
Movers remained 7.115*** (0.020)
Difference 0.056*** (0.026)
Adjusted
Stayers 7.171*** (0.008)
Movers remained 7.125*** (0.177)
Difference 0.046 (0.177)
Explained 0.0158 (0.017)
Unexplained 0.0305 (0.176)
N 3365
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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2.11 Conclusion, limits and further research
The analysis carried out suggests a positive effect of spatial mobility on earnings with some
differences according to different migration paths, specially due to post graduation migration
choices. While “Come back” and “Moversremained” show losses in earnings, “Double Movers”
and “Post graduation movers” show a wage premium on “Stayers”. Looking for a job on a
national scale seems compensates direct and inderects cost of migration which, from the table
A.1, are being dealt with by southern regions. As already hypothesized by Di Cinto and Grassi
(2012) the results appear to confirm that, in spite of lower resources, Southern universities pre-
pare graduates performing well in different labour markets. However, to draw such conclusion,
further decomposition should be implemented. If, as shown in the descriptive statistics of this
analysis, Italy is still facing with a “brain drain” phenomenon, to keep human capital in southern
regions, innovations in educational supplies, accompanied by a parallel evolution of local labour
markets, must be implemented. If the low educational level continues to characterizes workforce
composition, north-south gap can be hardly reduced and educational policies, which must be
supported by adequate resources, may have less effects if new professions with high human cap-
ital are not included as further possibilty of local development.
However, as stressed several times in this chapter the result interpretation should proceed
carefully. Firstly all the estimation should be read take into account an additional self-selection
since the sample is composed by graduates already employed. Than the relationship between un-
employment and migration, which has a considerable weight in migration literature (Ha¨ma¨la¨inen,
2002; Pekkala and Tervo, 2002; Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989) is not considered in this anal-
ysis.
Furthermore, additional bias can arise from selectivity in education since those enrolled to uni-
versity are not randomly selected among high school graduated.
A second observation must be made on the time frame considered (4 years after graduation).
Even if higher earning variance among early graduates can be found, the return on education at
beginning of working career tend to not differs significantly within country and long run analysis
may be preferred (Ciani and Mariani, 2014). On this point, several works explain the relevance
of using longitudinal data to estimate the migration effect on labour market outcomes (Hilmer,
2000) given that the migration effects could reflects temporary situation or a transition phase in
the labour market making more difficult to identify a casual link with economic performances
(Argentin, 2010). However, even if some alternative datasets69 would allow the analysis to be
extended over the long term, the degree of precision with which mobility is defined, it is subject
to a considerable reduction. As best of my knowledge, ISTAT and Almalaurea surveis are the
unique data sources with specific information on relocation decision.
A solution can be to evaluate the spatial mobility effect on the occupational status (contract,
job specialization and career breaks) or different measure of performances70.
Other limitation regards the data used that although suitable to research questions discussed,
do not allow to define the exact moment of migration. As explained in the next chapter in fact,
the “timing” of mobility is essential to estimate returns to spatial mobility, epsecially in short run
analysis. Furthemore the timing of mobility helps to overcome the “reverse causality” between
69Some waves of the Bank of Italy survey on household income and wealth make possible to identify origin
region, university and working region.
70Ghignoni and Croce (2015) investigate the effect of spatial mobility on educational mismatch showing a
negative effect of migration distance for university graduates while Marinelli (2011) finds that migrants (“non
returners”) are more satisfied on job tasks, economic treatment, and stability and security.
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unemployment and migration.
Finally, the analysis may be further extended starting from following point:
• since I have used the definition of regional migration, commuters, which has different
behaviour and charactetistics (Mocetti et al., 2010) are not analysed71;
• despite rising interest for the relative consequences on Italian labour market(Mocetti and
Porello, 2010), interantional migration is not considered.
71Ciriaci (2014, A) show that graduates who studied in university located at regional (or macro-area) bor-
ders are more likely to migrate after having completed their university career.
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Figure A.1
Trend in interregional student mobility (%) in the period 2005–14 from southern to northern region.
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data, section “Anagrafe nazionale degli studenti”
*Southern regions include: Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia.
Figure A.2
Net migration rate for all the Italian regions (%); average on ten academic years (2005–14).The elaboration
exlcuede on-line universities
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data, section “Anagrafe nazionale degli studenti”.
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Figure A.3
Difference between net migration rates in the academic year 2004/2005 and 2013/2014 for all Italian regions.
The elaboration exlcuede on-line universities
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data, section “Anagrafe nazionale degli studenti”.
Figure A.4
Annual expenditure (absolute value) in scholarships by all Italian regions.
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data.
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Figure A.5
Scholarships paid on the number of eligible students (%)
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data.
Figure A.6
Scholarships paid on the number of eligible students (%) for each region. Average on academic years between
2001 to 2014
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statiscts: full sample
High school
macro-area
University
macro-area
Working
macro-area
North West 25,49 32,34 41,64
North East 20,34 26,30 26,23
Center 14,58 22,61 20,77
South 31,11 14,90 9,05
Islands 8,48 3,84 2,31
Total 5281 5281 5281
High school macro-area Comeback Stayers Double
movers
Moversremained Post graduation movers
North West 14,92 42,70 6,38 9,99 14,27
North East 34,46 26,8 7,05 9,99 13,34
Center 13,14 16,36 13,76 10,70 15,72
South 24,51 11,03 58,56 54,84 46,90
Islands 12,97 3,11 14,25 14,48 9,77
Absolute values 563 2384 596 981 757
High school macro-area Comeback Stayers Double
movers
Moversremained Post graduation movers Absolute values
North West 6,24 75,63 2,82 7,29 8,02 1346
North Est 18,06 59,50 3,91 9,12 9,41 1074
Center 9,61 50,65 10,65 13,64 15,45 770
South 8,40 16,01 21,24 32,74 21,61 1643
Island 16,29 16,52 18,97 31,70 16,52 448
Ante graduation mobility Post graduation mobility
Stayes Movers
Stayes 75,90 24,10
Movers 45,84 54,16
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Table A.2: Variable description
Variable Description Source N.obs. Mean S.dev. Min. Max.
Net Migration Rate Net migration rate for each region; year
2004-2007
MIUR data, section: “Angrafe
nazionale degli studenti”
5281 -0,078 0,358 -1,768 0,360
Housing cost (origin) Housing cost and rental prices in the origin
province (average between two years: 2003
and 2007)
“Il Sole24ore” survey 5281 51,825 424,30 -764 (a) 953
Scholarships Scholarships paid on the number of eligible
students (%, average from 2001 to to 2006)
in the high school region
MIUR data 2970 0,747 0,188 0,469 1
Max University size
origin region
University size (in terms of student enrolled
by year) in the origin region
MIUR data 5281 3,572 0,680 1 4
University size (high
school area): small
up to 10 000 students - 18 0,003 0,058
University size (high
school area): medium
10 000–15 000 students - 540 0,102 0,303
University size (high
school area): big
15 000–40 000 students - 1307 0,247 0,431
University size (high
school area): mega
more that 40 000 students - 3416 0,646 0,477
Occupational rate 2004
2008 (%)
Regional occupational rate in the origin
region (average between years 2004-2008)
ISTAT data 2970 0,698 0,142 0,483 0,838
Trasports quality 2002
2007
Transport satisfaction in the orgin region;
average on three different trasport modes:
train, bus and pulman. Average on different
years: from 2002 to 2007
ISTAT data 5281 51,62 6,734 40,94 71,11
Female - ISTAT graduates survey 5281 0,503 0,500 0 1
High school mark Discete variable divided in three classes:
from 60 (minimum) to 75, from 76 to 90
and from 91 to 100 cum laude
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,190 0,786 1 3
High school mark: low (60
to 75)
- 1041 0,197 0,397
High school mark:
medium (75 to 90)
- 1668 0,315 0,464
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High school mark: high
(90 to 100 cum laude)
- 2572 0,487 0,499
Family social class Most prestigious professional position
among father and mother
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,165 0,803 1 3
Family social class: low - - 1337 0,253 0,434
Family social class:
medium
- - 1733 0,328 0,469
Family social class: high - - 2211 0,418 0,493
Poli. high school area Dummy for the presence of a polytechnic in
the origin region
“Repubblica” survey 5281 0,382 0,486 0 1
High school macroarea Discrete variable indicating the macroarea
where student takes high school diploma
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,768 1,349 1 5
North West - - 1346 0,254 0,435
North East - - 1074 0,203 0,402
Center - - 770 0,145 0,352
South - - 1643 0,311 0,462
Islands - - 448 0,084 0,278
High school track - ISTAT graduates survey 5281 1,700 0,896 1 3
Licei - - 3148 0,596 0,490
Psyco-Art - - 568 0,107 0,309
Vocational - - 1565 0,296 0,456
Field of study ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,872 1,481 1 6
Scientific (math and
physic)
- - 969 0,183 0,387
Engineering - - 1687 0,319 0,466
Economics - - 982 0,185 0,389
Social - - 521 0,098 0,298
Humanities - - 1031 0,195 0,396
Physical education - - 91 0,0172 0,130
Family study title Higher education level among parents ISTAT graduates survey 5281 3,276 1,137 1 5
Elementary/nothing - - 189 0,035 0,185
Middle school - - 994 0,188 0,390
High school - - 2591 0,490 0,499
Graduated - - 185 0,035 0,183
Post graduated - - 1322 0,250 0,433
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Transport quality 2008
2012
Transport satisfaction in the orgin region;
average on three different trasport modes:
train, bus and pulman. Average on different
years: from 2008 to 2012
ISTAT data 5281 57,293 10,23 41,871 73,723
Occupational rate 2009
2014 (%)
Regional occupational rate in the origin
region (average betwee years 2009-2014)
ISTAT data 5281 0,696 0,121 0,401 0,793
Age at graduation - ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,649 0,721 1 4
Age 22 or less - - 416 0,078 0,269
Age 23 24 - - 1375 0,260 0,438
Age 25 29 - - 3135 0,593 0,491
Age 30 or more - - 335 0,067 0,250
Size University at-
tended
- MIUR data 5281 2,922 0,836 1 4
University size: small - 202 0,0382 0,191
University size: medium - 1460 0,276 0,447
University size: high - 2167 0,410 0,491
University size: mega - 1452 0,274 0,446
Network Social network to get the first job ISTAT data 5281 0,207 0,405 0 1
On time Graduation on time ISTAT data 5281 0,538 0,499 0 1
Graduation Mark Degree mark is divided in
five categories: from 66, minimum value
found to 110 cum laude,
ISTAT data 5281 3,082 1,447 1 5
Mark less than 91 - - 971 0,183 0,387
Mark 91 100 - - 1101 0,208 0,406
Mark 101 105 - - 1044 0,197 0,398
Mark 106 110 - - 853 0,161 0,368
Mark 110 lode - - 1312 0,248 0,432
Erasmus Erasmus experience ISTAT data 5281 0,117 0,321 0 1
Phd Get a Phd;1=concluded 0=interrupted or
not started
ISTAT data 5281 0,018 0,132 0 1
Specialization Post laurea specialization; 1=concluded
0=interrupted or not started
ISTAT data 5281 0,041 0,197 0 1
Scholarship (work) Grant for a work 1=concluded; 0=inter-
rupted or not started
ISTAT data 5281 0,062 0,241 0 1
Master 1=concluded; 0=interrupted or not started ISTAT data 5281 0,038 0,191 0 1
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Stage Stage in a firm; 1=concluded 0=interrupted
or not started
ISTAT data 5281 0,316 0,465 0 1
Other spec. 1=concluded; 0=interrupted or not started ISTAT data 5281 0,124 0,329 0 1
Apprenticeships 1=concluded; 0=interrupted or not started ISTAT data 5281 0,182 0,386 0 1
Training (education) 1=concluded: 0=interrupted or not started ISTAT data 5281 0,062 0,24 0 1
Polytechnic University attended was a polytechnic ISTAT data and “Repubblica” sur-
vey
5281 0,093 0,29 0 1
Married - ISTAT data 5281 0,194 0,396 0 1
Private university Attended to a private university ISTAT data and “Repubblica” sur-
vey
5281 0,068 0,251 0 1
Internal Relocation
Rate (I.R.R.)
The ratio between the yeraly number of
cancellation for transfer residence in another
region and the regional population as on 1
January (o/oo)
5281 0,005 0,001 0,003 0,010
Post graduation
movers
Dummy indicating if the observation move
in another region after graduation
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 0,362 0,481 0 1
Ante graduation
movers
Dummy indicating if the observation move
in another region after high school
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 0,405 0,490 0 1
Monthly earnings (log-
arithm)
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 7,177 0,488 3,689 8,294
Housing cost (working
area)
Housing cost in the working province (rental
price; average between 2007 and 2011)
“Il Sole24ore” survey 5281 3324,0 1167,90 1175 5150
Housing cost (univer-
sity province)
Housing cost in university province (rental
price; average between 2007 and 2011)
“Il Sole24ore” survey 5281 3302,0 1124,88 1450 5150
Job specialisation Worker specialisation (ATECO 2007, two
digits)
ISTAT graduates survey 5281 3,155 0,895 1 4
Low specialisation 30 0,005 0,075
Low-middle specialisation 1679 0,317 0,465
Medium specialisation 1017 0,192 0,394
High specialisation 2555 0,483 0,499
Part time 5281 0,086 0,281 0 1
Working area ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,042 1,092 1 5
Working area: North East 2199 0,416 0,493
Working area: North West 1385 0,262 0,439
Working area: Center 1097 0,207 0,405
Working area: South 478 0,090 0,286
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Working area: Islands 122 0,023 0,150
Experience Working experience (months) ISTAT graduates survey 5281 38,664 15,282 2 54
B.A. ISTAT graduates survey 5281 1,311 0,463 1 2
Self-employed ISTAT graduates survey 5281 0,11 0,313 0 1
University macroarea ISTAT graduates survey 5281 2,316 1,179 1 5
University macroarea:
North East
1708 0,323 0,467
University macroarea:
North West
1389 0,263 0,44
University macroarea:
Center
1194 0,226 0,418
University macroarea:
South
787 0,149 0,356
University macroarea:
Islands
203 0,038 0,192
Year 2015 Dummy for the wave 2015 5281 0,580 0,493 0 1
(a)The presence of negative value is explained in the section 2.8.
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics: Stayers vs. Movers
Ante graduation mobility Post graduation mobility
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev.
Monthly earnings
(log)
3141 7,202 0,416 2140 7,141 0,575 3365 7,156 0,496 1916 7,214 0,471
Housing cost (working area) 3141 3231,230 1117,037 2140 3460,308 1226,390 3365 3270,604 1110,137 1916 3417,938 1257,792
Job specializatiion 3141 3,114 0,897 2140 3,214 0,888 3365 3,114 0,899 1916 3,226 0,882
Part-time 3141 0,083 0,277 2140 0,091 0,287 3365 0,090 0,287 1916 0,079 0,270
Private university 3141 0,042 0,201 2140 0,105 0,307 3365 0,077 0,266 1916 0,052 0,221
Family social class 3141 2,074 0,801 2140 2,299 0,786 3365 2,147 0,802 1916 2,199 0,804
Field of study 3141 2,838 1,471 2140 2,921 1,494 3365 2,906 1,476 1916 2,811 1,488
Female 3141 0,504 0,500 2140 0,503 0,500 3365 0,522 0,500 1916 0,471 0,499
Age 3141 2,630 0,727 2140 2,678 0,711 3365 2,629 0,729 1916 2,686 0,705
Graduation mark 3141 3,097 1,438 2140 3,060 1,459 3365 3,011 1,445 1916 3,208 1,442
Working area 3141 1,969 1,075 2140 2,149 1,108 3365 2,018 1,058 1916 2,083 1,148
Network 3141 0,210 0,408 2140 0,202 0,401 3365 0,229 0,420 1916 0,169 0,375
On time 3141 0,526 0,499 2140 0,557 0,497 3365 0,544 0,498 1916 0,529 0,499
Phd 3141 0,017 0,130 2140 0,019 0,135 3365 0,021 0,145 1916 0,011 0,107
Specialization 3141 0,037 0,189 2140 0,046 0,209 3365 0,036 0,187 1916 0,048 0,214
Scholarship (Work) 3141 0,054 0,227 2140 0,073 0,260 3365 0,053 0,224 1916 0,078 0,268
Master 3141 0,028 0,166 2140 0,052 0,223 3365 0,025 0,157 1916 0,061 0,239
Stage 3141 0,294 0,456 2140 0,349 0,477 3365 0,290 0,454 1916 0,363 0,481
Other spec. 3141 0,114 0,318 2140 0,138 0,345 3365 0,121 0,326 1916 0,128 0,335
Training 3141 0,159 0,365 2140 0,215 0,411 3365 0,181 0,385 1916 0,182 0,386
Training (educ) 3141 0,062 0,242 2140 0,060 0,238 3365 0,059 0,235 1916 0,067 0,250
Experience 3141 37,964 15,719 2140 39,692 14,559 3365 38,762 15,499 1916 38,492 14,896
B.A. 3141 1,357 0,479 2140 1,243 0,429 3365 1,333 0,471 1916 1,272 0,445
Autonomous 3141 0,086 0,280 2140 0,146 0,353 3365 0,114 0,318 1916 0,104 0,306
Scholarships 3141 0,801 0,172 2140 0,670 0,184 3365 0,783 0,177 1916 0,687 0,191
Married 3141 0,227 0,419 2140 0,145 0,353 3365 0,213 0,410 1916 0,161 0,367
Year 3141 0,469 0,499 2140 0,744 0,436 3365 0,500 0,500 1916 0,723 0,448
High school mark 3141 2,262 0,781 2140 2,330 0,763 3365 2,276 0,782 1916 2,315 0,762
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics by mobility path
Comeback Stayers Double movers Moversremained Post graduation movers
Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev. Count Mean St.dev.
Monthly earnings
(log)
563 7,069 0,542 2418 7,173 0,414 596 7,252 0,440 981 7,115 0,651 757 7,292 0,410
Housing
cost (working area)
563 2477,293 892,740 2384 3050,177 1032,018 596 3819,435 1174,272 981 3806,279 1111,369 757 3801,413 1181,710
Job
specialization
563 3,101 0,902 2384 3,056 0,902 596 3,255 0,884 981 3,255 0,878 757 3,296 0,857
Part
time
563 0,133 0,340 2384 0,092 0,289 596 0,057 0,232 981 0,087 0,281 757 0,057 0,232
Private
university
563 0,052 0,221 2384 0,046 0,210 596 0,081 0,272 981 0,151 0,358 757 0,029 0,168
Family
social class
563 2,123 0,785 2384 2,046 0,792 596 2,314 0,785 981 2,391 0,772 757 2,165 0,823
Field
of study
563 3,004 1,638 2384 2,918 1,501 596 2,914 1,481 981 2,877 1,414 757 2,587 1,342
Female 563 0,522 0,500 2384 0,526 0,499 596 0,471 0,500 981 0,511 0,500 757 0,433 0,496
Age 563 2,714 0,668 2384 2,613 0,734 596 2,661 0,740 981 2,667 0,717 757 2,684 0,703
Graduation
mark
563 3,139 1,356 2384 3,026 1,416 596 3,128 1,461 981 2,973 1,512 757 3,322 1,483
Working
area
563 2,812 1,260 2384 2,031 1,110 596 1,790 0,962 981 1,986 0,921 757 1,771 0,933
Network 563 0,218 0,414 2384 0,234 0,423 596 0,163 0,369 981 0,216 0,412 757 0,137 0,344
On
time
563 0,510 0,500 2384 0,522 0,500 596 0,537 0,499 981 0,596 0,491 757 0,538 0,499
Phd 563 0,012 0,111 2384 0,017 0,130 596 0,003 0,058 981 0,032 0,175 757 0,017 0,130
Specialization 563 0,036 0,185 2384 0,031 0,172 596 0,049 0,215 981 0,050 0,218 757 0,057 0,232
Scholarship
(Work)
563 0,064 0,245 2384 0,047 0,213 596 0,092 0,290 981 0,066 0,249 757 0,077 0,266
Master 563 0,046 0,210 2384 0,019 0,138 596 0,079 0,270 981 0,040 0,195 757 0,057 0,232
Stage 563 0,281 0,450 2384 0,266 0,442 596 0,413 0,493 981 0,349 0,477 757 0,384 0,487
Other
spec.
563 0,140 0,348 2384 0,115 0,320 596 0,139 0,347 981 0,136 0,343 757 0,111 0,314
Training 563 0,224 0,417 2384 0,160 0,367 596 0,180 0,384 981 0,232 0,423 757 0,153 0,360
Training
(educ)
563 0,101 0,302 2384 0,063 0,244 596 0,044 0,204 981 0,047 0,212 757 0,059 0,237
Experience 563 36,158 15,773 2384 37,497 16,057 596 39,502 14,287 981 41,835 13,574 757 39,433 14,516
B.A. 563 1,275 0,447 2384 1,380 0,486 596 1,255 0,436 981 1,216 0,412 757 1,284 0,451
Autonomous 563 0,187 0,390 2384 0,095 0,294 596 0,087 0,282 981 0,159 0,366 757 0,057 0,232
Scholarships 563 0,766 0,175 2384 0,840 0,141 596 0,622 0,168 981 0,643 0,177 757 0,678 0,199
Married 563 0,229 0,421 2384 0,254 0,435 596 0,119 0,324 981 0,113 0,317 757 0,143 0,350
Year 563 0,405 0,491 2384 0,346 0,476 596 0,852 0,355 981 0,874 0,332 757 0,857 0,350
High
school mark
563 2,158 0,779 2384 2,219 0,790 596 2,359 0,753 981 2,413 0,745 757 2,396 0,739
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Table A.5: Second stage of the 2SLS estimation: the effect of ante graduation mo-
bility on post graduation mobility
Dependent variable: Post graduation mobility
Coeff. Stand.errors
Ante graduation mobility 0.117*** (0.030)
Family social class: medium -0.016 (0.016)
Family social class: high -0.031* (0.018)
Female -0.048*** (0.013)
University macroarea: North East 0.088*** (0.022)
University macroarea: Center 0.120*** (0.025)
University macroarea: South 0.144** (0.059)
University macroarea: Islands 0.136* (0.071)
Field of study: engineering -0.008 (0.019)
Field of study: economics -0.064*** (0.020)
Field of study: social -0.023 (0.025)
Field of study: humanities -0.025 (0.020)
Field of study: physical educ. 0.007 (0.045)
Transport quality 2008 - 2012 -0.003*** (0.001)
Occupational rate 2009 2014 (%) -0.734*** (0.178)
Age: 23-24 -0.039* (0.023)
Age: 25-29 -0.045* (0.023)
Age: more than 30 -0.079** (0.033)
Univ. size: medium 0.008 (0.043)
Univ. size: high -0.011 (0.046)
Univ. size: mega -0.058 (0.048)
Family study title: middle school -0.009 (0.032)
Family study title: high school 0.036 (0.031)
Family study title: graduated 0.015 (0.045)
Family study title: post gradut. 0.056 (0.035)
Network -0.067*** (0.014)
On time -0.000 (0.014)
Grad.Mark: 91-100 0.044** (0.019)
Grad.Mark: 101-105 0.051** (0.020)
Grad.Mark: 106-110 0.073*** (0.021)
Grad.Mark: 110 lode 0.052*** (0.020)
Ereasmus 0.077*** (0.020)
Phd -0.122*** (0.046)
Specialization 0.025 (0.031)
Scholarship (Work) 0.043* (0.025)
Master 0.137*** (0.033)
Stage 0.059*** (0.013)
Others spec. -0.006 (0.018)
Training -0.044*** (0.016)
Training (educ) 0.041 (0.025)
Polytechnic -0.022 (0.024)
Housing cost (univer. prov.) -0.000*** (0.000)
Married -0.010 (0.015)
Private university -0.060 (0.037)
Year: 2015 0.169*** (0.015)
cons 1.005*** (0.164)
N 5281
F test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 5280) = 1425.54
Prob > F = 0.0000
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table A.6: Wage regression corrected trough with a different specification of the
RPB model
Dependent variable: Monthly earnings (log)
Coeff. Stand.errors
Post graduation mobility 0.040* (0.024)
Housing cost (working area) 0.000** (0.000)
Job specialization: middle 0.081 (0.076)
Job specialization: low-middle 0.074 (0.075)
Job specialization: high 0.081 (0.075)
Family study title: middle school 0.029 (0.028)
Family study title: high school 0.026 (0.028)
Family study title: graduated 0.032 (0.036)
Family study title: post gradut. 0.035 (0.031)
Part-time -0.510*** (0.026)
Private 0.031 (0.028)
High school mark 0.007 (0.008)
Family social class: medium 0.043*** (0.013)
Family social class: high 0.040** (0.016)
Engineering 0.055*** (0.015)
Economics 0.026 (0.016)
Social -0.069*** (0.020)
Humanities -0.141*** (0.020)
Physical Education -0.088* (0.052)
Female -0.086*** (0.012)
Age: 23-24 0.010 (0.019)
Age: 25-29 0.036 (0.024)
Age: more than 30 0.022 (0.036)
Graduation mark: 91-100 0.005 (0.019)
Graduation mark: 101-105 0.024 (0.020)
Graduation mark: 106-110 0.015 (0.022)
Graduation mark: 110 Lode 0.058*** (0.022)
Working area: Nord East -0.032** (0.013)
Working area: Center -0.073*** (0.016)
Working area: South -0.086*** (0.022)
Working area: Islands -0.172*** (0.058)
Network -0.012 (0.015)
On-time 0.029** (0.012)
Phd -0.039 (0.049)
Specialization 0.001 (0.028)
Master -0.002 (0.021)
Scholarship (Work) 0.017 (0.033)
Stage 0.034*** (0.011)
Other spec. -0.025 (0.019)
Training -0.082*** (0.017)
Training (educ) -0.003 (0.027)
Experience 0.004*** (0.000)
B.A. -0.023 (0.017)
Self-employed -0.588*** (0.037)
Married 0.016 (0.014)
Year 2015 -0.068*** (0.014)
cons 7.018*** (0.091)
N 2251
F test of excluded instruments:
F( 1, 5280) = 1317.17
Prob > F = 0.0000
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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3Migration and “job level”: an
estimation using an Ordered
Probit model
3.1 Introduction and research issue
Workplace mobility has been considered a tool with which to rebalance labour market differences
in terms of unemployment and the skills required in them and even a way to obtain better op-
portunities in terms of job specialization, wages and type of contract (Middeldorp et al., 2016).
As well as being included as an additional issue in any study of effectiveness and efficiency of
the university system, it might give suggestions in the evaluation of the early graduates’ work-
ing careers, job quality, satisfaction and “job level” (Bacci et al., 2008), characterized, at least
for Italy, by greater contractual instability and mobility between job and places (Argentin and
Triventi, 2011). Where the workings of the labour market vary, intensifying the spatial search
effort may be a good strategy for the purposes of obtaining a better job-match, coherent with
an individual’s academic career and expectations.
Interest in the effects of workforce mobility is not new and its relevance to macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies has been widely discussed (DaVanzo, 1981; Pissarides and Wadsworth,
1989). Many of the empirical findings have been limited by a data structure which generates,
especially, difficulties identifying the exact moment when people move and why (is it after or
before finding job). This also explains why any interpretation of the effects of workplace mobility
on wages (or other outcomes) should be read carefully. In fact, migration analysis usually infers
employment status before or at the time of migration with data on labour outcomes referring
to the period before migration (Mitchell, 2008). The same problem occurs in the evaluation of
factors affecting migration decisions, which should relate to earlier periods if interpretations are
to be correct (Mocetti et al., 2010).
Equally important is the choice of which variables are to be used to evaluate migration effect.
Most studies considered wages the most significant outcome to consider, but, as we saw in the
previous chapter, job position, contract and job specialization can also be consider, especially if
administrative data are available.
In fact, definitions of employment status and working conditions based on survey data are often
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generic and do not consider periods of labour inactivity between contracts that may have nega-
tive effects on working careers (Argentin and Triventi, 2011).
In the previous chapter I illustrated the effect of interregional mobility on wages taking into
account the endogeneity of migration. The results suggest that moving has a positive (though
small) impact on the early stages of a career. In this chapter I will introduce an empirical exercise
whose aim is to:
• evaluate the effects of workplace migration on a different labour market outcome;
• overcome the limits referred to above: timing of mobility and possible survey data bias.
Using information collected directly by the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, adequately
integrated with data provided by the “La Sapienza” University of Rome and the “Almalaurea”
database, I’ll try to answer the following questions: does workplace mobility lead to a good “job
level” in the labour market four years after graduation? What are the main drivers of relocation
after graduation? Other than observable factors such as field of study, age and degree mark
are there other unobservable factors affecting the likelihood of relocation and labour market
outcomes?
Before beginning with my empirical methodology, I will discuss research motivations and
some relevant results ruled out by previous empiriacal works in the next section.
3.2 Reasons behind workplace mobility
As explained in the first chapter, the flexibilization of the labour market in presence of significant
disparities between places may increases internal migration flows. Even if changes in labour mar-
ket conditions are greater for the unemployed than for the other individuals (Westerlund, 1998),
different functioning of local labour markets can prompt even those who are already employed
to move to improve their working conditions.
Certainly the reasons behind changes to young graduates’ employment opportunities over the
last decade are varied and complex. Complementary factors such as infrastructure costs, unem-
ployment rates, local bargaining (even at firm level) and family background may have affected
both employment opportunities and working conditions differently and a clear distinction be-
tween them is very difficult to achieve (Parenti and Tealdi, 2015).
A range of empirical works has attempted to analyze correlations between job changes and mi-
gration decisions. Haussen (2016) has analyzed migration decision determinants for first jobs
and the relationship between graduate job and location changes after labour market entry (five
years after graduation). He has shown that the majority of university graduates change job more
than once in the five years after graduation and that changes are strongly linked to interregional
migration 1.
Using a longitudinal Italian dataset Bacci et alt. (2008)2, have investigated which type of
degree courses are associated with a high level of mobility for occupational reasons and what
the individual characteristics influencing mobility (post-graduate studies, marriage, having at
least one graduate parent, having children, age at graduation, job satisfaction or being a working
student) are. This analysis produced interesting results. The degree courses with the highest
1He found that over five years, 40% of graduates left their university region with variation across regions
2The analysis draws upon the ALMALAUREA database on year 2000, 2001 and 2002 graduates.
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rates of mobility for occupational reasons are those with a considerable mobility “predisposition”
(international and diplomatic relations, translation and interpreting, institutions and financial
markets) and the likelihood of moving after gradutaion is strictly related to previous migration
since movers are more likely to study in a region other than their home region3.
As regards the effects of job changes and workplace mobility on labour market outcomes, there
is general agreement on the positive effects exerted on early graduates’ career paths.
Venhorst and Corvers (2015) used a sample of early graduates from the Netherlands, with an
OLS, controlling for different observed personal and regional characteristics, have shown that
job mobility has a positive effect on wage level and on job-match4.
Taking into account a twofold selection of migration and industry change, Abreu, Faggian and
McCann (2014) have shown a positive workplace mobility effect, and a negative one related to
changing both location and industry.
Starting with the assumption that job change can reinforce models explaining why earnings
increase with tenure, Topel (1992) has shown that in ten years after graduation, employees have
changed jobs an average of seven times and one third of their wage growth was attributable to
this factor. Furthermore, he argues that job duration correlates with wages, and wage growth is
associated with searching process (looking for a job on a national or international scale).
Van Ham (2001), has shown that workplace mobility is instrumental in career advancement
especially for those who accept long distances jobs: workers who accept long distance jobs show
greater career adavancement after job change as compared with those opting for jobs close to
home5.
The real innovation of the work referred to here is its introduction of the concept of job level
into career advancement measured comparing job levels obtained with previous employment6
with job levels defined by assigning skill levels to work on the basis of National Statistical Office
classifications.
Very similar resutls were obtained by Mitchell (2008) who argued that positive workplace mo-
bility effects do exist (occupation and activity sector changes), but these are strongly related to
“skill level”: the low skilled (also less mobile) experience diminished workplace mobility benefits,
other things being equal.
In the current literature, migration is seen as an investment, enabling specific human cap-
ital to be acquired and this may explain why those who move earn more. The role of specific
human capital is comparable to the “tenure effect”, which is generally used to explain earnings
variance. Middeldrop (2016), for example, has shown that the tenure effect (on wages) varied
in accordance to different mobility paths: it is higher for those who move several times (which
even those obtaining higher percentages of full time contracts in 5 years) and lower for stayers7.
Hensen et al. (2009) suggets that accumulated human capital is maximized by permanent full
time contracts, and contract types are associated with specific mobility path.
3He find also that those who graduates in universities located in centre-north regions are found to be less
prone to mobility than those who attend to university located in Southern regions, while, graduates employed
in central or Northern regions typically display a considerably higher tendency to mobility than those who
found job in the South.
4However, controlling for the endogeneity of migration through the instrumental variable approach, they
finds an insignificant effect of mobility on wage and gives this interpretation: local and economic characteristic
has effect on wage and not the mobility itself.
5The same authors, talking about spatial accessibility, stresses how the increase in quality and means of
transport in the last decade has grown commuting tolerance increasing predisposition to mobility.
6They estimate the effect of the workplace mobility on the difference in the job level.
7He also stressed that the positive effect of mobility on wages is significant for early (“Movers remained” in
the previous chapter) but not late movers (“Mobility post study” in the previous chapter) or commuters.
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Furthermore, he also points out that failure to account for different types of mobility and their
timing may underestimate the effect of spatial mobility on labour market outcomes.
A further factor considered in career progression analysis is the number of temporary con-
tracts preceding a permanent contract. The dissemination of permanent contracts has been a
feature of the response of almost all European countries to high unemployment. In Italy, too,
where good worker protection laws existed prior to reforms, these types of contracts, aiming to
ensure both a better match in the labour market and worker stabilization8, have spread ever since.
However if temporary and short term contracts allow more flexibility for firms, permanent
contracts generate greater benefits since, assuming that training opportunities are correlated
with contract duration, they lead to greater capital accumulation, with positive effects for both
firms and workers. Other than by internal reforms, the likelihood of getting a permanent job
has undoubtedly been influenced by the 2007 crisis (Berloffa et al., 2014; Lilla et al., 2012)9
which increased instability strictly correlated with higher wage volatility (Staffolani and Lilla,
2009). On this point, Lilla and Staffolani (2012) have discussed the entry market conditions of
young entrants using Ministry of Labour and Social policy data (“Comunicazioni obbligatorie”)
for the 2008-2010 period. Through a survival model, they sought to understand whether there
are individual characteristics affecting the likelihood of obtaining an open ended contract and
whether some contracts are more likely to turn in permanent 10. They also found that experience
helps people to obtain a permanent contract and those who have spent many years in education
experience greater difficulties finding a permanent job (although their fixed contracts are more
likely to be made permanent).
The last evidence suggested by the authors relates to Italian geographic differences: they
show that the use of temporary contracts may differ between geographical areas and found that
firms located in North-East and Central Italy are more inclined to use temporary contracts. This
suggests not only the need for heterogeneity between local labour markets to be considered, but
also that this heterogeneity may act as a push factor in migration models.
3.3 “Timing” of mobility
In the first chapter I discussed the issue of migration within the “Signalling” theory framework,
identifying migration as a screening device. As Middeldorp has stressed (2016), in estimating
spatial mobility on labour market outcomes, requires including information on the timing of
mobility (when it takes place) in order to calculate whether readiness to take a job in a different
province or region helps people to obtain better employment conditions. Furthermore, even if
the reverse causality between spatial mobility and labour market outcomes is not completely
overturned (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2011), this information gives us some suggestions on the causes
of migration and distinguishes between voluntary and mandatory choices.
In fact, the assumption that looking for a job in a different place may indicate greater effort
and motivation cannot be ruled out, while those who try to find a job locally, without moving,
8Picchio (2008), shows that temporary position, rather than unemployment, increases the probability of
getting a regular job in the short run.
9Berloffa et al. (2014) show that greater contractual instability in the Italian labour market has led to an
increased family role in the school to work transition.
10They use employment contracts as a unit of analysis and consider the unemployed too; furthermore they
consider all workers and not just graduates.
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may be “forced to stay” (and probably forced to accept jobs which do not correspond to their
expectations) or, are willing to wait for a suitable job without moving (and are probably influ-
enced by “non-pecuniary” motives such as social networks and family ties).
This assumption implies that the returns on migration may vary not only according to the mi-
gration paths discussed previously, but also by time as stressed by Kratz (2013)11.
3.4 Data sources
This work began with a project12 developed by “La Sapienza” University in Rome in conjunc-
tion with Italian Ministry of Labor and Social policy13 aiming to connect two administrative
databases: “Infostud”, an archive containing information on graduates of this university, and
the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy’s “Comunicazioni obbligatorie”, a database containing
the beginning and end of every work contract for all Italian workers. In fact, in accordance with
legislative decree 30/10/2007, starting on 1 March 2008, all employers are obliged to notify the
Labor Ministry of the start, extension, transformation and end of every contract14.
The first of these two databases (Infostud) contains both personal information (such as gender,
province of birth and residence) and data on education (from high school graduation to univer-
sity graduation marks). The information present in this database is very detailed, enabling field
of study, marks in each examination and time used to complete studies to be examined.
The “Comunicazioni obbligatorie” database is divided in two parts (Attivazioni and Cessazioni)15
the combination of which reports the following information16:
• contract start date (presumed and effective);
• contract end date (presumed and effective);
• number of contracts activated after graduation;
• number of contracts activated before graduation;
• duration of contract;
• type of contract;
• job qualification and level;
11He estimates the returns on regional migration through a fixed effect model (on longitudinal data) control-
ling for the number of years after migration and finding that higher returns are visible three years after migra-
tion.
12PRIN: Programmi di Ricerca di Interesse Nazionale; bando anno 2010-2011. Area 11. Successo formativo,
inclusione e coesione sociale: strategie innovative, ICT e modelli valutativi. Coordinatore scientifico nazionale:
G. Domenici. Coordinatore unita` locale Sapienza: P. Lucisano (http://prin.cineca.it).
13The data are taken from the archive “Comunicazioni Obbligatorie”.
14Unfortunately, information on the “transformation” of employment contracts, which tell us whether and
when contracts are made permanent is not available for the data used.
15The difference between the two matrixes is that the first reports information related to the contract ac-
tivation phase while the second reports information on the contract cessation phase. Some of the information
reported in the two databases overlaps.
16The variables reported are only part of those available. For a list of variables used in this analysis see table
B.5 while for a full list of the variables provided by Infostud and Comunicazioni obbligatorie see Lucisano and
Magni (2016).
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• activity sector;
• nation of birth;
• employer identification number;
• workplace location (“Comuni”);
• citizenship.
Great care was required in dataset construction since the information sources vary in struc-
ture.
Firstly, the Infostud database observations are not uniquely identified and have different
identification numbers in the presence of more than one qualification (B.A. or M.A.). In order to
avoid considering the same observation twice, the chronological approach used in Alleva (2012,
2015) can be used. However, in this case, where just two cohorts were considered this problem
should not arise since gaining two qualifications in the same year or less than two is not standard
practice17.
Even more significant is “contract repetition for the same individual”, a problem also high-
lighted by Alleva (20152, 2015). In fact, for the same observation I have as many rows as there
are contracts activated in the observational period. Furthermore, for every worker, it is common
to find more than one contract activated, simultaneously, an issue that makes it difficult calculate
real days worked.
Since my unit of analysis are workers (rather than contracts) I had to synthesize all available
informations in a single row to obtain a matrix without repetition where, for each row I have
one worker with all academic and working information.
Despite the great and comprehensive range of variables available, information on family back-
ground (parents’ qualification), which, as already explained in previous chapters, are relevant
factors to take into account in migration studies, is lacking. To fill this gap I will use data
coming from “Almalaurea questionnaire”18, available for La Sapienza since 2011. This survey
has collected data on both academic career and family background, some of which overlaps with
Infostud data19. In contrast to ISTAT surveys used in the second chapter, the Almalaurea ques-
tionnaire, is performed four times: before graduation, one year after graduation, three years
after graduation and five years later20. The repetition of the questionnaires over time allows
longitudinal data to be collected which is also useful in transition studies. However some limita-
tions prevented me from in depth exploitation of the survey’s “panel nature”. First of all, whilst
the Almalaurea questionnaire is provided by the university, the information in it is not directly
available since it is directly trasmitted to Almalaurea. This requires a waiting period before it
is put back (to university).
Further problems are the presence of missing values. In fact the three and five year period
questionnaires are not compulsory and are subject to this problem.
17A few observations in which a single individual obtained more than one qualification in one or two years
do exist. In such cases I considered the first qualification obtained if they are of same level (two M.A.s for ex-
ample) and the higher qualification where they are different.
18“Alamalurea” is an inter-university consortium made up (at present) of 73 universities accounting for
about 90% of Italian graduates (with the exception of those coming from private universities).
19Since Infostud is an administrative database I consider this data as principal source, and, as further proof,
I use the Almalaurea database to compare the consistency and possible errors in the data reported.
20Another difference is that the first Almalaurea questionnaire is compulsory and the data referred to above
is available for all graduates and not just for a random sample.
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The time lag mentioned limited the data at my disposal and the following table shows the
questionnaires available for the different cohorts of Sapienza graduates:
Year of graduation Available Almalaurea questionnaire
2011 All
2012 One and three years after graduation
2013 One and three years after graduation
2014 One year after graduation
2015 Only pre-graduation questionnaire
Since estimating the effects of migration one year after graduation may lead to biased results
(it may happen that too few graduates are employed one year on) and since the information
contained in the questionnaire carried out five years later is available only for 2011 graduates21,
I had to select 2011 and 2012 graduates alone22 (B.A. and M.A.) and the Almalaurea question-
naire carried out three years after graduation. Therefore, even if the original matrix has a panel
structure, where the same observation is followed from 2008 to 2016, the implementation of the
Almalaurea database forced me to take just two cohorts, where the data used are treated as
pooled cross section23. Whilist, as in the previous chapter, the use of longitudinal is advisable,
in this case it was not possible24.
The decision to use Almalaurea data implies the use of contracts activated up to the end of
the third year only although all academic and working career data is available for every graduate
of La Sapienza University in Rome up to 30/9/2016 (latest updated data available). For example,
for 2011 graduates, I have considered all contracts activated until 31/12/2014 and, for each one
of these, I have calculated several summary variables such as the number of contracts activated,
mean duration, number of employers and so on. This operation has been done for all quantitative
variables while for qualitative variables (for example region of work) I have registered the last
value for the last contract activated before 31/12/2014 alone25.
A further limitation to take into account is that the final dataset contains no information on
the self-employed or those who register no contracts in the reference period. Three assumption
can be made:
• they might be active in the “black economy”;
• they might be self-employed;
• they might be “Not (engaged) in Education, Employment or Training” (NEET)26.
21Furthermore the response rate after 5 years is lower than the others.
22I cannot consider 2013 graduates since data from the Italian labourministry is updated up to 30/9/2016.
23In the panel data we follow the same individuals over time while in the pooled cross section repetition of
the same observation in more than one year is purely accidental (Wooldridge, 2010). Here I am using the same
technique usable for a cross section analysis, which is equally efficient with the data structure described above,
too (Thill, 1995).
24For example the relationship between dependent and independent variables may be affected by temporal
and cross-sectional components which are easier to identify with panel data (Podesta`, 2002).
25For the two cohorts of graduates I have not considered those changing region of work after 31/12/2014 (for
2011 graduates) and 31/12/2015 (for 2012 graduates).
26This group also includes those who continue to study but these are identifiable thanks to information pro-
vided by Infostud.
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Identifying the “true” unemployed is impossible with Comunicazioni obbligatorie but this can
be overcome using the “Almalaurea” questionnaire which reports labourstatus (employed or un-
employed)27.
This may be a way of distinguishing between self-employed and those forced into the black
economy, on one hand, and those who are inactive, on the other28. However, in this exercise I
have only considered those already in the labour market (I decided to drop those with no active
contracts in the reference period), leaving aside the relationship between mobility and unem-
ployment.
After the adjustment discussed above, graduates cohort sample size is as follow:
Year of graduation N Freq. %
2011 13.394 18,41%
2012 14.199 19,52%
2013 14.395 19,79%
2014 15.361 21,12%
2015 15.400 21,17%
Total 72.749
The number of observations is subject to an additional reduction due to the presence of
missing values on key variables. Furthermore, as in the second chapter, I decided to drop those
enrolled in medicine29 those on other courses (M.A., Phd or other B.As and M.As) and those
who were working at the time of and prior to graduation. After this selection, for the year 2011
and 2012 I have at my disposal 3549 observations, 1534 for the first and 2015 for the second. As
shown in the next table, the percentage of movers after graduation in the two cohorts is quite
stable.
Stayers Movers
Year N.obs Freq. N.obs Freq.
2011 1311 85,46% 1720 81,17%
2012 223 14,54% 295 14,64%
1605 2119
The table B.7 in the appendix shows that greater part of student outside Lazio coming from
Campania (10,5%) and Calabria (5,2%) (even if we are not sure that the region of birth is exactly
the same where student take high school graduation.) while, after the first job, the place where
they move are in Emilia Romagna (11,2%) and Lombardia (32,4%).
Looking to the table B.10, where statistics for stayers and movers are reported, is clear that
those who move has an higher job level, higher graduation mark, higher full time contracts and
have actived a greater number of contracts three years after graduation.
3.5 Definition of “workplace mobility” and job level
Here I have defined mobility to work as a dummy with value 1 where region workplace after
three years is different from the original job.
27However information on employed/unemployed status is self-declared and thus potentially subject to bias.
28Another solution may be using other administrative data as those provided by I.N.P.S (“Istituto Nazionale
della Previdenza sociale”)
29Defense (military Academy) is not offered at La Sapienza.
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I have not considered different mobility paths and the remigration process, as in the previous
chapter, since it proved impossible to identify high school area even if individuals who moved to
study can be identified thanks to a variable from the Almalaurea survey which specifies whether
or not students rent rooms in order to attend university.
However I do have only information on birth region, and being the assumption that coincides
with region prior to enrollment, a very strong assumption, I have preferred not to consider study
mobility at all30.
For similar reasons I have not defined mobility as a change of residence since regions of work
frequently do not coincide with individual residence (Mocetti et al., 2010). Furthermore in the
definition of workplace mobility, I have not considered movement within university regions (Lazio
in this case). In fact, as in the previous chapter, the mover groups does not include those who
changed municipality (“Comuni” or provinces) after the first job31.
Another difference from the second chapter, where workplace mobility was defined as the
movement between university region and first job is that, here I have considered mobility after
transition in labour market was completed in order to reduce bias coming from reverse causality,
arising when it is not possible to distinguish whether individuals have moved due to unemploy-
ment (but are looking for work in region they studied in) or are looking for a job on a regional
or national scale.
As I argued above this makes a difference to estimates of the migration premium.
Taking into account that from the first migration to the end of the observation period, there
may have been other remigration processes (not considered here), my interpretation of the “work-
place mobility” dummy is the following: has been at least one migration after the first job and
up to three years after graduation?
As dependent variable I follow the concept of “job level” defined by Van Ham (2001) as the
job position to which corresponds “the amount of theoretical or practical schooling needed to
perform the task adequately and needed working experience (or training time)”32.
As Venhorst and Corves have explained (2015), the “job level” is a much broader concept that
captures the effects of spatial mobility on the labour market better than wages 33. The differences
in labour market functioning may imply not simply differences in earnings (adjustable in Italy
through second-rate or firm level baragaining) but also in the dissemination of certain types of
contract or in sector specilization according to working area.
Therefore, the dependent variable synthesizes three categories of information: type of con-
tract, job qualification and a variable given by the ratio between days effectively worked and the
number of days between graduation day and the last day in the observational period (31/12/2014
for 2011 graduates and 31/12/2015 for 2012 graduates)34.
30Venhorst and Corvers (2015) justify the same choice, hypothesizing that relations with area of birth could
have modified over time and are stronger by the age of 16.
31The region of work is derived by aggregating municipalities by regions. I have not used provinces as ag-
gregation units since, starting from 2011, they have been subject to many modifications. From the same year
municipalities have also been subject to modification (some of these have been cancelled) and to avoid mistakes
I have not considered individuals coming from and working in one of these.
32He defined five job levels according to different job specialization degrees (tabella su come ho definito il job
level dai dati istat)
33The data on wages is available in the Almalaurea questionnaire but divided into classes and, furthermore,
characterized by the presence of many missing values for the reasons explained above.
34A very similar approach is used in Alleva et al. (2015) where, via a logit model, the authors seek to es-
timate factors affecting the job level specified taking into account type of contract, duration and job special-
ization. Specifically, the dependent variable is divided into “contratto ottimale” (permanent contract, higher
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The variable is specified as follows;
Potential =
Networked dayi
Maximumdays of employabilityi
i=1,......,N.
The last component (“Potential”) of the dependent variable should express a measure of how
many days workers were employed and how many potential employment days there were. As
we saw above, the presence of overlapping contracts is a problem which is compounded by the
presence of “one day contracts”35 and a great deal of care has been paid to consider only the net
working days.
The Comunicazioni obbligatorie dataset reports types of contracts which are differentiated
into many categories (around 60) and I decided to reduce these to two: permanent and temporary
contracts. In addition, whilst distinguishing apprenticeship contracts from temporary contracts
would be preferable, making this distinction implied sixteen categories for the dependent variable
and some of these are empty. For this reason I decided to use the first specification with twelve
categories36.
As far as job qualifications are concerned, this component is based on the classification
adopted by ISTAT37 in 2011 (see table B.5 in the appendix).
Initially i grouped qualifications into three categories: high, medium and low specialization
and low specialization but given the low number of observations for the last level I decided to
merge medium and low specialization 38.
The last consideration is on the variable timing of mobility. This framework has been built
starting from the first contract. I calculated the days between the first contract activated by the
individual and the first contract obtained in a different workplace (where this occurred). This
variable assumes values other than zero for those who move at least once in the observation
period and zero values for those who do not move at all (see table B.10 in the appendix).
specialization and duration of at least 8 months) and “contratto quasi ottimale” (higher specialization and du-
ration of at least 8 months).
35Alleva et al (2012) show that the same individual can have hundreds of contracts in the same year and
many of these last one day.
36Whilst in reducing many categories the Ordered Probit model generates a loss of information, this choice
makes sense when numbers of observations for each categories are very low (Greene and Hensher, 2010).
37CP2011
38This classification is modeled following the report: “Fraboni R. and Sabbadini L.L. (eds.) 2014, Gener-
azioni a confronto. Come cambiano i percorsi verso la vita adulta. Istat, Roma”; pg. 85.
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The categories for the dependent variable are specified as follows:
Table 3.1: Job level specifications
Dependent variable: Type of contract Job qualification Days worked /
categories Working days (%)
1 Temporary Medium-Low specialization x<75%
2 Temporary High specialization x<75%
3 Permanent Medium-Low specialization x<75%
4 Permanent High specialization x<75%
5 Temporary Medium-Low specialization 75%<x<25%
6 Temporary High specialization 75%<x<25%
7 Permanent Medium-Low specialization 75%<x<25%
8 Permanent High specialization 75%<x<25%
9 Temporary Medium-Low specialization x>75%
10 Temporary High specialization x>75%
11 Permanent Medium-Low specialization x>75%
12 Permanent High specialization x>75%
3.6 Econometric specification
The empirical strategy used accounts for the possibility that unobservable factors affecting mi-
gration decisions will also affect the outcome variables. The model is thean made up of two
stages. In the first stage I have estimated migration probability through a Probit model and,
in the second one I have used an Ordered Probit model to calculate the effects of workplace
mobility on various labour market levels.
The methodology takes up a recent work by Iammarino and Marinelli (2017) using an Ordered
Probit model to estimate the effect of workplace mobility on over-education. The authors used a
two-step procedure and without using any “exclusion restrictions” to overcome migration endo-
geneity, found that interregional mobility increases employability and the likelihood of a better
labour market match39. Other than considering the endogenous relationship between migration
and “job level”, as in the precious chapter, also self-selection into employment should be take in
to account. However, I have not considered the second issue since here, too, it proved impossible
to identify a good instrumental variable for the employment selection equation40. Self-selection
into employment can bias our results if the likelihood of obtaining a certain “job level” is dif-
ferent for employed and unemployed workers respectively. This could limit the relevance of the
39Devillanova (2013) reached a conflicting result for the effect of interregional mobility on over-education:
accounting for migration endogeneity and including job characteristics as control, he found a positive inter-
regional mobility effect on the likelihood of over-education. Although it is not verifiable in the theoretical
framework adopted, one explanation mentioned is that since human capital is not portable (not a perfect sub-
stitute), migrants are more likely to be over-educated.
40Devillanova (2013) use family member numbers as tools for self-selection in employment and critique Van
Ham (2003) who use age as an exclusion restriction since this variable impacts both on employment and over-
education (dependent variable).
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estimate presented and an extension of this work would be to resolve this.
The econometric specification proposed uses a latent regression model (Green, 2007) where
the outcome equation is specified as follows:
Y ∗i = X
′
iβ +Mi + εi (3.1)
Mi represents the endogenous dummy variable (here workplace mobility), X
′
i a vector of
explanatory variables and εi is the random error term, assumed normally distributed across ob-
servatinos, which has mean equal to zero and variance eqaul to one.
The unobservable latent dependent variable Y ∗i is related to an observed ordered discrete variable
Yi:
Y ∗i =

0 if Y ∗i ≤ 0
1 if 0 < Y ∗i ≤ µ1
2 if µ1 < Y
∗
i ≤ µ2
.
.
.
J if µJ−1 ≤ Y ∗i
where µ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated with β. From is model we obtain the
probability for different ordered outcomes:

Pr(y = 0 | x) = Φ(x′β)
Pr(y = 1 | x) = Φ(µ1 − x′β)− Φ(−x′β)
Pr(y = 2 | x) = Φ(µ2 − x′β)− Φ(µ1 − x′β)
.
.
Pr(y = J | x) = 1− Φ(µJ−1 − x′β)
The relevant part of this model is represented by the marginal effects and their coeffi-
cient interpretation is the following: each increment of a unit in the independent variable in-
creases/decreases the probability of selecting alternative j by a certain percentage. Formally,
these are expressed as follows:

∂ Pr(y=0|x)
∂x = φ(x
′β)β,
∂ Pr(y=1|x)
∂x = [−φ(x′β)β − φ(µ− x′β)]β,
∂ Pr(y=J|x)
∂x = φ(µ− x′β)]β,
Here Φ represents the standard normal cumulative density function. Since this model can
be considered an extension of the univariate Probit model, optimization is obtained with the
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maximum likelihood estimation.
The 12 classes identified with table 3.1, must be ordered, mutually exclusive and exhaustive41.
Within the random utility function framework, every class is associated with a different utility
function and a higher class is associated with higher utility (Greene and Hensher, 2010).
As in the second chapter, I assumed that migration is related to labour market condition and
to observable and unobservable individual characteristics (Picchio, 2008). Mobile graduates are
more able and motivated (or have more financial resources) and better labour market outcomes
could be partly explained by selectivity and not by migration itself (Wiers-Jenssen, 2011).
To overcome this problem I used the top step “Heckman procedure”. In the first step I calculated
the likelihood of migration and derived inverse Mills, adding it as a covariate to the Ordered
Probit model.
The selection equation is as follows:
Mi = X
′
iα+P.R.i2002+ηi
(3.2)
M is a dummy variable indicating migration, X ′i a the set of covariates affecting both migration
decisions and job levels, and P.R.i2002 is the instrument variable that should be correlated with
migration probability but not with outcome variable. As usual, the error term has a normal
distribution.
The inverse Mills ratio (the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distri-
bution function of a distribution) is calculated as follows42:
λi =
φ(X ′iα)
Φ(Z ′iα)
The problem in using the inverse Mills ratio is the collinearity between the correction term
and other regressors in the outcome equation (Bushway et al., 2007). In fact, even if the model’s
assumption of non-linearity may be sufficient to avoid the use of the instrumental variable, I
would add P.R.i2002, which does not enter the set of covariate X
′
i used in the Ordered Probit
model. The next section describes the instrument used.
41It is standard practice to order classes from worst to best (Boes, 2013).
42Since the inverse Mills ratio is derived from normal distribution, it is advisable to use an Ordered Probit
model and not a logit model. In fact, while in the logit model errors are assumed to follow standard logistics
distribution, in the Probit model the error term follows normal distribution.
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3.7 Instrument and exclusion restriction
As stressed previously, past migration affects the actual likelihood of moving and not simply on
the basis of the results in terms of labour market outcomes and education. In fact, empirical
work has argued that previous migration is relevant to the second generation of immigrants and
the results in terms of wage and educational outcomes are related to changes in concentration of
immigrants in the chosen location (Borjas, 1992; Goodwin-White, 2012).
One of the main channels by which past migration influences newer migration is the local
labour market information flow that facilitates the catching up process, reducing the disadvan-
tage deriving from being “non-native” (Cutillo and Ceccarelli, 2012). Taking into account that
one of the determinants in location choice is the percentage of an individual’s ethnic group that
is working in the same area (Bartel, 1989), I have assumed that relocation decisions after grad-
uation are influenced by the percentage of people who relocate and the fact that some of these
come from the same region of origin43.
For these reasons I have taken the internal migration rate between regions in 2002, the first
year available. This data are provided by ISTAT and refers to registration and deregistration (of
Italian and foreign individuals) numbered in local authority birth records44.
The index (“Past Relocation in 2002”) used as instrument is structured as follows:
P.R.j2002 =
Regionij
Total number of invidual transferred fromregioni
i=1,......,20 (Origin45)
j=1,......,20 (Destination)
The index is expressed in percentage terms and given by the ratio between of total number
of individuals coming from the region i and transferred to region j on the total number of indi-
viduals transferred from region i in 2002.
Table B.1 (appendix) shows the value of the index, by region of birth and destination. The higher
value corresponds to the cell where region of birth and destination are the same, suggesting that
the lion’s share of mobility occurs within the same region46.
I have sought to disentangle this “composition effect” using a different instrumental variable
derived from data already used in a previous work (Piras, 2005).
The instrument proposed has the same structure as its predecessor but is based on the graduate
migration flow (between regions), from 1990 to 1999.
43Bartel (1989) has suggested that economic conditions have relatively limited effects on destination choice
and immigrants are mainly attracted by a large concentration of earlier immigrants.
44Documents and data are downloadable from the following website:
http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCIS MIGRAZIONILang=
46Interregional mobility rates are in fact derived from mobility between Italian town council areas.
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The alternative instrument (“Past Graduates relocation”) is made up as follows:
P.G.R.ijt =
Regionijt
Total number of individuals transferred fromregionit
i=1,......,20 (Origin47)
j=1,......,20 (Destination)
t=t¯=1990,......,1999.
The index is expressed in percentages and show how many graduates coming from region i
went to region j (transfer residence).
The two instrument presented are very similar except in the compostion: in the second there
are only graduates (with no distinction between M.A.s and B.A. or specification reasons for move-
ment). Testing a further instrument helped me to understand the composition effect better, even
though the motivation behind it is the same as explained above. Using alernative instrument,
the results were very similar both for selection and outcome equations but, as shown in table
B.8 (appendix), the correlation between past relocation and current workplace mobility becomes
non significant and I decided to opt for the first instrument presented.
Scholarly arguments on the right variable to use in interregional mobility vary and often
conflict. With a linear probability model, Devillanova (2013) tried to estimate the effect of mi-
gration on over-education and used ‘housing tenure’ as instrumental variable, a variable which
should affect the likelihood of moving but not the independent variable (over-education)48. Dev-
illanova also discussed the problems potentially coming from using regional variables as tools for
migration, supporting the idea that local variables cannot capture the individual unobservable
characteristics which are at the origin of the endogeneity problem.
In a very similar work in which she tried to rule out determinants of study and work migration
through a bivariate Probit model, Capuano (2009) also supported the thesis by which regional
variables are not suitable as exclusion restrictions in both equations.
Internationally speaking, Venhorst and Corvers (2015) investigated the impact of inter-
regional mobility on job-match quality using two dummies as instrumental variables: one indi-
cating whether a graduate lives in the central economic region of the Netherlands at age sixteen,
and one indicating whether the graduate had one or more parents born outside the Netherlands.
The latter is an individual characteristic while the second is based on motivation closely related
to the one argued for here. In fact, living in a rich region at the age of 16 affects search behav-
ior, positively if we assume that there is a correlation between coming from a rich region and
available information, negatively if we assume that there are better employment opportunities
in rich regions.
Furthermore they also introduced a third variable, “Spatial mobility before the onset of study”,
which is a similar variable to that used in this exercise. Every individual’s migration path (in
terms of distance) is compared to the same migration path of very similar individuals (same
graduation cohort, same home region, same field of study)49.
The example cited above and the absence in the dataset of an individual variable suitable to
overcoming endogeneity, led me to choose the instrument described above.
48However, housing tenure can be correlated with income and with actual profession and this casts doubt on
this choice.
49This is the ratio of the distance moved by graduate i to the average distance traversed by his or her peer
group, excluding graduate i.
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3.8 Empirical results for the Probit model
Table 3.2 reports the marginal effects for the Probit model. The ISEE code (Equivalent Eco-
nomic Situation Indicator) is the assessment tool for the household’s economic situation used to
apply tariff reductions and/or contributions for educational services. I have used it as a proxy
for disposable household income. I split this continuous variable into five categories (from worst
to better conditions) and used the first category as a reference category. As we have seen, the
second category alone is significant and shows that “belonging to wealthier families” decreases
the likelihood of moving by 2,6%. The other classes are not significant but show the same trend.
Differences in the ISEE code result may be due to significant differences in the number of
observations between the first two modalities and the last (see table B.5). Furthermore, it should
be considered that it is standard practice especially for those with self-employed parents, not
to declare their true economic condition. In fact, Alleva has stressed (2015), the ISEE code is
self-declared and thus subject to some bias which reduces the trustworthiness of the results.
The “post graduate specialization” dummy inidicates if individuals have completed an M.A., a
Phd and any other kind of activity (non-academic) and, as we can see, it is not significant50.
There is no information in the dataset which distinguishes between public or self-employed
work but it is possible to derive this distinction from the ISTAT code on job qualification which
specifies the public or private nature of almost all professions (see table B.6 in the appendix).
This distinction is relevant in this analysis. In fact, those employed in the public sector show
different migration likelihoods since their area of work is decided by government or regional ad-
ministrations (Devillanova, 2013).
I have used the same variable both in the Probit and Ordered Probit models but their structures
are different.
In the Probit model, I considered public employment for first contracts, thus prior to migration,
and sought to answer this question: does being a public employee affect migration decisions neg-
atively or positively? On the other hand, in the Ordered Probit model, I considered the “public
sector employees” variable as a control in order to verify whether workplace mobility maintained
its effect even when the distinction between public and private employees was taken into ac-
count51. However, since for some professions this distinction cannot be deduced, I was unable to
calculate all the individuals effectively working in the public sector with absolute certainty.
As shown in the Probit model, the variable is significant and positive (5%), in line with Devil-
lanova’s findings (2013), where public employees showed higher rates of mobility. For the “parent
self-employed”, which is a dummy indicating the presence of at least one parent working indepen-
dently, I used the same methodology (I cross-referenced information from different questions).
Here, the distinction between public and self-employed is much clearer and thus these results are
more reliable.
However this variable, as parents’ social class and educational level52, does not show significant
effects. This result may be justified by an assumption that families with higher education and
social class might attach greater value to human capital investment (Impicciatore and Tuorto,
2011), than, to relocation for study and I would not expect a direct influence on workplace mo-
bility.
50In contrast to the previous chapter here it proved impossible to distinguish between specialization types
but only whether these were complete, interrupted or underway.
51In this case, job qualifications were observed at the end of the observed period and the distinction between
public or private was made on the basis of the last contract activated.
52The two variables have the same structure as those used in the second chapter except for the educational
level where I have added a category indicating whether both parents are graduates (the reference category).
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The results confirm a negative (but non significant) relationship between age at graduation
and migration since young graduates are more prone to move after their first job (Parenti and
Tealdi, 2015)53. Graduates in chemistry, pharmaceuticals, social sciences and humanities are
more mobile than scientific graduates (maths). Some of these results correspond with Bacci et
al (2008) who used Almalaurea data to investigate the fields of study associated with greater
mobility rates. He stressed that some degree courses lead to a natural predisposition to mobility:
political science, art, translation and interpreting54. As regards Economics graduates I was ex-
pecting a positive correlation with mobility to work since the empirical work cited above shows
that in general, more technical fields show a greater propensity to mobility55.
The relevance of the subject of study control is also highlighted by other empirical work
focusing on different countries. Abreu, Faggian and McCann (2014) used longitudinal micro-
data on 5,000 recent UK graduates who finished their studies in 2002/03, showing that business
graduates are more flexible in their migration strategies and earn higher salaries (this suggests
adding this covariate in outcome equations too).
Those with M.A.s show greater mobility than those with B.A.s. This may be explained in
terms of an increased level of specialization making national-scale competition possible while
B.A. graduates have more general competences and are easier to replace in other local labour
markets. In according that expected regards, positive migration selection in graduation mark is
shown (Ciriaci, 2009), even if the coefficients magnitude are very low.
Controlling for region of birth generated no significant result and this may be due to the
specific sample selected (newly graduated students in Rome) or, as explained above, to possible
differences between region of birth and home region before enrollment at university.
The last variable reported in table 3.2 shows the marginal effects of the instrumental variable.
The coefficient is highly meaningful and the effect negative: the relocation rate from region i
to the region j in 2002 is negative correlated with the present relocation rate. If we start from
Borjas’s hypothesis (Borjas, 1992), this is a counterintuitive result since I would have expected
that individuals to be attracted to place where individuals had moved previously. It is difficult
to identify the reasons behind these results but some hypotheses may be suggested.
The first relates to the composition effect which I have already discussed. The composition effect
is based on possible changes in labour market functioning (especially technological progress56)
which has changed geographical labourdemand. In fact, while the main direction of migration
remains the same (from the South to the Central-Northern regions), the composition in terms of
age and education may be substantially different (Etzo, 2011; Mocetti et al., 2010)57 .
However, as I have explained, I sought to isolate this effect using past relocation rates of
graduates from 1990 to 1999, and obtained very similar results (see table B.8 in the appendix)
in terms of direction (but not significance) of the effect on the endogenous dummy and thus can
exclude this argument as a possible justification for this result.
53Bacci et al. (2008) arrived at an opposite result, interpreting it as a consequence of delayed entry in the
labour market by those individuals with a post-graduate qualification (which are those with a greater mobility
rate).
54Here, translation and interpreting are grouped together with humanities.
55Some results may be different due to different field of study classification or grouping.
56An interesting reflection on the effect of technological change on the Italian labour market has been pro-
posed by Stagliano` (2016).
57Etzo explains how this change influenced the role of family networks on migrations paths too.
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Another possible explanation of this result may be related to a change in the relationship
between native internal mobility and immigration in Italy, which is discussed in Porello and
Mocetti (2010, B). These two authors found that immigration is positively associated with in-
flows of highly educated local people and it is possible that the clustering of foreigners in the
North-Central regions might have met a job demand that was satisfied in the past by those from
the Southern regions. If this reasoning is baseless then we might expect that low skills decrease
migration propensity and high skills increase migration propensity with some effects in terms of
composition.58.
A last possible reason for the results obtained may be the “saturation effect”. Past migration
may have been induced by some activity sector which saturated over the years and this may have
obliged present graduates to choose other destinations in their job searches. The three hypothe-
ses proposed are intertwined and, showing their empirical validity would be very difficult here.
These are simply speculative answers that may be used as avenues to be explored in subsequent
research.
3.9 Empirical results for the Ordered Probit model
Table 3.7 shows the probability forecast for each outcome given that the rest of the variables are
at their mean values59.
The values are all significant and the probabilities are much greater for the first outcome. For
example in the first table we can see that the predicted probability of being in the first class is
22% given that all predictors are set to their mean values while the probability of being included
in the ninth class is 10%. This is a plausible result since I have considered individuals three years
after graduation, at the first stage of their professional careers, when employment instability is
usual.
However, other than the “short term effect”, a possible explanation for this result may be that
the classes of the independent variable are clustered in terms of number of observations and some
categories have many more observations than others. As shown in table B.5 (appendix) the lion’s
share of the observations is distributed in the first (24%), fifth (22%) and ninth (9%) class. This
could lead to higher predicted probabilities for classes with high numbers of observations.
This could led to get higher predicted probability for the classes with the high number of
observations.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the Ordered Probit model results, respectively with and without cor-
rection for endogeneity. Leaving aside interpretation for the control variable coefficients, in the
uncorrected Ordered Probit model (table 3.3), the endogenous dummy is highly significant, with
a positive coefficient (18,8%). Looking at the corrected estimation for endogeneity (table 3.4), the
effect of migration on job levels is lower (11,6%) than that estimated previously. This means that
unobservable characteristics (other than “being a migrant”) increase the likelihood of achieving
a good job level. Furthermore the correction term λ is positive and significant and thus the two
step correction finds empirical justification. In fact, adding the selectivity term, which in this
case indicates the likelihood that an individual might decide to relocate after their first job over
the cumulative probability of an individual’s decision, as additional control, helps to control for
unobservable factors present in the error term influencing the decision to move and job levels.
58This could also have induced the low skilled to change destination and turn their attention to international
labour markets.
59The numbers in brackets are the outcomes, ordered from worst to best job level.
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The direction and significance of the selection term suggests that there is a positive reward
(than an “upward bias”) from unobservable factors affecting migration propensity or, as ex-
plained in section 2.10, there are unobserved factors increasing both the probability of selection
and increasing the dependent variable score.
The same table shows the cut off parameter µ, which is needed for the computation but
there is no direct interpretation. However, it serves to show the extent to which the differences
between the ordered categories are sharply delineated. Where these differences are not clear,
the cut-off point (and its relative significance) is more widely dispersed60 (Greene and Hensher,
2010). In tables 3.3 and 3.4 a polarization between the first threshold parameters and the last,
clearly defining the direction of the effects of workplace mobility on job level, is visible.
Since reporting the marginal effect of all predicted outcomes would burden results representa-
tion, within class showing a negative and positive relationship between spatial mobility and job
levels (see table 3.7), I have selected those with the highest numbers of observations and reported
marginal effects for these two predicted outcomes alone. As explained above, the classes to select
(see table B.5 in the appendix) are the first for the classes where there is a negative relationship
between workplace mobility and job level, and the ninth where I found a negative relationship.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the marginal effects of the classes selected. The most natural way to
interpret ordered response models (and discrete probability models in general) is to determine
how a marginal change in one regressor changes the distribution of the outcome variable. For the
dummy explanatory variables, the marginal effects of an Ordered Probit model denote a change
in probability for the outcomes when a specific characteristic is present (female=1) versus when
it is not (female=0). In the case of discrete variables, the marginal effects show the difference in
predicted probabilities for each category relative to the reference ones.
For continuous variables the marginal effect indicates change in the dependent variable for small
independent variable changes (“instantaneous rate of change”) (Torres-Reyna, 2014). For exam-
ple if one covariate increases by very small amount (e.g. 0.001), then P(Y=1) would increase by
the estimated percentage.
Considering table 3.6 where the effect of workplace mobility on job levels is positive. Firstly
I found a negative relationship between post graduate specialization and job level and between
public employment and job level. It is plausible to assume that those with higher human capital
(thus in this case those who complete a post-graduate activity) are subject to more contractual
instability (which could be offset by higher wages) while I was expecting (in the short run) the
opposite result for public employees. A possible reason might be a more widespread use of tem-
porary contracts in the public sector or it is possible that career progression in the public sector
is slower than in the private sector.
On the family background effect I found opposite results between social class and educational
level: while higher educational levels are associated with better results in the labour market,
higher social class is associated with lower job levels. The results obtained for this variable are
the opposite of those found in the previous chapter (where higher social classes are associated
with higher earnings) but the independent variable used in this analysis is different and the
concept of job level defined here is much more similar to a performance concept. In fact, whilst
it is possible that those with better family backgrounds earn more, it is also possible that such
60For example, if the dependent variable was an opinion and the preferences were dispersed, than the cut-off
parameters would be less significant.
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individuals wait longer for the “best job” and thus start work later61. Furthermore, this result
may be biased by self-employed workers, absent in the sample analyzed.
As usual I added controls for field of study finding that quantitative subjects are associated
with higher job levels as compared to humanities, psychology and architecture. On the strength
of the data available, I also controlled for numbers of contracts activated up to the end of the
observational period (“number of contracts” variable). This variable is positively associated with
higher job levels (the coefficient is small but highly significant) confirming that a large number
of contracts activated contributes to obtaining better employment conditions (Lilla et al., 2012;
Picchio, 2008).
The effect of workplace mobility remains strongly significant even when I controlled for age
of first contract which seems to impact on job level: first contracts are later and employment
conditions are worse. This accords with previous results and with the “tenure effect”, where
experience and specific human capital accumulation pay over time62.
I added the activity sector as control (Ateco classification, 2007). Firstly I used three categories
(agriculture, industry and services) but those employed in the first were very few and thus I
decided to merge agriculture and industry into a single sector (here the reference group). The
last relevant control added was the timing of mobility (“timing” variable). As I have stressed
several times in this dissertation, this represents relevant information to consider in estimating
workplace mobility.
This variable can be called the “delaying effect” and suggests that after their first jobs, those
who decide to move early (and are thus available for new jobs in a different regions) tend to
achieve higher job levels, though magnitude coefficient is very low.
As expected, comparing this results with table 3.5 where I estimate the marginal effects for first
job level (the worst employment condition in this framework), the direction of workplace mobility
is the opposite (-6%) as the effect of the control variables discussed above.
Finally, table 3.8 reports the marginal effects for the two variables of interest, selectivity
term and endogenous variable. The coefficients are almost all significant but for the migration
dummy values are very low (from 0,3% to 6%). A clear turnaround in the sixth category, which
is also the median category, is extremely interesting. The change concerns the direction for
the endogenous dummy and this helps to confirm the positive effect of workplace mobility on
employment conditions. The strongest effects are shown for the categories with the greatest
number of observations (1st and 9th).
61On this point, Bratti and Staffolani (2001) have found that higher social class is associated with worse
academic career performance. They also argue that those with better family backgrounds are able to achieve
better employment conditions thanks to the social network effect discussed in the first chapter.
62Result confirmed by the number of contracts effect.
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Table 3.2: Probit model: marginal effects
Dependent variable: workplace mobility
Coeff. Stand.errors
ISEE code:8 to 14 -0.026** (0.012)
ISEE code:15 to 21 -0.033 (0.029)
ISEE code:22 to 27 -0.004 (0.032)
ISEE code:28 to 34 -0.010 (0.031)
Post graduate specialization 0.007 (0.012)
Public sector employees 0.052* (0.029)
Parent self employed 0.009 (0.014)
Parent social class: medium -0.00002 (0.012)
Parent social class: low 0.017 (0.026)
Parent educational level: higher 0.005 (0.023)
Parent educational level: medium -0.002 (0.026)
Parent educational level: low -0.001 (0.031)
Age at graduation: >26 -0.003 (0.009)
Age at graduation: >30 -0.033 (0.026)
Chemistry/pharmacy 0.052*** (0.0192)
Engineering 0.025 (0.019)
Architecture 0.011 (0.025)
Economics -0.005 (0.028)
Politics/social science 0.072*** (0.022)
Law -0.017 (0.075)
Literature 0.062*** (0.018)
Psychology 0.059** (0.025)
M.A. 0.041*** (0.012)
Grad. Mark 104 -0.017* (0.009)
Grad. Mark 105-109 0.009 (0.014)
Grad. Mark 110 cum laude 0.004 (0.018)
Male 0.008 (0.013)
Erasmus 0.019** (0.009)
Macro-area of birth: North East 0.037 (0.065)
Macro-area of birth: Center 0.005 (0.057)
Macro-area of birth: South -0.023 (0.056)
Macro-area of birth: Islands 0.067 (0.056)
Past relocation 2002 -0.373*** (0.154)
Year 0.012 (0.011)
N 3724
(dy/dx) is for discrete change in dummy variable
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table 3.3: Ordered probit without correction
Dependent variable: job level
Coef. Stand. errors
ISEE code -0.007 (0.016)
Post graduate specialization -0.186*** (0.054)
Parent self employed -0.066 (0.047)
Public sector employees -0.197*** (0.068)
Parent social class -0.061** (0.029)
Parent educational level 0.069*** (0.013)
Age at graduation 0.353*** (0.029)
Field -0.076*** (0.006)
M.A. 0.550*** (0.058)
Graduation mark -0.032*** (0.012)
Male 0.173*** (0.051)
Number of contracts 0.004*** (0.0008)
Erasmus -0.122*** (0.033)
Last working area 0.006 (0.020)
Macro-area of birth -0.107** (0.046)
Age first contract (classes) -0.543*** (0.033)
Full time 0.257*** (0.0341)
Activity sector: services 0.041 (0.030)
Timing mobility -0.0001*** (0.00003)
Workplace mobility 0.188*** (0.044)
Year 0.130*** (0.023)
cut1 -1.306*** (0.183)
cut2 -1.023*** (0.185)
cut3 -0.900*** (0.181)
cut4 -0.873*** (0.180)
cut5 -0.231 (0.183)
cut6 -0.0106 (0.184)
cut7 0.253 (0.183)
cut8 0.329* (0.180)
cut9 0.789*** (0.190)
cut10 1.115*** (0.195)
cut11 1.782*** (0.192)
N 3549
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table 3.4: Ordered probit with correction
Dependent variable: job level
Coef. Stand. errors
ISEE code -0.013 (0.015)
Post graduate specialization -0.184*** (0.057)
Parent self employed -0.062 (0.049)
Public sector employees -0.195*** (0.065)
Parent social class -0.058* (0.030)
Parent educational level 0.065*** (0.013)
Age at graduation 0.349*** (0.030)
Field -0.074*** (0.006)
M.A. 0.569*** (0.056)
Graduation mark -0.030** (0.011)
Male 0.177*** (0.052)
Number of contracts 0.004*** (0.0008)
Erasmus -0.111*** (0.032)
Last Working area -0.019 (0.020)
Macro-area of birth -0.077* (0.042)
Age first contract (classes) -0.543*** (0.033)
Full time 0.257*** (0.033)
Activity sector: services 0.044 (0.029)
Timing mobility -0.0001*** (0.00004)
λ 0.230*** (0.042)
Workplace mobility 0.116** (0.047)
Year 0.133*** (0.023)
cut1 -1.055*** (0.247)
cut2 -0.771*** (0.252)
cut3 -0.649*** (0.245)
cut4 -0.622** (0.244)
cut5 0.0215 (0.248)
cut6 0.242 (0.254)
cut7 0.506** (0.252)
cut8 0.582** (0.246)
cut9 1.043*** (0.254)
cut10 1.368*** (0.265)
cut11 2.036*** (0.257)
N 3549
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table 3.5: Predicted probability for outcome 1: marginal effects
Dependent variable: job level
Coeff. Stand. errors
ISEE code: 8 to 14 0.002 (0.007)
ISEE code: 15 to 21 0.019 (0.018)
ISEE code: 22 to 27 0.063** (0.027)
ISEE code: 28 to 34 -0.0003 (0.032)
Post graduate specialization 0.067*** (0.023)
Public sector employees 0.018 (0.014)
Parent self employed 0.042** (0.018)
Parent social class: medium 0.016*** (0.005)
Parent social class: low 0.041** (0.019)
Parent educational level: higher -0.028** (0.014)
Parent educational level: medium -0.035*** (0.012)
Parent educational level: low -0.064*** (0.012)
Age at graduation: >26 -0.110*** (0.008)
Age at graduation: >30 -0.165*** (0.013)
Chemistry/pharmacy -0.008 (0.013)
Engineering -0.096*** (0.010)
Architecture 0.169*** (0.026)
Economics -0.023 (0.015)
Politics/Social science 0.096*** (0.016)
Law 0.025 (0.059)
Literature 0.156*** (0.012)
Psychology 0.088*** (0.011)
M.A. -0.138*** (0.011)
Grad. Mark 104 0.002 (0.013)
Grad. Mark 105-109 0.006 (0.011)
Grad. Mark 110 cum laude 0.018 (0.011)
Number contracts -0.021* (0.011)
Male -0.0009*** (0.0001)
Erasmus 0.021* (0.011)
Macro-area of birth: North Est -0.021 (0.062)
Macro-area of birth: Center -0.031 (0.020)
Macro-area of birth: South 0.001 (0.022)
Macro-area of birth: Island 0.091*** (0.035)
Last Working area: North East 0.076*** (0.014)
Last Working area: Center -0.008 (0.010)
Last Working area: South 0.032 (0.027)
Last Working area: Islands -0.075 (0.048)
Age first contract (classes) (26 to 30) 0.135*** (0.016)
Age first contract (classes) (greater 30) 0.268*** (0.021)
Full time -0.055*** (0.007)
Activity sector: services -0.023*** (0.008)
Timing mobility 0.00003** (0.00001)
λ -0.019** (0.007)
Workplace mobility -0.060*** (0.012)
Year -0.034*** (0.006)
N 3549
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.010
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Table 3.6: Predicted probability for outcome 9: marginal effects
Coeff. Stand. errors
ISEE code: 8 to 14 -0.001 (0.002)
ISEE code: 15 to 21 -0.007 (0.007)
ISEE code: 22 to 27 -0.022*** (0.008)
ISEE code: 28 to 34 0.0001 (0.012)
Post graduate specialization -0.024*** (0.007)
Public sector employees -0.015** (0.006)
Parent self employed -0.007 (0.005)
Parent social class: medium -0.006*** (0.002)
Parent social class: low -0.015** (0.006)
Parent educational level: higher 0.010** (0.005)
Parent educational level: medium 0.013*** (0.004)
Parent educational level: low 0.025*** (0.004)
Age at graduation: >26 0.042*** (0.003)
Age at graduation: >30 0.070*** (0.007)
Chemistry/pharmacy 0.003 (0.006)
Engineering 0.050*** (0.004)
Architecture -0.056*** (0.008)
Economics 0.011 (0.007)
Politics/Social science -0.036*** (0.006)
Law -0.010 (0.024)
Literature -0.053*** (0.005)
Psychological -0.033*** (0.004)
M.A. 0.052*** (0.003)
Grad. Mark 104 -0.0009 (0.005)
Grad. Mark 105-109 -0.002 (0.004)
Grad. Mark 110 cum laude -0.007 (0.004)
Male 0.008* (0.004)
Number contracts 0.0003*** (0.00007)
Erasmus -0.008** (0.004)
Macro-area of birth: North East 0.008 (0.024)
Macro-area of birth: Center 0.012 (0.007)
Macro-area of birth: South -0.0004 (0.008)
Macro-area of birth: Islands -0.028*** (0.010)
Last working area: North East -0.026*** (0.004)
Last working area: Center 0.003 (0.004)
Last working area: South -0.012 (0.009)
Last working area: Islands 0.034 (0.023)
Age first contract (classes) (26 to 30) -0.059*** (0.007)
Age first contract (classes) (greater 30) -0.096*** (0.007)
Full time 0.021*** (0.002)
Activity sector: Services 0.009*** (0.003)
Timing mobility -0.00001** (0.000005)
λ 0.007** (0.003)
Workplace mobility 0.025*** (0.005)
Year 0.013*** (0.002)
N 3549
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.010
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3.10 Limits and further research
The dataset built into this exercise enabled me to overcome some problems in the estimation of
the return from workplace mobility, especially those referred to the timing of mobility.
However some limitations persist. The first one relates to the lenght of the observation period,
probably too short for an in-depth understanding of the relationship between migration and
labour market outcome. This suggests to extending this analysis on the long run.
Other limitations regard the definition of public employer which may be subject to bias for
the reason explained above.
The dataset created has great potential and can be used to carry out policy suggestions on
the school to work transition issue.
With reference to the research question addressed in this empirical work, this analysis can be
extended by analyzing migration decision and simultaneous changes of employer or sector of
activity in order to get a better measure of the return on workplace mobility. In fact, it has
been shown that if this changes, it may alter the relationship between workplace mobility and
employment condition (Hunt, 2004).
Usefully complementing the dataset with additional information, is possible to carry out stud-
ies on the coherence between subject of study and job qualification in order to investigate the
labour market balance between demand and supply (over-education, job quality and the duration
model).
It might also be interesting to study the relationship between educational supply and the
productivity system in greater depth together exploiting the territoriality of the data collected.
Understanding which types of graduates are absorbed into the local labour market can be useful
for the purposes of adapting study courses to labour market subject to ongoing changes. Finally,
the dataset can be supplemented with other source data (for example INPS data) to include
self-employed workers unfortunately not considered in this analysis.
A general observation needs to be made on the restricted sample since i use just graduates
from “Sapienza”, that, despite the fact it’s one of the bigger University in Europe, doesn’t provide
a rappresentative sample of the entire population. However, since in the estimation of the return
from regional migration it is important to consider group as homogenus as possibile (Venhorst
and Co¨rvers, 2015)63, we should not see this as analysis weakness because use such data allow to
eliminate part of heterogeneity coming from having graduates in very different Universities and
labour markets.
Even if the results generalization can be subject to some limits, analysis based on different
adminstrative data source are quite rare for Italy and the methodologies proposed in this chap-
ter might be a good starting point to implement big data collection for public policies evaluations.
63Sestito and Viviani (2016) have also tried to estimate the effect of two labour market policies using data
on just one Italian region (Veneto). They explain that using microdata on a single Italian region has the benefit
of the estimates not being affected by spurious local labour market trends.
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Table B.1: Past relocation in 2002 by region of birth and destination
Region of
birth//Region of
destination
Piemonte Valle
d’Aosta
Liguria Lombardia Trentino Veneto Friuli Emilia
Romagna
Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio
Piemonte 78,80% 0,39% 2,88% 4,72% 0,15% 1,05% 0,32% 1,41% 0,88% 0,16% 0,35% 1,12%
Valle D’Aosta 8,47% 71,81% 1,52% 2,78% 0,12% 1,35% 1,67% 2,38% 1,30% 0,02% 0,32% 1,35%
Liguria 9,41% 0,23% 65,98% 6,72% 0,32% 1,12% 0,35% 2,34% 4,67% 0,20% 0,42% 1,65%
Lombardia 2,27% 0,05% 1,16% 82,21% 0,29% 1,45% 0,33% 2,17% 1,06% 0,16% 0,44% 1,13%
Trentino 0,69% 0,02% 0,36% 3,62% 79,83% 4,61% 0,83% 1,78% 1,06% 0,15% 0,42% 1,43%
Veneto 0,69% 0,02% 0,33% 3,36% 0,75% 83,54% 2,16% 1,99% 1,23% 0,16% 0,28% 1,08%
Friuli 0,91% 0,05% 0,49% 2,89% 0,50% 6,87% 77,84% 1,32% 0,80% 0,14% 0,36% 1,72%
Emilia Romagna 0,91% 0,06% 0,61% 4,47% 0,29% 2,09% 0,38% 76,51% 1,41% 0,25% 1,43% 1,47%
Umbria 1,30% 0,03% 0,52% 3,13% 0,34% 1,46% 0,31% 2,63% 5,54% 62,07% 2,89% 10,34%
Marche 0,71% 0,06% 0,36% 2,94% 0,31% 2,03% 0,33% 5,73% 1,23% 1,04% 71,94% 3,19%
Lazio 1,34% 0,06% 0,57% 4,03% 0,41% 2,14% 0,81% 2,22% 2,73% 2,03% 1,51% 69,44%
Abruzzo 1,10% 0,02% 0,35% 3,70% 0,36% 1,57% 0,52% 3,20% 1,28% 0,64% 3,79% 8,19%
Molise 1,99% 0,11% 0,49% 5,83% 0,70% 1,08% 0,13% 5,51% 1,76% 0,83% 2,46% 9,90%
Campania 1,96% 0,05% 0,53% 6,37% 0,38% 2,36% 1,01% 6,64% 3,64% 0,98% 1,63% 5,16%
Puglia 3,37% 0,08% 0,74% 10,69% 0,92% 4,26% 1,43% 9,09% 2,51% 0,59% 3,09% 4,30%
Basilicata 4,76% 0,08% 0,87% 9,71% 0,53% 2,10% 0,71% 8,31% 4,95% 0,86% 1,48% 5,80%
Calabria 6,17% 0,46% 1,92% 14,60% 0,68% 2,98% 0,75% 6,27% 3,99% 1,09% 0,93% 7,37%
Sicilia 3,95% 0,09% 1,13% 10,32% 0,51% 3,75% 1,26% 5,64% 3,59% 0,46% 1,10% 2,90%
Sardegna 3,54% 0,24% 1,51% 6,88% 0,64% 3,18% 0,99% 3,62% 2,77% 0,48% 0,77% 3,74%
Toscana 50,41% 0,53% 0,02% 1,48% 0,11% 0,53% 0,13% 1,13% 39,43% 0,55% 0,26% 1,49%
Own elaboration on ISTAT data *Continue on the next page
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Region of
birth//Region of
destination
Abruzzo Molise Campania Basilicata Calabria Sicilia Sardegna Puglia
Piemonte 0,28% 0,10% 1,41% 0,20% 1,41% 2,19% 0,92% 1,28%
Valle D’Aosta 0,27% 0,02% 0,86% 0,27% 2,60% 1,35% 0,88% 0,64%
Liguria 0,27% 0,04% 1,20% 0,12% 1,21% 1,54% 1,27% 0,94%
Lombardia 0,32% 0,08% 1,47% 0,18% 1,25% 1,87% 0,78% 1,32%
Trentino 0,27% 0,06% 1,03% 0,09% 0,73% 1,29% 0,45% 1,29%
Veneto 0,24% 0,04% 1,04% 0,07% 0,47% 1,24% 0,43% 0,90%
Friuli 0,35% 0,08% 1,65% 0,07% 0,44% 1,64% 0,50% 1,38%
Emilia Romagna 0,49% 0,13% 3,12% 0,21% 1,14% 2,15% 0,65% 2,23%
Umbria 0,76% 0,15% 3,37% 0,23% 1,52% 1,37% 0,67% 1,37%
Marche 2,29% 0,24% 2,36% 0,19% 0,42% 1,48% 0,29% 2,88%
Lazio 2,19% 0,48% 3,55% 0,27% 1,76% 1,56% 1,30% 1,59%
Abruzzo 68,39% 1,02% 2,20% 0,13% 0,34% 0,57% 0,36% 2,26%
Molise 7,57% 48,36% 7,36% 0,38% 0,21% 0,49% 0,55% 4,28%
u`Campania 0,72% 0,57% 64,96% 0,47% 0,76% 0,65% 0,33% 0,83%
Puglia 1,60% 0,61% 1,86% 0,96% 0,78% 0,97% 0,40% 51,74%
Basilicata 1,06% 0,38% 7,35% 37,70% 2,88% 1,09% 0,21% 9,18%
Calabria 0,48% 0,20% 2,24% 0,54% 44,53% 2,73% 0,37% 1,72%
Sicilia 0,31% 0,07% 0,92% 0,09% 0,94% 61,80% 0,36% 0,81%
Sardegna 0,27% 0,08% 1,02% 0,03% 0,58% 0,99% 68,21% 0,46%
Toscana 0,14% 0,04% 1,35% 0,44% 0,12% 0,42% 0,97% 0,44%
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Table B.3: Past (graduates) relocation 1990-1999 by region of birth and destination
Region of
birth//Region
of destination
Abruzzo Basilicata Calabria Campania Emilia
Ro-
magna
Friuili Lazio Liguria Lombardia Marche Molise Piemonte
Abruzzo 61,94% 0,27% 0,90% 1,85% 5,55% 0,55% 7,26% 0,39% 4,84% 3,79% 1,54% 1,73%
Basilicata 1,20% 37,79% 2,86% 9,89% 5,58% 0,81% 5,66% 0,89% 7,45% 1,00% 0,18% 3,74%
Calabria 0,68% 0,69% 46,98% 2,47% 5,43% 0,57% 6,35% 1,86% 10,96% 0,71% 0,23% 6,04%
Campania 0,88% 1,11% 1,24% 69,75% 2,92% 0,64% 5,57% 0,62% 5,36% 0,65% 0,65% 1,98%
Emilia Romagna 0,94% 0,24% 1,62% 1,10% 72,94% 0,93% 1,20% 0,91% 6,00% 1,97% 0,14% 1,30%
Friuili 0,39% 0,15% 0,82% 0,92% 3,25% 69,81% 1,66% 0,69% 3,91% 0,77% 0,08% 1,26%
Lazio 3,38% 0,79% 6,25% 3,85% 2,72% 1,02% 52,47% 1,06% 4,78% 1,87% 1,18% 2,22%
Liguria 0,38% 0,18% 3,10% 0,88% 3,35% 0,80% 1,79% 55,64% 9,97% 0,50% 0,03% 10,69%
Lombardia 0,52% 0,20% 2,09% 1,40% 3,25% 0,61% 1,30% 2,01% 75,01% 0,73% 0,11% 3,29%
Marche 2,83% 0,11% 0,71% 0,82% 9,21% 0,81% 3,04% 0,33% 4,40% 65,98% 0,25% 1,28%
Molise 7,90% 0,62% 1,21% 6,29% 5,97% 0,52% 10,69% 0,34% 5,49% 2,16% 43,35% 2,15%
Piemonte 0,49% 0,24% 2,84% 1,32% 1,99% 0,74% 1,64% 3,41% 6,67% 0,54% 0,12% 71,28%
Puglia 2,07% 1,75% 1,30% 2,23% 8,19% 1,00% 4,32% 0,78% 9,01% 1,64% 0,51% 3,38%
Sardegna 0,34% 0,08% 0,66% 0,89% 1,99% 0,51% 3,01% 0,92% 3,30% 0,48% 0,06% 1,57%
Sicilia 0,28% 0,13% 1,57% 0,80% 2,37% 0,81% 2,54% 0,61% 6,99% 0,35% 0,06% 3,04%
Toscana 0,43% 0,26% 2,23% 1,31% 2,74% 0,58% 2,54% 2,14% 3,86% 0,66% 0,15% 1,44%
Trentino 0,78% 0,10% 0,68% 0,98% 4,54% 1,39% 0,85% 0,63% 5,02% 0,84% 0,03% 1,11%
Umbria 1,41% 0,30% 3,66% 1,68% 3,62% 0,99% 7,80% 0,54% 3,89% 4,08% 0,46% 1,89%
Val D’Aosta 0,50% 0,24% 0,97% 0,71% 3,00% 0,34% 0,96% 2,17% 3,92% 0,39% 0,14% 15,18%
Veneto 0,41% 0,11% 0,72% 0,78% 3,74% 3,06% 1,06% 0,43% 4,05% 0,60% 0,07% 1,00%
Own elaboration on ISTAT data *Continue on the next page
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Region of
birth//Region
of destination
Puglia Sardinia Sicilia Tuscany Trentino Umbria Val
D’Aosta
Veneto
Abruzzo 1,98% 0,36% 0,71% 2,31% 0,53% 1,14% 0,12% 2,25%
Basilicata 11,93% 0,56% 1,44% 5,20% 0,51% 1,10% 0,11% 2,13%
Calabria 1,77% 0,49% 4,13% 5,94% 0,50% 1,42% 0,09% 2,71%
Campania 1,60% 0,52% 0,97% 2,70% 0,36% 0,64% 0,07% 1,75%
Emilia Romagna 1,86% 0,48% 1,11% 2,23% 0,92% 0,43% 0,08% 3,62%
Friuli 0,87% 0,30% 1,57% 1,40% 0,79% 0,24% 0,07% 11,05%
Lazio 2,42% 1,79% 2,76% 4,78% 0,72% 3,23% 0,13% 2,59%
Liguria 0,95% 1,19% 1,43% 6,13% 0,42% 0,36% 0,39% 1,82%
Lombardy 1,36% 0,45% 2,17% 1,97% 0,60% 0,31% 0,13% 2,46%
Marche 1,51% 0,37% 0,70% 2,47% 0,47% 2,21% 0,02% 2,48%
Molise 3,58% 0,55% 0,79% 3,74% 0,24% 1,57% 0,18% 2,65%
Piedmont 1,11% 0,67% 2,18% 1,77% 0,29% 0,34% 0,83% 1,54%
Puglia 52,68% 0,51% 1,05% 3,84% 0,66% 0,99% 0,09% 4,01%
Sardinia 0,58% 79,45% 1,16% 2,76% 0,20% 0,53% 0,07% 1,44%
Sicilia 0,83% 0,57% 73,72% 2,14% 0,39% 0,34% 0,12% 2,35%
Tuscany 1,04% 0,78% 1,11% 75,74% 0,36% 1,10% 0,08% 1,48%
Trentino 0,83% 0,28% 1,15% 1,77% 70,29% 0,40% 0,09% 8,25%
Umbria 1,51% 0,67% 1,07% 6,16% 0,50% 57,51% 0,10% 2,14%
Val D’Aosta 0,95% 0,65% 1,37% 1,04% 0,05% 0,30% 66,29% 0,84%
Veneto 0,86% 0,34% 1,19% 1,32% 1,56% 0,24% 0,03% 78,42%
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Table B.5: Variables description
Variable N.obs. Source Mean Sd Min. Max.
Job level 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 5,026 3,313 1 12
Job level: 1 - 0,243 0,429 -
Job level: 2 - 0,089 0,286 -
Job level: 3 - 0,041 0,199 -
Job level: 4 - 0,009 0,095 -
Job level: 5 - 0,227 0,419 - -
Job level: 6 - 0,073 0,26 -
Job level: 7 - 0,078 0,268 -
Job level: 8 - 0,02 0,14 -
Job level: 9 - 0,099 0,298 -
Job level: 10 - 0,048 0,214 -
Job level: 11 - 0,051 0,22 -
Job level: 12 - 0,018 0,134 -
Job specialization 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) and IS-
TAT (CP2011, 2 digits)
0,259 0,438 0 1
Last type of contract (1:tem-
porary)
3549 Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 0,781 0,413 0 1
Days worked/working days 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 0,423 0,307 0,001 0,997
Isee code 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 1,654 0,847 1 5
Isee code: 1 - 0,524 0,499 -
Isee code: 2 - 0,347 0,476 -
Isee code: 3 - 0,09 0,286 -
Isee code: 4 - 0,022 0,148 -
Isee code: 5 - 0,014 0,12 -
Specialization 3549 Almalaurea 0,056 0,23 0 1
Parent self employed 3549 Almalaurea 0,172 0,378 0 1
Public sector employee 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) and IS-
TAT (CP2011, 5 digits)
0,043 0,205 0 1
Family social classes 3549 Almalaurea 1,784 0,661 1 3
Family social classes: 1 - 0,346 0,475 -
Family social classes: 2 - 0,518 0,499 -
Family social classes: 3 - 0,135 0,342 -
Family study title 3549 Almalaurea 2,861 0,838 1 4
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Family study title: both graduated - 0,088 0,284 -
Family study title: max graduated - 0,163 0,37 -
Family study title: max high
school diploma
- 0,544 0,498 -
Family study title: max elementary - 0,202 0,401 -
Age at graduation 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 1,578 0,619 1 3
Age at graduation: up to 26 - 0,491 0,499 -
Age at graduation: 27 to 30 - 0,438 0,496 -
Age at graduation: over 30 - 0,069 0,254 -
Field of study 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 5,01 2,633 1 9
Scientific (matematical, physical
and natural science)
- 0,058 0,235 -
Pharma-chemical - 0,174 0,379 -
Engineering - 0,158 0,365 -
Architecture. - 0,089 0,284 -
Economic/Statistics - 0,083 0,277 -
Political and social science - 0,117 0,322 -
Law - 0,004 0,069 -
Humanistic - 0,204 0,403 -
Psychological - 0,108 0,311 -
Master degree 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 0,346 0,475 0 1
Graduation mark 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 2,871 1,166 1 4
Graduation mark: 78 to 100 - 0,191 0,393 -
Graduation mark: 101 to 104 - 0,177 0,382 -
Graduation mark: 105 to 109 - 0,197 0,398 -
Graduation mark: 110 and 110
cum laude
- 0,432 0,495 -
Male 3549 Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 0,345 0,475 0 1
Number of contract 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 3,468 10,645 1 316
Erasmus 3549 Almalaurea 0,122 0,327 0 1
Last working area 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 2,865 0,783 1 5
North West - 0,107 0,31 -
North East - 0,05 0,218 -
Center - 0,719 0,449 -
South - 0,113 0,316 -
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Island - 0,009 0,094 -
Origin Macro-area 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 3,268 0,591 1 5
North West - 0,016 0,126 -
North East - 0,017 0,129 -
Center - 0,658 0,474 -
South - 0,297 0,457 -
Island - 0,01 0,101 -
Age first contract 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 1,809 0,645 1 3
Age at first contract: up to 26 - 0,321 0,467 -
Age at first contract: 27 to 30 - 0,547 0,497 -
Age at first contract: over 30 - 0,131 0,337 -
Full time 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 0,678 0,467 0 1
Sector of activiy: Services 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) and IS-
TAT (ATECO, 2007)
0,859 0,3476 0 1
Timing mobility 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 147,47 452,08 0 3894
Year 3549 Infostud data (Sapienza University) 0,567 0,495 0 1
Workplace mobility 3549 (e) Comunicazioni obbligatorie (Ministry of Labor) 0,145 0,353 0 1
Past relocation in 2002 3549 ISTAT 0,422 0,312 0,006 0,835
(e) Own elaboration
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Table B.6: Public sector employees: ATECO code, 5 digits
ATECO
code
Classification
1.1.1.1.0 Membri di organismi di governo e di assemblee nazionali con potesta` legislativa
e regolamentare
1.1.1.2.0 Membri di organismi di governo e di assemblee regionali e di Province au-
tonome con potesta` legislativa e regolamentare
1.1.1.3.0 Membri di organismi di governo e di assemblee provinciali con potesta` regola-
mentare
1.1.1.4.0 Membri di organismi di governo e di assemblee sub-provinciali e comunali con
potesta` regolamentare
1.1.2.1.0 Ambasciatori, ministri plenipotenziari ed altri dirigenti della carriera diplomat-
ica
1.1.2.2.1 Commissari di governo, prefetti e vice prefetti
1.1.2.2.2 Capi e vice capi della polizia di Stato, questori ed alti responsabili della si-
curezza pubblica
1.1.2.2.3 Segretari generali e responsabili del controllo e della gestione nella amminis-
trazione pubblica
1.1.2.3.1 Direttori degli uffici scolastici territoriali ed equiparati
1.1.2.3.2 Sovrintendenti al patrimonio culturale nazionale
1.1.2.4.1 Direttori generali, dipartimentali ed equiparati delle amministrazioni dello
Stato, degli enti pubblici non economici e degli enti locali
1.1.2.4.2 Rettori di universita`, direttori di istituzioni dell’Alta Formazione e di enti di
ricerca
1.1.2.4.3 Direttori generali ed equiparati nella sanita`
1.1.2.5.0 Dirigenti scolastici ed equiparati
1.1.2.6.1 Dirigenti ed equiparati delle amministrazioni dello Stato, degli enti pubblici non
economici e degli enti locali
1.1.2.6.2 Dirigenti ed equiparati delle universita` e degli enti di ricerca
1.1.2.6.3 Dirigenti ed equiparati nella sanita`
1.1.3.1.0 Dirigenti della magistratura ordinaria
1.1.3.2.0 Dirigenti della magistratura amministrativa e delle giurisdizioni speciali
2.5.2.2.2 Esperi legali in enti pubblici
2.5.2.3.0 Notai
2.5.2.4.0 Magistrati
2.6.1.1.1 Docenti universitari in scienze matematiche e dell’informazione
2.6.1.1.2 Docenti universitari in scienze fisiche
2.6.1.1.3 Docenti universitari in scienze chimiche e farmaceutiche
2.6.1.1.4 Docenti universitari in scienze della terra
2.6.1.2.1 Docenti universitari in scienze biologiche
2.6.1.2.2 Docenti universitari in scienze agrarie, zootecniche e della produzione animale
2.6.1.2.3 Docenti universitari in scienze mediche
2.6.1.3.1 Docenti universitari in scienze ingegneristiche civili e dell’architettura
2.6.1.3.2 Docenti universitari in scienze ingegneristiche industriali e dell’informazione
2.6.1.4.0 Docenti universitari in scienze dell’antichita`, filologico-letterarie e storico-
artistiche
2.6.1.5.1 Docenti universitari in scienze storiche e filosofiche
2.6.1.5.2 Docenti universitari in scienze pedagogiche e psicologiche
2.6.1.6.0 Docenti universitari in scienze economiche e statistiche
2.6.1.7.1 Docenti universitari in scienze giuridiche
2.6.1.7.2 Docenti universitari in scienze politiche e sociali
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2.6.3.1.1 Professori di discipline artistiche nelle accademie di belle arti e nelle istituzioni
scolastiche assimilate
2.6.3.1.2 Professori di discipline musicali nei conservatori e nelle istituzioni scolastiche
assimilate
2.6.3.1.3 Professori di arte drammatica e danza nelle accademie e nelle istituzioni scolas-
tiche assimilate
2.6.3.2.1 Professori di scienze matematiche, fisiche e chimiche nella scuola secondaria
superiore
2.6.3.2.2 Professori di scienze della vita e della salute nella scuola secondaria superiore
2.6.3.2.3 Professori di discipline tecnico-ingegneristiche nella scuola secondaria superiore
2.6.3.2.4 Professori di scienze dell’informazione nella scuola secondaria superiore
2.6.3.2.5 Professori di scienze letterarie, artistiche, storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e
psicologiche nella scuola secondaria superiore
2.6.3.2.6 Professori di scienze giuridiche, economiche e sociali nella scuola secondaria
superiore
2.6.3.3.1 Professori di discipline umanistiche nella scuola secondaria inferiore
2.6.3.3.2 Professori di discipline tecniche e scientifiche nella scuola secondaria inferiore
2.6.4.1.0 Professori di scuola primaria
2.6.4.2.0 Professori di scuola pre-primaria
2.6.5.2.0 Ispettori scolastici e professioni assimilate
5.4.8.1.0 Personale di guardiania territoriale
5.4.8.2.0 Vigili urbani
5.4.8.3.1 Agenti della Polizia di Stato
5.4.8.3.2 Agenti della Guardia di Finanza
5.4.8.3.3 Agenti del corpo forestale
5.4.8.4.1 Vigili del fuoco
5.4.8.4.2 Personale delle squadre antincendio
8.1.4.5.0 Operatori ecologici e altri raccoglitori e separatori di rifiuti
8.1.5.1.0 Bidelli e professioni assimilate
9.1.1.1.0 Ufficiali delle forze armate
9.2.1.1.0 Sergenti, sovraintendenti e marescialli delle forze armate
9.3.1.1.0 Truppa delle forze armate
All the codes are available at the following link: http://professioni.istat.it/sistemainformativoprofessioni/cp2011/
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Table B.7: Descriptive statiscts: full sample
Macroarea of birth First mobility Last place of work
Piemonte 0,20% 5,60 % 1,55 %
Lombardia 1,18% 32,43 % 8,62 %
Trentino-Alto Adige 0,11% 1,35 % 0,42 %
Veneto 0,68% 5,60 % 1,44 %
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0,14% 0,58 % 0,37 %
Liguria 0,25% 1,93% 0,62 %
Emilia-Romagna 0,79% 11,20 % 2,79 %
Toscana 0,93% 8,30 % 2,06 %
Umbria 1,78% 1,74 % 1,04 %
Marche 1,55% 2,70 % 1,21 %
Lazio 57,73% 65,34 %
Abruzzo 3,86% 4,83 % 2,31 %
Molise 2,73% 1,74 % 1,72 %
Campania 10,51% 8,30% 4,54 %
Puglia 4,96% 3,28% 1,89 %
Basilicata 2,09% 1,35 % 0,54 %
Calabria 5,21% 2,12 % 1,30 %
Sicilia 4,25% 3,47 % 1,35 %
Sardegna 1,04% 3,47 % 0,90 %
Total (absolute value) 3549 518 3549
Own elaboration on ISTAT data
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Table B.8: Probit model with alternative instrument: marginal effects
Dependent variable: workplace mobility
Coeff. Stand.errors
ISEE code: 8 to 14 -0.026** (0.012)
ISEE code:15 to 21 -0.032 (0.028)
ISEE code:22 to 27 -0.004 (0.031)
ISEE code:28 to 34 -0.007 (0.030)
Post laurea specialization 0.007 (0.013)
Public sector employees 0.046 (0.033)
Parent self employed 0.009 (0.014)
Parent social class: medium -0.001 (0.012)
Parent social class: low 0.013 (0.027)
Parent educational level: higher 0.006 (0.023)
Parent educational level: medium -0.003 (0.027)
Parent educational level: low -0.004 (0.032)
Age at graduation: >26 -0.002 (0.008)
Age at graduation: >30 -0.032 (0.024)
Chemistry/pharmacy 0.054*** (0.017)
Engineering 0.030* (0.018)
Architecture 0.012 (0.025)
Economics -0.002 (0.028)
Politics/social science 0.078*** (0.020)
Law -0.022 (0.071)
Literature 0.068*** (0.018)
Psychological 0.062** (0.024)
M.A. 0.041*** (0.011)
Grad. Mark 104 -0.017* (0.009)
Grad. Mark 105-109 0.010 (0.015)
Grad. Mark 110 cum laude 0.007 (0.017)
Male 0.009 (0.012)
Erasmus 0.021** (0.009)
Macro-area of birth: North East 0.043 (0.069)
Macro-area of birth: Center -0.018 (0.060)
Macro-area of birth: South -0.016 (0.062)
Macro-area of birth: Islands 0.098* (0.059)
Past relocation: 1990-1999 -0.369 (0.227)
Year 0.011 (0.012)
N 3549
(dy/dx) is for discrete change of dummy variable
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table B.9: Ordered probit with correction
Dependent variable: job level
Coef. Stand. errors
ISEE code -0.013 (0.015)
Post laurea specialization -0.184*** (0.056)
Parent self employed -0.062 (0.049)
Public sector employees -0.195*** (0.065)
Parent social class -0.059* (0.030)
Parent educational level 0.066*** (0.014)
Age at graduation 0.349*** (0.030)
Field of study -0.074*** (0.006)
M.A. 0.568*** (0.057)
Graduation mark -0.029** (0.012)
Male 0.177*** (0.052)
Number of contracts 0.004*** (0.0008)
Erasmus -0.111*** (0.031)
Last working area -0.015 (0.020)
Macro-area of birth -0.084* (0.044)
Age first contract (class) -0.543*** (0.034)
Full time 0.258*** (0.033)
Activity sector: services 0.046 (0.030)
Timing mobility -0.0001*** (0.00004)
λ 0.114* (0.066)
Workplace mobility 0.214*** (0.040)
Year 0.133*** (0.023)
cut1 -1.078*** (0.274)
cut2 -0.795*** (0.279)
cut3 -0.672** (0.271)
cut4 -0.645** (0.270)
cut5 -0.001 (0.274)
cut6 0.218 (0.281)
cut7 0.482* (0.279)
cut8 0.558** (0.272)
cut9 1.019*** (0.281)
cut10 1.345*** (0.293)
cut11 2.012*** (0.284)
N 3549
Cluster Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Table B.10: Descriptive statistics by workplace mobility
Stayers — ——— Movers
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Job level 4,996 3,332 5,201 3,201
Job specialization 0,259 0,438 0,259 0,438
Days worked/working days 0,420 0,312 0,443 0,285
Last type of contract (1:temporary) 0,782 0,412 0,774 0,419
ISEE code 1,659 0,845 1,624 0,861
Post graduate specialization 0,055 0,228 0,064 0,244
Parent self employed 0,172 0,378 0,176 0,381
Public sector employees 0,041 0,200 0,056 0,230
Parent social class 1,793 0,661 1,766 0,662
Parent educational level 2,870 0,837 2,807 0,844
Age at graduation 1,578 0,623 1,577 0,594
Field of study 4,964 2,637 5,282 2,618
Master degree 0,547 0,498 0,643 0,480
Graduation mark 2,847 1,173 3,010 1,120
Male 0,345 0,475 0,355 0,479
Number of contracts 3,255 10,338 4,745 12,224
Erasmus 0,117 0,322 0,153 0,360
Last working area 2,925 0,683 2,514 1,151
Origin Macro-area 3,252 0,576 3,361 0,669
Age first contract 1,816 0,648 1,766 0,626
Full time 0,667 0,471 0,741 0,438
Sector of activity: services 0,864 0,342 0,834 0,372
Timing mobility 1010,373 727,363
Year 0,567 0,496 0,569 0,496
Past relocation in 2002 0,468 0,301 0,155 0,239
N 3031 518
Own elaboration on ISTAT data
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